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ABSTRACT
Heather Krull: Earnings Disparities:
The Role of Internal Promotions and Job Performance Evaluations
(Under the direction of Donna Gilleskie)
This study utilizes a unique data set containing detailed labor market information
for individuals employed by the state of North Carolina over ten years. The inclusion of
the state’s promotion decisions and each worker’s annual performance evaluations allow for
an empirical test of the presence of statistical discrimination that has not been possible
in previous studies. Statistical discrimination is said to exist if, in the absence of perfect
information about a worker’s productivity, an employer uses characteristics of that worker’s
(race or gender) group to substitute for individual-specific information missing from a signal
of the worker’s productivity. If the signal is “noisier” for blacks or women than it is for white
men, equally productive workers may be paid differently. If, however, performance evaluation
serves as a suitable proxy for individual productivity and if statistical discrimination exists
at the point of hiring, then the significance of observable characteristics (race and gender)
in explaining wage or promotion disparities should diminish with tenure.
Results suggest that blacks may be statistically discriminated against at the time of
hire, but that men and women are not treated differently. This outcome elicits further
investigation into how statistical discrimination affects other labor market outcomes which
differ across groups, including wage disparities and the rate at which promotions are realized.
Equations explaining the dynamic employment process approximated by the wage and salary
grade, performance evaluation, promotion, and quit probabilities of North Carolina state
employees are estimated jointly to allow for correlation in unobserved permanent and time-
varying heterogeneity factors affecting each outcome.
When controlling for measures unique to these data, such as performance evaluation
and promotion history, women and black men are not shown to be significantly more or
less likely to be promoted than white men. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity,
iii
endogeneity of relevant explanatory variables, and performance and promotion history, wage
gaps effectively disappear. Consistent with the result that statistical discrimination may
exist at the time of hire, tenure interacted with race and/or gender produces negligible or
insignificant coefficients in all equations, suggesting that after controlling for performance,
race and gender do not independently influence employment outcomes.
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1 Introduction
To explain earnings disparities across gender or race, wage differential studies typically focus
on a combination of explanatory variables including differences in the quantity or quality
of education, labor force attachment, pre-market factors, geographic location, the returns
to education, tenure, experience, and affirmative action. The most obvious source of wage
variation absent from this research is worker productivity. This information is seldom, if
ever, available in nationally representative data sets and is often proxied by such variables
as schooling, tenure, experience. Also lacking from many wage differential studies, but high-
lighted by McCue (1996) and others as a significant source of wage growth, is the incidence
of internal mobility, including promotion. She finds that approximately 15% of the wage
growth enjoyed by men throughout the lifecycle can be attributed to internal mobility, with
a smaller contribution for women. Furthermore, better paid workers have a higher probabil-
ity of being promoted and generally advance their positions early in their career.
It is important to distinguish between “statistical discrimination” and the more com-
monly referenced “taste discrimination” when evaluating reasons for earning disparities
among groups (e.g., gender, race, or age). One approach to examining racial or gender
wage differentials involves a theory of discrimination, whereby differences in wages are de-
composed into “explained” productivity attributes and “unexplained” differences, commonly
cited as prejudice against women or racial minorities. This prejudice is of the “taste discrim-
ination” form and assumes what cannot be explained with education, occupational choice,
work experience, etc., is the result of disutility experienced by employers who hire women or
minorities.1 Alternatively, an employer that statistically discriminates judges an individual
on the basis of the average characteristics of the group to which she belongs rather than upon
her own personal characteristics. Statistical discrimination may happen if a supervisor with
1See, for example, Becker (1971), Black (1995), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), and Flabbi (2005).
particular characteristics has more reliable information at the onset of employment about a
similar worker than about a worker belonging to a different group. The information disparity
may be due to either differences in networking strategies across groups or a greater likelihood
of miscommunication between members of different groups than between members of like
groups (Lang, 1986). As more information becomes available about a worker’s ability (i.e.
productivity), statistical discrimination should diminish.
This research furthers the investigation of the earnings gap with a focus on possible
differences due to statistical discrimination. The contributions are two-fold: 1) The analyses
benefit from the availability of a uniform measure of a worker’s productivity, and 2) The
analyses seek evidence of disparities in wages even after controlling for endogenous tenure,
promotion, and productivity. Support for the presence of statistical discrimination in the
promotion process, for example, may be evidenced by changes in the size and statistical
significance of coefficients measuring the influence of individual characteristics on the proba-
bility of promotion as a worker’s tenure with a firm increases. Put differently, over the course
of a worker’s tenure with an employer, there may be significant differences across races in
which characteristics are influential in the promotion process and when these attributes play
an increasingly important role. That is, a firm may place more emphasis on the race and
gender of a minority worker than on potentially less reliable observables such as education
and labor market experience in the early stages of the worker’s employment. Over time,
however, the shift toward relying on worker performance may be much greater for minorities
than for workers who are more prominently represented with the firm, which might suggest
evidence of statistical discrimination. Hence, accurate measurement of the effects of these
characteristics in explaining wages and promotion is necessary to verify their importance.
The data used in this work allow for better measurement of these effects.
This work makes use of a rich and comprehensive data set from the North Carolina
Office of State Personnel (hereafter referred to as the NC OSP) that is not publicly available.
The data contain two features not available in nationally-representative data sets commonly
used to study longitudinal employment behavior: a uniform measure of worker performance
and an unambiguous definition of promotion (demotion). First, the state’s system of annual
evaluation provides a measure of performance comparable across workers and time. While
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worker effort is difficult to measure in general, a firm’s evaluation of effort is more readily
obtained. Such an evaluation, however, can only be used if comparable across individuals
or when provided by a single firm. Usually this results in a small sample size. The state
of NC, however, employs over 100,000 people each year. Secondly, previous studies have
relied on a worker’s self-reported promotion, change in tasks, or unusually large increase
in wages (or a combination thereof) as an indication that a promotion has occurred. The
state of NC, however, employs a salary grade system similar to the General Schedule (GS)
pay scale utilized by the federal government. A promotion (demotion) is defined as an
increase (decrease) in salary grade, accompanied by a change in the worker’s position-specific
personnel number. The clarity of this definition leaves no room for arbitrary interpretation
as deemed necessary by the data used in most other studies.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature. The data are
described in Section 3. Section 4 describes the theoretical and empirical models. The
estimates of the empirical model are provided in section 5, Section 6 contains the results of
simulations, and Section 7 concludes.
3
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2 Related Empirical Literature
The study that most closely resembles the research undertaken in this project is Blau and
DeVaro’s (2006) examination of promotion and wages. They utilize the Multi-City Study
of Urban Inequality to estimate the gender differential in (expected) promotions and wage
growth due to, and independent of, promotions. Included in these data is a measure of worker
productivity reported by supervisors who are asked to rank the performance of their most
recently-hired worker. The authors estimate, separately for men and women, the probability
of promotion for the most recently-hired worker, the expected promotion for this worker
within the next five years, the wage growth already experienced by the most recently hired
worker, the within-job wage growth attainable in the starting position in the absence of
a promotion (for any worker), and the expected wage growth associated with an expected
promotion.
While men and blacks are consistently and significantly predicted to be promoted
with greater frequency than women (by 2-3 percentage points), the results are generally
insensitive to the addition of performance evaluation, firm characteristics, and occupational
controls compared to a baseline specification which includes race, gender, age, tenure, and
education. Men are only statistically significantly expected to be promoted more often
than women in the baseline and performance evaluation specifications. However, a previous
realized promotion has a much larger impact (∼ 25%) on the probability of an expected
future promotion.
In addition to promotions, the authors analyze wage growth. The coefficient on “pro-
moted already” in the wage growth since hire equation suggests that earnings grow by 7-8%
with a promotion for both men and women, holding all else constant. An equation estimating
wage growth in the absence of a promotion reveals almost no difference between the out-
comes of men and women. However, since the question asked of supervisors referred to any
employee, if the answer was provided for a hypothetical male worker, but the most recently
hired employee is female, the results may underestimate the gender gap in wage growth.
The difference in expected wages for workers expected to be promoted within the next five
years is trivial and does not consistently favor one gender. Finally, Blau and DeVaro use
information on the gender of a worker’s supervisor to consider whether men are less likely
to promote female (than male) subordinates and find no evidence to support this notion.
One limitation of the study conducted by Blau and DeVaro is the lack of a control for
unobserved heterogeneity. If the same unobserved factors affect both wages and promotions
(ability, for instance), workers who experience a promotion are likely the same workers who
would have earned higher wages even in the absence of a promotion. This selection bias
may understate the extent to which women are at a disadvantage in terms of wage gains
associated with promotions. The current study makes use of an estimation technique that
controls for this potential correlation between the error terms in the wage and promotion
equations.
While the work of Blau and DeVaro serves as a convenient framework to which results
of this study can be compared, this research makes use of, and contributes to, three bodies of
literature: wage differentials, promotions, and statistical discrimination. Each is considered.
2.1 Wage Differentials
Black-white wage differential studies have unanimously documented a narrowing of the wage
gap between roughly the 1940s and 1980, at which time progress began to slow. Smith and
Welch (1987) find that in 1940, the average black man earned 43% of the wages the average
white man earned, and black women earned 40% of the average white woman’s earnings.
That gap had closed to 73% and 99% for men and women, respectively, by 1980. Like many
other studies, they attribute the gains to additional years of schooling coupled with improved
quality of schooling, migration from the rural south to northern cities, and affirmative action
(though Smith (1993) later cites that blacks are only a minority of the 75% of the population
protected by affirmative action, with women benefitting the most in terms of improved
economic status and higher wages). They suggest that the halted progress is the result of
the accelerated break-up of the American family, rising rates of black unemployment, a weak
5
attachment to the labor force among blacks, and a slow-down in American economic growth.
This study explores whether there exists a potential difference in the rate at which whites
and blacks are promoted, and if so, what role that difference contributes to the wage gap.
Ginther and Hayes (1999) use the Survey of Doctorate Recipients to examine gender
salary and promotion differentials of academics in the humanities. They improve upon
previous studies by controlling for productivity with measures including journal and book
publications, in addition to demographic characteristics, primary work activity, and employer
characteristics. An Oaxaca decomposition of the wage differential suggests that the earnings
gap virtually disappears when estimated separately by for tenured and tenure-track faculty
to account for the endogeneity of rank.
Long (1976) examines racial and gender differences in earnings and employment using
the 1970 Census. Using standard earnings equation explanatory variables and productivity
indicators, defined as years of education, experience, location, and work preferences, he
estimates a black/white male earnings ratio of 75.8% and a female/male earnings ratio of
73.9%. Disaggregating the samples, he finds that the subset of 18-34 year old black men
fare the best, as do single women. Both blacks and women (relative to whites and men,
respectively) enjoy earnings ratios that are considerably larger in the federal sector than
private. Contrary to Ginther and Hayes, Long concludes that a significant earnings gap
exists even after controlling for productivity factors. Finally, Long esimates the probability
of being employed in the federal sector and finds that blacks are more likely than whites,
and women are less likely than men, which he attributes to the high concentration of black
men, and low concentration of women, in the postal service. Ultimately, he concludes that
discrimination against black men occurs in hiring or being promoted to well-paying positions,
and that women have faced difficulty in being hired by the federal government, followed by
modest rates of promotion and pay.
2.2 Promotions
The focus of most previous studies of promotions has been gender differences. They are
generally conducted in the form of static logit regressions, where the occurrence of a pro-
motion is explained by personal observable characteristics and other variables specific to the
6
employer or available data. Eberts and Stone (1985) estimate a multinomial logit regression
using longitudinal data of public educators and determine that men are promoted at a faster
rate than women initially (at the beginning of the 1970s) but that women enjoy significant
gains throughout the decade as a result of the federal Title IX Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity legislation. They also find that more highly educated workers are more likely to be
promoted and that promotion probabilities decline with experience for both men and women.
Cannings (1988) analyzes managerial promotions within four of the 400 largest Canadian
corporations. She finds that women, on average, receive 0.56 fewer promotions per year than
men even when holding constant “career-relevant” factors. Thus, she concludes, women are
promoted less often as the result of being born women. Jones and Makepeace (1996) find
that the proportion of women who reach managerial ranks falls short of the fraction of men
who, in reality, are promoted to such positions, even when women are “treated” the same
as men. However, unlike Cannings’ evidence that women face a “glass ceiling,” they find
that the differential treatment is minimal when compared to labor market characteristics,
particularly experience.
Olson and Becker (1983) make use of the Quality of Employment Panel data to examine
both wage and promotion differentials by gender. They theorize that discrimination need
not manifest itself in the form of lower wages or promotion rates. Alternatively, women
may be promoted as often as men, but the job level gain (and associated wage gain) from
a promotion may be smaller than that of men. Similarly, women may be afforded fewer
general and job specific training opportunities if the firm anticipates women are more likely
to attrit.
The authors estimate a stay/leave equation, a promotion equation for those workers
who choose to stay, and then use the selection-bias variables from these two equations in a
wage regression to control for the possible correlation between promotions, attrition, and the
error term. They find that women are less likely than men to be promoted, and conditional
on having been promoted, women enjoy only a slightly (insignificant) larger wage gain than
men. If women were held to the same promotion standard as men, nearly 32% would have
been promoted rather than the observed 19%. Furthermore, a decomposition of the wage
differential reveals that the observed 6% decline in the wage gap would have been roughly
7
9% if men and women were subject to the same promotion standards. The hypothesis that
women and men are evaluated on the same basis, but that women are paid less when pro-
moted, is rejected. Instead, Olson and Becker conclude that men and women face different
promotion processes and that unequal access to opportunities is what constitutes the differ-
ence in employment outcomes. Worth noting is the fact that the authors do not have access
to job level data but identify this as a source of discrimination. The data used in this study
include the worker’s position, or level within the salary grade hierarchy, and as a result, it
is this avenue of discrimination that is considered.
Spurr (1990) focuses on the gender differential in promotion rates among lawyers. After
controlling for school rank, academic achievement, location, and firm characteristics, both
logistic and hazard results suggest that women are less likely to be promoted to partner than
men. For both genders, the conditional hazard of leaving a firm peaks during or immedi-
ately after the probability of promotion reaches its maximum. Additionally, more years of
experience increases the probability of being promoted, up to a certain point, after which the
partnership is less likely. To examine the possibility that the reason women are promoted
less frequently than men is because affirmative action only affects the hiring process, but not
promotions, Spurr considers an attorney’s law school rank and the probability of achieving
honors while in school. Because the gender differential in both is statistically insignificant,
he concludes that different rates of promotion cannot be attributed to affirmative action.
Finally, Spurr uses the Yule Birth Process to determine whether women are held to a higher
promotion standard. Though this method reveals no significant difference in productivity
across gender, he finds that women are held to a promotion standard 56 to 72% higher than
that of men. In sum, he finds evidence of discrimination in the promotion process to part-
nership, though cannot rule out the possibility that different levels of effort are exerted or
that firms statistically discriminate against women due to a belief that they may leave.
Hersch and Viscusi (1996) consider how a woman’s promotions may be related to having
recently terminated her current employment to follow her husband to a new job. Regressing
the number of promotions on various demographic characteristics and two mobility variables
(moved for a better job and moved because of spousal relocation), they find that women are
promoted more frequently, most likely the result of accepting a lower level job than she is
8
qualified for. Hersch and Viscusi also consider differences in promotion across races. They
find that the negative impact of being white on the number of promotions is insignificant
and likely the result of the extremely small number of blacks in the sample. The effect of
the number of promotions on wages is half again as large for men as it is for women.
Killingsworth and Reimers (1983) estimate a logit regression of the probability that
workers are assigned to a particular rank at a point in time. The results are then used
to estimate the conditional (on the current period’s rank) and unconditional likelihood of
promotion. Using data on the civilian employees at a large U.S. Army base in the Southeast,
they find that nonwhites tend to be employed in lower paid types of positions (blue collar
“wage” versus white collar GS position) and lower paid levels within each type. Women are
more likely to be in higher paid types of positions (white collar) but at lower paid levels.
When these results are used to simulate promotion probabilities, they determine that more
nonwhites would be employed in GS positions rather than “wage” (blue collar) jobs, whereas
whites would be more likely to be in wage plans and lower GS positions. Furthermore, a
larger percentage of nonwhites would be promoted out of GS 1-4 positions and into GS 7-9
or GS 11-16 if they were white, while a smaller percentage of whites would be promoted if
they were nonwhite. Thus, Killingsworth and Reimers conclude that race is associated with
both different ranking probabilities and different probabilities of change in rank.
Ginther and Hayes (1999) find that proportional hazard estimates of promotion differ
by race and gender, even after controlling for productivity (journal and book publications),
which is found to be an insignificant covariate. Based on this result, together with their
wage analysis, they conclude that female academics in the humanities face a glass ceiling.
McCue (1996) deviates from traditional wage growth studies that examine workers not
changing positions or those that change employers altogether. Instead, she considers internal
mobility and uses a first differenced wage equation approach to estimate the contribution of
promotions and other types of mobility to wage growth. She finds that excess wage growth
from position changes contributes 9-18% of total wage growth during the first decade in the
labor market. Wages grow most quickly for inexperienced workers. To examine the incidence
of internal promotions (that she defines as categorization of a reported position change by
respondents, ignoring measured wage changes), McCue estimates a hazard function where
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workers are at risk of leaving their current position. Black men and women are less likely to
leave their current positions than are white men and women. Higher wages, more education,
and less labor market experience and job tenure are associated with an increased likelihood
of internal moves.
2.3 Statistical Discrimination
Discrimination, in its most basic form, is said to exist if workers belonging to different (racial
or gender) groups are otherwise observationally equivalent but treated differently by virtue
of their race or gender, which alone does not directly affect productivity (Heckman, 1998).
Darity and Mason (1998) offer a comprehensive summary of evidence suggesting that, while
discrimination has declined in recent decades, largely as a result of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it remains prevalent today. They cite pre-Civil Rights advertisements that explicitly
discriminate against women and racial minorities in housing and employment. More recent
wage disparity studies consistently document a statistically significant negative effect on
earnings of being female and/or non-white.
Apart from taste-based discrimination, statistical discrimination is said to exist if two
equally productive groups of workers are observed differently, where the individual produc-
tivity of members of one group is observed with more error than the other. As a result
of uncertainty, employers estimate productivity to be a weighted sum of mean group and
individual characteristics. More emphasis is placed on group characteristics for workers be-
longing to the group whose productivity is measured less accurately. Thus, seemingly high-
(low)-productivity workers in the group whose signal is noisier earn less (more) than equally-
productive members of the other group. Both groups receive the same average compensation,
but equally-productive individuals belonging to the two groups are not compensated the
same.
Fryer (2002) describes a dynamic model in which a firm’s beliefs about the two groups
of workers may flip. The group that is originally discriminated against in the hiring process
will ultimately have more talent (the “talent effect”), on average, as a result of having
faced a more stringent hiring standard. Thus, under certain conditions (simply, that the
positive talent effect outweighs the negative “investment effect,” whereby the discriminated
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against group may under-invest in human capital as a result of the stricter hiring threshhold
and/or the belief that promotions will likewise be difficult to achieve), it may be this group
that is favored in the second-stage promotion process. As a result, some workers who face
statistical discrimination in the hiring process may benefit in the form of a greater likelihood
of promotion in stage two. It is unlikely, though, that the average group payoff from statistical
discrimination will improve.
In a different theoretical approach, Oettinger (1996) and Goldsmith, Hamilton, and
Darity (2006) develop a framework in which workers who are statistically discriminated
against tend to benefit more by staying with a single firm and gaining experience, whereas
favored groups experience larger wage gains by seeking and accepting better outside offers.
Particularly relevant to this research is Oettinger’s (1996) consideration of the effect
of statistical discrimination on early career evolution and the racial wage gap. He develops
a 2-period model of statistical discrimination in which a firm imperfectly observes worker
productivity, where the signal for a black worker is “noisier” than that of a white worker
(σ2v,b > σ
2
v,w) Both individuals and firms learn a worker’s true productivity after the first
period, and employees are faced with the decision to stay or leave. The model predicts the
absence of a black-white wage gap at labor force entry followed by the emergence of an
earnings differential as experience accumulates, mostly because blacks enjoy smaller benefits
from job mobility. Whites are expected to experience larger wage gains for leaving, whereas
blacks receive more substantial gains for staying, thus a distinction between experience and
tenure is necessary. His empirical work with the NLSY data provides support for some of
the model’s predictions.
Like Oettinger, Goldsmith et al. (2006) describe a “theory of ability misperception,”
characterized by two propositions: 1) employers reward nonwhites less than whites for previ-
ous experience as a result of an inaccurate belief that nonwhites acquire less knowledge from
previous employment, and 2) employers learn about workers by observing them on the job
and update their beliefs in such a way that the racial difference in the return to tenure is less
than that of experience. When comparing white and black men from the Multi City Study
of Urban Inequality, they find evidence of proposition 1 and week support of proposition
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2. When the sub-samples of black and white men are further disaggregated into groups de-
fined by job characteristics or other workplace settings, they find overwhelming support for
both propositions. Robustness checks using samples of women and Latinos generally provide
additional evidence of their theory of ability misperception, particularly in the context of
different workplace settings. Their results are largely consistent with Oettinger’s dynamic
statistical discrimination hypotheses.
Other empirical studies of statistical discrimination have considered a variety of envi-
ronments including the labor market (Lundberg and Startz, 1983), traffic stops (Knowles,
Perisco, and Todd, 2001), mortgage lending (Berkovec, et. al., 1998), automobile purchases
(Goldberg, 1996), as well as other consumer markets (Yinger, 1998).
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3 Data Description
The data, provided by the NC OSP, contain basic demographic characteristics about every
employee covered by the State Personnel Act, including information such as age, race, gender,
and education level, as well as detailed job information each year the individual is employed
with the state.2 Perhaps most importantly, the data include job performance and promotion
indicators not typically found in standard individual-level data sets.
Specifically, the state of North Carolina annually evaluates the performance of each of
its employees. The worker’s performance is measured on a 1-5 scale, where “1” indicates
“unsatisfactory” and “5” represents “outstanding.” Typically, each worker’s performance is
evaluated on either March 31 or June 30. This Performance Management System date is
described as the “Effective Date of Performance Management System Rating,” indicating
that the evaluation refers to the worker’s perceived performance during the previous year,
and the salary and salary grade take effect as of the date reported (and are thus valid
for the next period). More commonly-used economic data sets (such as the CPS or NLSY)
randomly sample individuals who do not work for the same employer, thus making a uniform
comparison of worker performance an impossibility.
2The complete list of variables includes: Person-Specific Identification Number, Position-specific Personnel
Number, Position-Career Status Code, Position Manager-Supervisor Code, Employee Position-Career Status
Code, Employee Manager-Supervisor Code, Standard Occupational Category Code, Sex, Age, Race, Federal
EEO Category Description, Employee Job Title Code, Employee Job Title Description, 5-digit Budget Code,
Handicap Status, University Budget Source, Employment Status, Performance Management System (PMS)
Code, Effective Date of Performance Management System Rating, Department/Division Description, Edu-
cation Level Required, Veteran Status, Employee Aggregate Service in Months as of End of Last Complete
Month, Employee Grade, T-Grade Designation, Employee Step in Salary Range, Employee Annual Salary
or Hourly Wage, Federal EEO Category Code, Employee Education Level, Race Description of Employee,
Position Type, Appointment Type, Position Months Per Year, Employee’s Date of Birth, Employee’s Entry
on Duty (EOD) Date, County Code Representing Location of Position, Filler, Account Filler, Account Ob-
ject, Budget Code of Position, Responsibility Cost Center of Position, Position Fund Code, Position Object
Code, Budgeted Salary of Position, Position FLSA Code, Employee FLSA Code, Last Personnel Action on
Employee, Date of Last Employee Action, Position Job Title Code, Position Job Title, Position County
Name, Employee’s Longevity Payment Due Date, Employee Part-Time Hours, Position (or budgeted) Grade
Level, Position Part-Time Hours.
Additionally, previous studies of this nature rely on arbitrary definitions of a promo-
tion (demotion), generally characterized as a self-reported change in tasks or an unusually
large increase (decrease) in earnings. According to the state of North Carolina, a worker
is promoted (demoted) if his salary grade increases (decreases) and position-specific per-
sonnel number changes. The NC OSP data set used in this study also contains a variable
detailing the worker’s most recent personnel action, including a promotion (demotion) code.
This variable, supplemented with a researcher-constructed indicator of promotion/demotion
based on salary grade and personnel number, should reasonably accurately capture the re-
alized promotions (demotions).
Of the 1,081,533 employment positions offered by the state over a ten year period
(1994-2003), 114,060 are vacant positions, leaving 967,473 valid filled positions (in some
cases, a worker may hold multiple jobs in a single year). Of those, 190,784 are unique
individuals. 857 workers are dropped from the sample because they held multiple jobs with
the state in at least one of the ten sample years. 25,422 workers are dropped due to age
restrictions, 25,079 of which were less than 25 years of age when first observed, 22 had no
age information available, and 321 had missing or invalid birthdates (from which age could
not be calculated manually). 283 workers are excluded from the sample due to inconsistent
reports of race, as well as the small sample (5,410 total) of the workers whose race is listed as
“other” (American-Indian, Asian-American, Spanish-American, or “other”). 22 individuals
have an equal number of male and female reports of gender. If the number of male and
female codes is not equal, the gender most commonly-reported is used. 1,349 individuals
are dropped because of education, 831 of whom have no education information, 374 workers
are reported to experience a decrease in education, and the remaining 144 reportedly have a
multi-level increase in education. 83,820 individuals are dropped due to invalid tenure data
(unavailable in all employment years) or because tenure exceeds 12 months at the time the
individual is first observed. In addition to missing or invalid demographic or socioeconomic
data (age, gender, race, education), other unavailable independent variables that resulted in
a worker being dropped from the sample include hourly wage earnings (7,162 individuals),
EEO category (57 workers), and job location (eight individuals). Finally, 43,271 workers are
eliminated due to missing dependent variables (salary grade and/or performance evaluation).
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The sample used in estimation contains 23,123 unique black or white individuals, each with
a valid set of dependent variables. The composition of individuals dropped based on the
above exclusion restrictions is detailed in Appendix B.
Each year, an employee’s continuous years of service with the state of North Carolina
can be categorized as a one-year spell, a multi-year spell, the longest spell, and/or the first
spell. The descriptive statistics provided in Appendix C make use of the worker’s first spell
with the state. Even if an employee has two spells during the 10-year time frame, or the
first spell is not the longest, only one spell (the first) per worker is used in estimation. Tables
C.1 - C.7 provide descriptive statistics of the final sample.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
According to Table C.1, the average worker in the sample is 37 years old at the time of
hire. Nearly 60% of the sample is female, and 70% is white. The average performance
evaluation is more than four, representing better than “very good.” 63% of the reported
employment-year education levels involve more than a high school diploma. The average
annual salary is slighly less than $30,000. Finally, the average length of first spells with the
state is roughly three years, and more than 50% of the sample is employed in professional
or office and clerical positions.
White men enjoy the greatest earnings, followed by white women. Black men and
women earn roughly the same annual salary, which is approximately $4,000 less than white
women. White women receive the most favorable performance evaluations, on average.
Finally, there is little variation across race or gender in the rate at which promotions and
demotions occur.
As Table C.3 depicts, the majority of all four demographic groups has earned a high
school education, and whites, particularly white women, are most likely to bring to the labor
market an advanced degree. White men and women are much more likely to be employed in
professional positions, whereas blacks more frequently work in service and maintenance or
as technicians. Men of both races are more likely to be employed in protective service and
skilled craft, whereas women are much more likely to work in office and clerical positions.
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One of the goals of this study is to analyze the way in which promotions happen within
the state of North Carolina. Previous studies report that men are often observed to be
promoted more frequently than women (Spurr, 1990; Jones and Makepeace, 1996; Cannings,
1988), and whites more often than blacks (Killingsworth and Reimers, 1983). Explaining
these gaps is difficult, in part because data relevant to the prevalence of promotions is seldom
available. This study makes use of an employer’s perception of individual performance on
the job, and one hypothesis is that workers may be under-placed at the onset of employment
but later enjoy promotions in a sort of “catch up” effect. If that is the case, one would
expect that blacks and women, most likely, would enjoy early promotions with potentially
greater rewards. In order to unconditionally examine this possibility, Appendix Tables C.3
- C.5 describe a worker’s initial placement with the state, information about the time of
promotions, and the corresponding grade increases that accompany promotions.
Black men begin their employment spell with the state at the lowest salary grade, on
average. They are assigned to a grade more than five levels below that of their white male
counterparts. Though the vast majority of the sample is never promoted, and fewer still
experience a demotion, the demographic group most frequently promoted in the second year
of employment is black men. On the other hand, white men have the most amount of tenure
at the time of the first promotion. Furthermore, black men enjoy the largest positive grade
change, on average, when promoted. To be discussed in more detail later, these patterns
are consistent with the possibility that the state may initially under-predict the ability and
performance of blacks, but after observing them on the job, correct for this miscalculation
by promoting them more often and with greater reward when promoted.
While most of the individuals in the sample (∼ 95%) had one continuous employment
spell between 1994 and 2003, consideration must be given to treatment of those who left
the state and later returned during the ten-year period. As an alternative to using multiple
spells for these individuals, either the first or longest spell seems most appropriate. In order
to accurately capture the true distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, to be discussed in
detail later, one approach is to use in estimation only individuals who are new state employees
at the time they are first observed. Both entry date and aggregate months of service are
available, so an accurate construction of tenure is possible. Thus, only those individuals who
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have zero to twelve months of service when first observed are included in estimation, and
only their first spell is utilized. Descriptive statistics of the sample’s employment spells are
detailed in Tables C.6 and C.7.
While the NC OSP data contain variables not found in standard economic data sets,
the econometrician nonetheless faces empirical issues that must be dealt with. These in-
clude issues related to outside employment alternatives, the reported incidence of involuntary
termination, candidate pool for potential hires, the worker’s wage and outside earnings po-
tential, the potential lack of supervisor information, and the specific nature of the data.
Information regarding each of these, and efforts to deal with them, are presented in Ap-
pendix D.
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4 Model
4.1 Dynamic Model of Labor Supply Decisions and Employment
Outcomes
4.1.1 Introduction
The theoretical model is framed with data from the state of North Carolina in mind. That
is, a snap shot of ten years of positions and their occupants (i.e. employees) is available.
Information on an individual is known only when he is working with the state. While full
spells with the state may be observed for a particular individual over the ten years, it is more
common to have left- or right-censored spells. Slightly more than half (57%) of the estimation
sample is observed to be working during the final year of available data. Furthermore, the
sample used in this dissertation is restricted to tenure with the state of one year or less when
first observed.
Conditional on having been hired, a worker makes the decision to continue working
for the state or to leave (dt) based on demographic characteristics and lagged variables,
including whether or not he was promoted at the end of the previous period (at−1), how
his work performance was evaluated (pt−1), and his new wage (wt) and salary grade offer
(gt). During each period, an employee exerts effort on the job. At the end of the period,
the state assesses the worker’s effort level in the form of a performance evaluation. With
an evaluation of the individual’s performance, the state decides whether or not to promote
the worker. Since a promotion is defined as a simultaneous change in personnel number
and increase in salary grade, once a promotion decision has been made, next period’s salary
grade and salary (within that salary grade) are announced. The employee uses all of this
information to make his employment decision at the start of the next period.
Specifically, timing is as follows:
dt
gt, wt pt
at
dt+1
worker
makes t
emp. dec.
(stay/leave)
salary
grade &
salary
(observed if dt = 0)
worker exerts
effort (unobserved)
worker
performance
evaluation
(observed)
promotion
decision
(observed)
worker
makes t+1
emp. dec.
(stay/leave)
In this model, the individual makes two choices, whether or not to continue to work for
the state and the level of effort to exert. The former is observed by the econometrician; the
latter is not. Each decision depends upon exogenous variables and lagged or realized values
of the endogenous variables. Conditional on choosing to continue working for the state, the
terms of the employment contract are salary grade and salary, which are partly determined
by employee characteristics such as education, performance, and tenure. The performance
evaluation and promotion decision represent probabilistic outcomes that are influenced by
employee behavior. Tenure with the state is defined by the employee’s decision to stay or
leave.
4.1.2 Per-Period Discrete Choices
At the beginning of the period, with knowledge of last period’s performance evaluation
and promotion outcome, as well as his current salary grade and wage offer, the worker
decides whether or not to continue his employment with the state. In addition to his current
employment outcomes, factors that influence the probability of terminating his tenure with
the state include the unemployment rate, the presence of alternative job offers, and private
sector wages. No distinction is made between full- and part-time employment; thus, two
mutually-exclusive choices are available: dt = 0 if he chooses to continue working for the
state and dt = 1 if he leaves.
Conditional on choosing to stay (dt = 0), the worker is paid according to the salary
grade and wage offers that were announced at the end of period t− 1, following his realized
performance evaluation and promotion decision. At that point, the worker decides to exert
some effort level, ft. While this is not an outcome observed in the data, one would assume
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the worker chooses his current work effort so as to maximize his current value of lifetime
utility.
Both per-period decisions depend upon a set of variables that define a worker’s employ-
ment history with the state. These “state” variables include lagged performance evaluation
(pt−1), last period’s promotion decision (at−1), as well as current salary grade (gt), salary
(wt), and current tenure (xt). Since salary grades are directly tied to promotions, in that
a promotion is defined as a change in personnel position number and an increase in salary
grade, and wages are positively correlated with salary grades, it is reasonable to assume
that when the worker makes her employment decision, he is made aware of his next-period
earnings. Thus, the state vector at the beginning of period t is
zt = (pt−1, at−1, gt, wt, xt, Xt, Zt) , (4.1)
where Xt is a vector containing exogenous individual demographic characteristics, and Zt
contains exogenous market characteristics.
4.1.3 Performance Evaluation
At the end of the period, after the state has had the opportunity to observe an employee,
his performance is formally evaluated. He receives a score of 1-5, where 1 represents “unsat-
isfactory” and 5 reflects “outstanding” performance on-the-job. The probability of earning
a performance rating of p in period t is given by
pipt = P (pt = p|pt−1, at−1, ft, xt, Xt) (4.2)
The vector, Xt, contains exogenous demographic characteristics that potentially affect a
worker’s performance evaluation, including race, gender, age, education level, and occupa-
tional assignment. Lagged performance evaluation is a determinant of current evaluation
in that workers whose performance on the job was recognized last period as favorable, for
instance, will likely continue to perform well, as within-firm upward mobility and promo-
tions are likely tied to the way performance is perceived by one’s supervisor. Last period’s
promotion decision presumably affects current performance. If a worker was promoted last
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period, he is relatively new in his current position and may under-perform relative to another
employee whose skills in that particular position are more developed to do well on the job.
Finally, tenure with the state may also play a role in a worker’s performance evaluation.
4.1.4 Promotion
After being observed and evaluated in the current position, the state makes a decision re-
garding whether or not to promote a worker. Those who provided more effort in period t,
and who likely received better performance ratings, are the employees who are most likely
to be moved to a higher ranking position. Thus, the probability of being promoted as the
end of period t nears is
piat = P (at = a|pt, at−1, ft, xt, Xt) (4.3)
Last period’s promotion decision affects the probability of being promoted in much the same
way it affects current performance evaluation. Workers who recently enjoyed a promotion
to a new position are not likely to be performing at such a high level that there is reason to
promote them again. Rather, those who have done well at their current job and who would
benefit (both personally, and the state) by moving to a more demanding position are likely
the individuals who will be promoted this period.
An individual’s length of time with the state is also likely to affect promotion decisions.
Previous studies show that workers are most likely to be promoted early in their careers, so
the longer someone is with the state, perhaps the less likely it is that they will be promoted.
This may be due, in part, to sorting into positions that best suit both the worker and
employer. Additionally, if the reliability of information in a worker’s signal at the time of
hire differs by race or gender, certain workers may be more likely to be promoted as the
state has more time to observe them. Specifically, if the firm statistically discriminates
against blacks at the time of hire due to a weak signal, it is those workers who may be
promoted more frequently over time if the state is using performance evaluations to better
its information about the worker’s ability. Therefore, tenure with the state may influence
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promotion decisions for all workers as they sort themselves into suitable matches, as well as
differentially by race and/or gender as the state learns about workers.
4.1.5 Per-Period Utility and Budget Constraint
State employees are assumed to derive utility from consumption and effort exerted at work
(the latter having a negative affect on utility). Demographic variables may also shift utility,
which is denoted U(Ct, ft, Xt, ξ
f
t ), where ξ
f
t is a random error component that varies with
time and effort level. In this simple model, savings is not considered, so consumption equals
employment income. That is, Ct = wt(ft−1, pt−1, at−1, xt, Xt).
4.1.6 The Optimization Problem
The problem each employee faces at the beginning of every period can be represented by a
value function, in the form of Bellman equations. At the end of a period, the worker makes
a decision regarding whether or not to work for the state in the next period. Conditional on
choosing to stay, he exerts some unobserved (by the researcher) effort level. This effort is
evaluated by his supervisor in the form of a 5-outcome performance evaluation at the end of
period t. After evaluating a worker, the employer decides whether or not to promote him to
a new position. If so, the worker is informed of a higher salary grade and wage offer, which
subsequently affect his stay decision.
The value of choosing to continue to work for the state and exert effort level ft = f in
period t is
V 0f (zt, ξ
f
t ) = U(Ct, ft, Xt, ξ
f
t ) + β
[
Σ5p=1Σ
1
a=0pi
p
t pi
a
t V (zt+1)
]
, ∀t , ∀f (4.4)
where β is the discount rate and V (zt+1) is the maximal value of future utility. The maximal
value of lifetime utility at the start of period t+1 is the expected maximum between staying
with the state or leaving. That is,
V (zt+1) = Et
[
max V 0 (zt+1) , V
1(zt+1)
]
, (4.5)
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where the value of staying, unconditional on effort is
V 0(zt+1) = Et
[
max
f ′
V 0f ′
(
zt+1, ξ
f
t+1
)]
,∀t, (4.6)
and the value of leaving is
V 1(zt+1) = g (xt+1, Xt+1, Zt+1) + u
d
t+1 (4.7)
The value of the non-state option (which does not distinguish between working elsewhere,
being unemployed, or being out of the labor force) is approximated by the function g(·) that
depends on total work experience, demographic characteristics, and exogenous employment
market characteristics, Zt. Total work experience equals tenure with the state, xt, plus work
experience prior to employment with the state.3
Hence, the probability of choosing to continue to work for the state in period t+ 1 is
P (dt+1 = 0) = P
(
V 0(zt+1) > V
1(zt+1)
)
P
(
V 0 (zt+1) > V
1
(zt+1) + u
d
t+1
)
P
(
udt+1 < V
0 (zt+1)− V 1 (zt+1)
)
, (4.8)
where V
1
(zt+1) = g(xt+1, Xt+1, Zt+1) is the deterministic component of V
1(zt+1). Note that
V 0(zt+1) can be approximated by an n
th order Taylor series expansion in the state variables.
4.2 Empirical Specification
The dynamic employment model suggests five outcomes of interest: salary grade, annual
earnings, performance evaluation, the occurrence of a promotion, and the worker’s decision
to continue working for the state. The empirical specification of each is considered in turn.
The particular nature of the data require small deviations from the theory above, and will
be noted below.
3Because total experience is not available within the NC OSP data, it is treated as exogenous (and is
included in X1) for simplicity.
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4.2.1 Salary Grade and Salary
At the beginning of a period, conditional on not having terminated the current employment
spell, a worker’s salary grade, gt, and associated salary, wt, are observed. Workers are paid
according to the state’s salary hierarchical structure, where salary grades range from 50-96.
There is a monotonic relationship between salary and salary grade, detailed in Appendix
Table G.2. However, because of the overlap of salaries across grades, modeling the outcomes
for both variables is necessary.
Though salary grades are technically discrete values, the wide range (47 outcomes)
allows for estimation as a continuous index. Thus, conditional on having decided to continue
working for the state, salary grade is specified as
gt = δ0 + δ1Xt + δ2gt−1 + δ3wt−1 + δ4pt−1 + δ5at−1 + δ6xt + u
g
t , (4.9)
where Xt = (r, f, ct, edt, ot) is a vector of demographic characteristics including race (r), gen-
der (f), age (ct), education level (edt), occupational category (ot). The endogenous variables
that influence salary grade determination, and whose specification is detailed below, include
previous salary grade (gt−1), previous salary (wt−1), lagged performance evaluation (pt−1),
promotion history (at−1), and current tenure with the state (xt). Also included are inter-
actions involving these variables. The error term, ugt , represents unobservable information
that determines grade and is explained in more detail later.
A worker’s earnings level is positively correlated with salary grade. Once the salary
grade has been assigned, a wage offer therein is presented to the employee.
wt = β0 + β1Xt + β2gt + β3wt−1 + β4pt−1 + β5at−1 + β6xt + uwt , (4.10)
where Xt is defined as above. Current earnings are a function of, and determined after,
current salary grade, so gt enters the wage equation rather than gt−1. Variation in the
natural log of earnings, rather than levels, is explained in estimation.
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4.2.2 Performance Evaluation
After having observed a worker’s performance on the job, the employee’s supervisor conducts
an evaluation at the end of the period. All workers are evaluated annually on a scale
ranging from “unsatisfactory” (pt=1) to “outstanding” (pt=5). The probability of observing
performance evaluation m is given by
P (pt = m) =
exp {γ0m + γ1mXt + γ2mgt + γ3mwt + γ4mpt−1 + γ5mat−1 + γ6mxt}∑5
m′=1 exp {γ0m′ + γ1m′Xt + γ2m′gt + γ3m′wt + γ4m′pt−1 + γ5m′at−1 + γ6m′xt}
,
(4.11)
where m takes on values 1, . . . , 5. As with earnings, according to the timeline defined above,
current salary grade and current earnings influence performance ratings, rather than lagged
values of these variables.4
4.2.3 Promotion
At the end of a period, after having observed the worker’s performance in his current position,
the state decides whether or not a worker should be promoted.5 Many of the same variables
that influence the other observed outcomes will affect which action the firm takes. One
contribution this study makes to the empirical promotion literature is the inclusion of the
worker’s performance evaluation in the firm’s promotion decision. Therefore, assuming a
logistic error, uat , the probability that the state agency chooses to promote the worker,
at = 1, at the end of period t, is
P (at = 1) =
exp {η0 + η1Xt + η2gt + η3wt + η4pt + η5at−1 + η6xt}
1 + exp {η0 + η1Xt + η2gt + η3wt + η4pt + η5at−1 + η6xt} , (4.12)
where all variables are defined as above.
4Of the 62,057 observations, 31 performance evaluations are 1 (“unsatisfactory”) and 330 are 2 (“below
good”). As a result, only a 4-outcome model is estimated, where 1s and 2s are combined. Furthermore, while
consideration was given to including all five levels of evaluation when used as an explanatory variable, that
there are only 31 reports of unsatisfactory makes this an impossibility, and only four outcomes are included.
5The equation was originally estimated as a polychotomous outcome, where the state promoted, demoted,
or made no change to the worker’s status. However, of the 62,057 observed outcomes, only 429 (0.19%) reflect
demotions. Thus, demotions are ignored in favor of a dichotomous outcome equation.
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4.2.4 Tenure Decision
Finally, a worker’s tenure is accumulated as he makes employment decisions each period.
Theory suggests that, with his current wage offer, salary grade, and promotion decision
in hand, an employee chooses to stay with the firm for one more year or quit in favor
of a different alternative. Specifically, the probability of continuing to work for the state,
dt+1 = 1, assuming a logistic error u
d
t+1, is given by equation 4.8,
P (dt+1 = 0) = P
(
udt+1 < V
0 (zt+1)− V 1 (zt+1)
)
= P
(
udt+1 < V
0 (zt+1)− g (xt+1, Xt+1, Zt+1)
)
The right-hand side of the inequality is approximated by a Taylor series expansion of the
observable variables at the beginning of period t+1, (gt+1, wt+1, pt, at, Xt+1, Zt+1), assuming
ut has a logistic distribution. Thus,
P (dt+1 = 1) =
exp {τ0 + τ1Xt + τ2gt + τ3wt + τ4pt + τ5at + τ6xt + τ7Zt}
1 + exp {τ0 + τ1Xt + τ2gt + τ3wt + τ4pt + τ5at + τ6xt + τ7Zt} .(4.13)
Note that in the specification of Equation 4.13, all variables entering a worker’s decision
to stay or leave come from the current period. Specifically, wt and gt are used instead of
wt+1 and gt+1, as wages and salary grade are only observed if the worker chooses to continue
working for the state and are unavailable if they do not appear in the data in period t+ 1.
4.2.5 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Unobserved permanent or time-varying individual heterogeneity that influences one or more
of the above outcomes reveals itself as correlation among the error components of each
equation, uet , for e = g, w, p, a, d. For example, highly motivated workers likely bring to
the labor market a more enhanced set of human capital and thus are assigned higher salary
grade and earn higher wages; they also probably perform better on the job and are rewarded
in the form of better performance evaluations and promotions. This unobserved correlation
between equations is an example of permanent individual heterogeneity.
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Additionally, during the course of an individual’s tenure with the state, unobserved,
changing factors may influence observed decisions. For instance, an unobserved shock to
one’s health, or changes in family structure, such as the birth of a child (unobserved in
the data) may influence a worker’s employment choices for a temporary period of time.
Alternatively, as workers sort themselves into positions within the state that improve the
employer-employee match, their individual quit propensities may decline due to factors un-
observed by the econometrician. These unobserved, changing factors are captured as a
time-varying component of the error term.
Failure to model this correlation results in biased estimates of the marginal effects of
these variables when they are used as explanatory variables in the dynamic employment pro-
cess.6 To model these unobservables, the error terms, uet , are decomposed into a permanent
individual heterogeneity component, µ, a time-varying individual heterogeneity component,
νt, and an i.i.d. error, ²
e
t , where
uet = ρeµ+ ωeνt + ²
e
t (4.14)
where the i.i.d. error is normally distributed, ²et ∼ N(0, σ2e) for continuous equations and
logistic or extreme value distributed for logit and multinomial logit equations. The factor
loadings on µ and νt are ρe and ωe, respectively, and are parameters to be estimated in the
empirical model. The probability weight on the kth support for a given factor is specified as
a multinomial logit,
ψk =
eϑk(
1 + ΣK−1k=1 eϑk
) (4.15)
6In a slightly different context, Black, et al. (1990) test two hypotheses that attempt to explain the
negative relationship between tenure at a firm and quit propensities: state dependence (i.e., the conditional
quit rate for a group of workers declines with tenure because of a decrease in individual quit propensities
over time) and heterogeneity (i.e., observationally equivalent workers have different quit propensities due
to individual preferences, and the conditional quit rate declines over time as workers sort themselves into
good worker-firm matches according to these preferences). They find that a model with a heterogeneity
specification better predicts the observed outcomes than one without, which illustrates the need to control
for unobserved characteristics.
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for K supports, where ϑk is the estimated parameter. The locations of the points of support,
µk, are constant across equations, bound by zero and one, and are estimated using logits,
µk =
e$k
(1 + e$k)
, k = 2, . . . , K − 1 (4.16)
where $k is the parameter to be estimated. For identification, two points of support on
each factor are fixed at values of zero and one. If the number of supports for a given factor
is greater than two, the non-normalized points lie between zero and one. A differential
effect of the unobserved heterogeneity in each equation is measured by the equation- and
outcome-specific factor loadings on the unobserved heterogeneity mass points. The mass
point locations ν`t, and the probabilities of each mass point, %`, for each of the L mass points
in the time-varying heterogeneity distribution are estimated analogously.
4.2.6 Initial Conditions
In addition to these five outcomes, initial conditions are introduced to the empirical spec-
ification. First, one goal of this study is to explore whether added information about a
worker’s on-the-job ability influences the way the state makes post-hiring decisions regard-
ing wages, salary grade, promotions, and performance evaluations. Second, if, according to
theory, salary grade, earnings, and performance evaluations are endogenous in the period
t > 1 equations, then they are endogenous in the period t = 1 equations as well. That is,
the period t = 1 values reflect the terms of the employment offer at the time of hire. The
first period outcomes of salary grade and salary depend on the basic information available
to the state at the time of hire (specifically, race, gender, age, and education). First period
performance evaluation is also estimated differently from evaluations in subsequent periods
because lagged performance evaluation is not available.
While a five-category measure of education is used in period t > 1 equations, the state
has access to more detailed information about a new hire’s education. Therefore, finely-
defined educational dummies are used to identify the three initial conditions, salary grade,
earnings, and performance evaluation. Since promotions are defined as an increase in salary
grade relative to the previous period, it is not possible for individuals to observe a promotion
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in their first year of employment. Additionally, it is assumed that the same current variables
that affect the decision to stay in periods t > 1 also affect the first period decision. Thus,
initial conditions for promotion and the decision to stay are not estimated. The three initial
conditions are presumably affected by the same permanent individual heterogeneity that is
included in subsequent periods, and it is thus included in estimation of the period t = 1
equations. A worker’s initial salary grade is modeled continuously, as in later periods, and
is specified in its reduced form as
g1 = ϕ
1
0 + ϕ
1
1X1 + ϕ
1
2E1 + ρgµ+ ²
g
1, (4.17)
where X1 = (r, f, ct) is a vector of demographic characteristics including only race (r), gender
(f), and age (ct) at the time of hire. E1 is a vector of education dummies observed by the
state when the worker is hired and includes indicators for less than ninth grade, more than
ninth grade but less than a high school diploma, high school plus one year, high school plus
two years, high school plus three years, an associate’s degree, a four-year college degree, a
master’s degree, and professional degree, including individuals employed as a Ph.D., dentist,
medical doctor, or lawyer. The excluded category is a high school diploma.
First period earnings are also estimated as a continuous variable and defined in reduced
form as
w1 = ϕ
2
0 + ϕ
2
1X1 + ϕ
2
2E1 + ρwµ+ ²
w
1 , (4.18)
where X1 and E1 are defined as in the salary grade equation.
Finally, the reduced form probability of receiving a performance rating of m in the first
period is given by
P (p1 = m) =
exp {ϕ30m + ϕ31mX1 + ϕ32mE1 + ρpmµ}∑5
m′=1 exp
{
ϕ3
0m
′ + ϕ3
1m
′X1 + ϕ32m′E1 + ρpm′µ
} , ∀m = 1 . . . , 5.(4.19)
All nine education variables (relative to a high school diploma) are statistically signifi-
cant in the initial earnings and salary grade equations, and at a minimum, high school plus
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three years, college, master’s, and professional degree are statistically significant in the each
of the three performance evaluation outcome equations.
The set of dynamic equations is estimated jointly to allow for the correlation across
equations. No distributional assumption is imposed on the permanent and time-varying indi-
vidual components. Rather, their distribution is estimated using the discrete factor random
effects estimation method.7 This method approximates the distribution of the permanent
heterogeneity by a finite number of mass points, µk, and their accompanying probability
weights, ψk, k = 1, . . . , K. Similarly, the distribution of time-varying heterogeneity is esti-
mated with mass points, ν`t, and probability weights %`, ` = 1, . . . , L.
The likelihood function for individual n, which represents the probability of observing
realized salary grade, annual earnings, performance evaluation, promotion decision, and
choices of effort (assumed, for simplicity and without loss of generality, to be high effort (f
= 1)or low effort (f = 0)) and continuation or termination of employment with the state, is
given by
Ln (Θ|µ, νt) =
{
K∑
k=1
ψk
(
φg1(·|µk)φw1(·|µk)
3∏
m=0
Pr(p1 = m|µk)1(pn1=m)
·
1∏
j=0
Pr(a1 = j|µk)1(an1=j)
1∏
q=0
Pr(d1 = q|µk)1(dn1=q)
·
1∏
y=0
Pr(f1 = y|µk)1(f1=y)
)
(4.20)
·
Tn∏
t=2
[
L∑
`=1
%`
(
φg(·|µk, ν`t)φw(·|µk, ν`t)
3∏
m=0
Pr(pt = m|µk, ν`t)1(pnt=m)
·
1∏
j=0
Pr(at = j|µk, ν`t)1(ant=j)
1∏
q=0
Pr(dt = q|µk, ν`t)1(dnt=q)
·
1∏
y=0
Pr(ft = y|µk, ν`t)1(fnt=y)
)]}
,
where Θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated, Θ = (δ, β, γ, ν, τ, ϕ, ρe, ωe, ψ,Θ), with
ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3) representing the vector of coefficients from the initial conditions, and φg(·)
and φw(·) are continuous density functions. The likelihood function for a sample of N workers
7See Heckman and Singer (1984), Mroz and Guilkey (1992), and Mroz (1999).
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is
Ln (Θ) =
N∏
n=1
Ln(Θ) . (4.21)
4.2.7 Identification
Identification in the current model comes from variation in a number of sources. First, Bhar-
gava and Sargan (1983) and Arellano and Bond (1991) argue that in estimation of dynamic
models using panel data, identification rests on the availability of exogenous variables condi-
tional on unobservable individual effects. In the present context, exogenous variation comes
from private sector wages, percentage of job vacancies in the state, and unemployment rates.
Furthermore, lagged endogenous variables enter each of the five equations in the system and
aid in identification since controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity removes serial
correlation from the errors. In addition, interactions of lagged variables with exogenous vari-
ables, as well as other lags, are present in every equation. Second, the non-linear functional
form of several equations further assists in identification. Finally, the three initial conditions
are estimated using nine education dummy variables which are excluded from the time t > 1
equations.
4.3 Statistical Discrimination Model
4.3.1 Static Statistical Discrimination Model
In addition to allowing for a formal model of wage determination that accurately controls
for promotions, performance on the job, and unobserved heterogeneity, the data used in
this study provide an opportunity to explore whether gender and racial differentials can
be explained by something other than an employer’s distaste for employing certain work-
ers. Specifically, the early statistical discrimination literature suggests a simple test of the
existence of such discrimination. Before evaluating results of the full five-equation model
specified above, this test of statistical discrimination will be described and conducted as a
preliminary exploration of what evidence exists to support the notion that the portion of a
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wage differential not captured by explanatory variables may not necessarily be attributed to
taste discrimination.
A formal model of statistical discrimination, first developed by Phelps (1972), Arrow
(1973), and Aigner and Cain (1977), and subsequently expanded and tested in a variety of
contexts,8 is used as the starting point here. The basic static model assumes that firms do
not observe a worker’s true productivity, α. Instead, a noisy signal, s, is observed, where
s = α+ v. (4.22)
True productivity, α, is assumed to be normally distributed with mean m and variance σ2α,
i.e., α ∼ N(m,σ2α). Suppose initially that different groups of workers are equally productive,
on average. Independent of α, v is normally distributed, v ∼ N(0, σ2v). A signal of the
worker’s productivity may consist of a single observable measure such as a test score, but
more realistically may be multi-dimensional and include information conveyed on a resume´
(education level, job market experience), as well as worker characteristics observed by a firm
during an interview (gender, race, age).
The model of statistical discrimination rests on the assumption that a black worker may
send an employer a noisier signal than a white worker, i.e. σ2v,b > σ
2
v,w. One argument justify-
ing this claim involves the sociological observation that workers belonging to different groups
are more likely to miscommunicate than workers in the same group (Lang, 1986). Suppose,
for instance, that a firm employs predominantly white managers. A black job applicant may
have a more difficult time communicating his ability to a potential supervisor than would a
white applicant. The white manager may then rely on past experiences with black subordi-
nates to compensate for the communication, and thus, information, gap. Relative to a white
job candidate, the manager may place added emphasis on what he has observed in previous
black employees and less on this particular individual’s signal. A second explanation for the
existence of statistical discrimination is that white workers more frequently network for jobs
using personal contacts, a method which allows for the acquisition of additional information
about the quality of a candidate by the firm (Holzer, 1987).
8See Knowles, Perisco, and Todd, 2001, as one example.
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A firm making a hiring, wage, or promotion decision, observing only a worker’s signal,
uses that information to predict the employee’s unobserved productivity.9 The expected
value of a worker’s ability, given his signal, is
αˆ = E(α|s) = (1− λ2)m+ λ2s, (4.23)
where
λ2 =
σ2α
σ2α + σ
2
v
(4.24)
is the square of the correlation coefficient between the signal and the true productivity and
measures the reliability of the signal. In this basic static framework, the presence of statistical
discrimination, σ2v,b > σ
2
v,w, suggests that the state will place more emphasis on average group
performance than an individual’s personal signal if the worker is black, per equation 4.23.
This conditional expectation reveals itself in the wage determination process, assuming firms
pay workers according to their expected marginal productivity (i.e., w = αˆ = E(α|s)).10 If
average productivity, m, is identical across groups, all workers will receive the same earnings.
If m differs across groups, a wage differential will necessarily exist.
One would imagine, however, that as the state observes a worker’s productivity, the
employer is able to update his beliefs about the worker’s ability using both the employee’s
signal and previous evaluations of his performance on the job. Thus, given the availability
of data that reflect on-the-job performance, a dynamic model of statistical discrimination is
considered in which the firm observes a simple signal at the time of hire, and adds to that
information observations of a worker’s performance as tenure is accrued.
4.3.2 Dynamic Statistical Discrimination Model
Consider now a dynamic framework. As in the static model, at the beginning of the first
period, neither the worker or the firm knows the worker’s productivity. The firm, however,
9The terms ‘skill,’ ‘ability,’ and ‘productivity’ will be used synonymously here.
10Oettinger assumes workers are paid a weighted average of expected marginal productivity and piece rate
wages. This specification produces the same average wage (m) but is not used here because of the nature of
the data used in estimation, whereby workers are almost certainly not paid piece rate wages.
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receives a noisy signal about the worker’s skill, where
st = α + vt . (4.25)
Consistent with the static model, α ∼ N(m,σ2α), and independent of α, v ∼ N(0, σ2v) and
is i.i.d. The worker’s (unconditional and conditional (on α)) signal is distributed normally,
where
s ∼ N(m,σ2α + σ2v) (4.26)
s|α ∼ N(α, σ2v) . (4.27)
At the beginning of the first period, the state’s beliefs about a worker’s ability can only
be conditioned on the first observed signal. That is,
α|s ∼ N ((1− λ2)m+ λ2s, σ2α(1− λ2)) , (4.28)
where λ is defined as in Equation 4.24.11
At the end of the first period (and at the end of every subsequent employment year),
the state evaluates the worker’s performance in his current position. Like a worker’s signal,
observed performance, pt, is also a noisy measure of the worker’s true ability. Thus,
pt = α + κt, (4.29)
where, independent of α, κ ∼ N(0, σ2κ). Similar to a worker’s signal, performance evaluation
is distributed normally, both conditionally and unconditionally.
p ∼ N(m,σ2α + σ2κ) (4.30)
p|α ∼ N(α, σ2κ) . (4.31)
11See Appendix E for full derivation of these results.
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Additionally, given that α and v are uncorrelated, as are α and κ, it must be the case that
s and p are orthogonal, conditional on α.
At the beginning of the next period, after evaluating a worker’s performance, the state
updates its beliefs about a worker’s ability by conditioning on both the current signal and
last period’s performance evaluation.12 Using Bayes’ Rule, it can be shown that, conditional
on both the signal and previous evaluation, the variance of worker ability is13
var(α|s, p) = σ
2
ασ
2
vσ
2
κ
σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α
. (4.32)
Comparing the period two prior (period one posterior) belief about the variance of ability to
the period one prior information, it is clear that the additional information about a worker’s
performance decreases the conditional variance of ability. Specifically, var(α|s, p) < var(α|s)
if
σ2ασ
2
vσ
2
κ
σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α
< σ2α(1− λ2),
or
σ2ασ
2
vσ
2
κ
σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α
<
σ2ασ
2
v
σ2α + σ
2
v
0 < σ4ασ
4
v (4.33)
Since σ4ασ
4
v is always positive, the conditional variance of ability will decrease with the ad-
dition of new information (the worker’s performance evaluation) each period. The posterior
information at the end of period t will become the prior belief of the state at the beginning
of period t+1. As a worker’s tenure with the state increases, beliefs about ability will evolve
in this manner according to Bayes’ Rule.
12For examples of Bayesian updating in models with dynamic learning, see Crawford and Shum (2005),
Hamilton and Chan (2005), and Mira (2005).
13For probability density function, f(·), f (α|s, p) = f(α)f(s,p|α)f(s,p) = f(α,s,p)f(s,p) since, by Bayes Rule, f(s, p|α) =
f(α,s,p)
f(α) . Like α|s, the derivation of E(α|s, p) and var(α|s, p) can be found in Appendix E.
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In addition to examining the evolution of the conditional variance of ability, the state’s
conditional expectation of ability will yield information regarding how changing beliefs influ-
ence wage, promotion, performance evaluation, and promotion decisions, as reflected in the
equations estimated in the model. Specifically, the posterior mean of ability (conditioned
on both the original signal and the worker’s performance evaluation) will be larger than the
prior (conditioned on only the signal) if the following is true:
pσ2ασ
2
v +mσ
2
κσ
2
v + sσ
2
ασ
2
κ
σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α
> (1− λ2)m+ λ2s,
or
pσ2ασ
2
v +mσ
2
κσ
2
v + sσ
2
ασ
2
κ
σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α
>
mσ2v + sσ
2
α
σ2α + σ
2
v
,
which can be shown to simplify to
(p− s)σ2α > (m− p)σ2v . (4.34)
While nothing definitive can be said about the theoretical relationships between p and
s or between m and p, one can conclude that the larger is the variance of the signal error
(σ2v), ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that the posterior belief about ability will exceed
the prior. In fact, one may even assume that p, s, σ2α, and m do not differ by race. Thus,
since the underlying statistical discrimination assumption is that σ2v,b > σ
2
v,w, this result
suggests that blacks are more likely than whites to benefit from the added information. This
is consistent with the conclusions drawn by Oettinger (1996) and Goldsmith, et al. (2006),
who suggest that black workers benefit from continuing to work for their present employer,
while whites can often better themselves by seeking outside wage offers.
By allowing the state’s expectation of a worker’s productivity in a potentially new po-
sition to be conditioned on his current signal and known (perceived) performance in previous
periods, Bayesian updating describes how the state’s productivity beliefs evolve. If the state
is observed to statistically discriminate, one might expect more favorable outcomes for a
discriminated against worker as his tenure with the state increases, as the new information
increases the state’s expectation of a worker’s ability the larger is the original signal variance.
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As this new information is used in future employment decisions, a black worker or woman
should be observed to be more likely to experience outcomes which are positively correlated
with expected ability.
4.3.3 Empirical Test of Statistical Discrimination
Aigner and Cain (1977) describe an empirical test of statistical discrimination, whereby
performance evaluation is regressed on individual and group characteristics. This procedure
is possible using data from the state of North Carolina because of the inclusion of annual
performance evaluation. Specifically, the state’s estimate of worker ability, αˆ can be thought
of as a least squares prediction, where the worker’s productivity is expressed in terms of a
group effect, (1− λ2)m, an individual effect, λ2s, and an error term, ε. That is,
α = (1− λ2)m+ λ2s+ ε . (4.35)
This equation is estimable if a worker’s end-of-period performance evaluation, for example,
is treated as a measure of ability and is regressed upon individual characteristics, including
group (race or gender), Xt.
14 That is,
pt = (1− λ2pt)m+ λ2ptXt + εpt , (4.36)
Different signal error variances across groups support there being evidence of statistical
discrimination.15 Since σ2κ is imbedded in λ
2
p (analogous to equation 4.24), if equation 4.36 is
estimated separately for two groups, different λ2ps imply differences in either the variance of
the signal error (σ2κ) or the variance of the group’s productivity (σ
2
α). Specifically, consider
estimating equation 4.36 separately for blacks and whites (or males and females) such that
14Note that here the performance evaluation equation is specified as an OLS regression, but may also be
estimated using multinomial logit. For the purposes of testing for statistical discrimination, OLS is used.
15Here, signal refers to the worker’s performance evaluation, according to the test proposed by the authors,
but will also be conducted using beginning-of-period wages to reflect the state’s expectation of productivity
before observing the worker.
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pw = (1− λ2pw)mw + λ2pwXpw + εw (4.37a)
pb = (1− λ2pb)mb + λ2pbXpb + εb (4.37b)
Here, the “group effect,” (1 − λ2)m, is simply the constant term. From that parameter
estimate, λ2 can be extracted, and conclusions can be drawn regarding σ2κ and σ
2
α.
The individual component, Xt, consists of the employee’s race (r), gender (f), age
(ct), education level (edt), occupational category (ot), and months of tenure at the time of
evaluation (xt) when estimated in the first period of employment to determine whether the
state statistically discriminates before beginning to learn about a worker’s performance.
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makin’ space
5 Results
5.1 OLS Results of Testing for Statistical Discrimination
Before addressing results from the jointly estimated set of equations described in section
4.2, a preliminary test of statistical discrimination is conducted, as described in Section
4.3.3, to determine if there is evidence supporting the presence of statistical discrimination.
Specifically, suppose equation 4.36 is estimated separately for blacks and whites (or males
and females), where
pw = (1− λ2pw)mw + λ2pwXpw + εw
pb = (1− λ2pb)mb + λ2pbXpb + εb .
Theory predicts that a finding where λ2pw 6= λ2pb suggests that either var(αb) 6= var(αw) or
var(κb) 6= var(κw), though it may not be possible to identify the source of the variation in
signal quality.
The inclusion of a worker’s performance evaluation in this data set allows for esti-
mation that was only previously a theoretical possibility. Because workers are evaluated
after current-period salary grade and wages are determined and after the worker has been
observed, this equation can be thought of as end-of-period. One would expect that perfor-
mance evaluations would reflect the updating of information on the part of the state, seen
as a reduction in the difference between the signal error variances across groups if certain
workers are, in fact, statistically discriminated against.
At the beginning of a period, however, before having observed workers, signal error
variances would differ if the state has less information about a particular group. Therefore,
if employees are paid according to their expected marginal productivity, earnings can also
be regressed on a group effect and an individual effect, where the same interpretation of
the group effect is possible. The results of the earnings equation should provide additional
information about the practice of statistical discrimination, as the worker has not yet been
observed when the state makes initial predictions about his ability.
In practice, then, the test of statistical discrimination described by Aigner and Cain
(1977) involves estimation of a beginning-of-period earnings equation and an end-of-period
performance evaluation equation. Both are regressed separately for blacks and whites, and
for men and women. The included covariates are standard wage equation variables: female or
black indicators, education, occupation, age, tenure, year dummies, interactions, and specific
to this framework, salary grade (“basic signal”). Should statistical discrimination exit, to
test whether or not the signal differential at the beginning of the period diminishes as a
worker continues to be observed, earnings and performance evaluations are also estimated
with lagged performance evaluation included as an independent variable (“updated signal”).
Each of the independent variables is measured as the deviation from the variable mean.
The “group effect,” (1 − λ2)m, when estimated separately, is the regression constant.
If E(α) = m, where empirically α is earnings or performance evaluation, a vector containing
the average of the dependent variable can be included rather than a vector of ones. Then, the
slope on the constant (in this case, the group mean of the dependent variable in question)
is (1-λ2), from which λ2 can be calculated. Estimates of the constants in separate OLS
regressions of both performance evaluation and earnings, by race and gender, in the worker’s
first year of employment, are reported in Table 5.1:
Table 5.1: Test of Equal Signal Quality Across Groups: First Employment Year
Annual Earnings Performance Evaluation
Avg. ln(Salary) Constant λ2 z Avg. Eval. (1-5) Constant λ2 z
(s.d.) (s.e.) (s.d.) (s.e.)
Whites 10.156 0.711
0.289
-2.512
3.004 0.151
0.849
1.051
(0.345) (0.003) (0.707) (0.088)
Blacks 9.961 0.725
0.275
2.697 -0.031
1.031
(0.288) (0.005) (0.691) (0.149)
Men 10.150 0.723
0.277
5.333
2.843 -0.209
1.209
-2.904
(0.342) (0.003) (0.702) (0.133)
Women 10.055 0.698
0.302
2.961 0.265
0.735
(0.334) (0.004) (0.723) (0.094)
40
In the beginning-of-period earnings equations, z-scores reject the null hypothesis of
equal signal qualities across both race and gender in the first period of employment. By
the end of the first period, the state has observed and evaluated the worker’s performance,
and tests of equal signal quality do not provide evidence of statistical discrimination against
blacks (the difference between men and women still holds). This suggests that, at the time
of hire when a wage decision is made, the state may have different information about black
and white workers, but that information disparity seems to have disappeared after observing
workers. Because performance evaluations of one (“unsatisfactory”) and two (“below good”)
are rarely given, consideration must be given to the fact that, even in the presence of “noisy”
information about blacks, the gap may not be reflected in the form of a poor performance
evaluation.
To further investigate whether statistical discrimination has disappeared completely
by the end of the first year of employment, this same test is conducted for all levels of tenure
with the state. Table 5.3 reports the z-statistics for each both genders and races, across
time, for both earnings and performance evaluation.
Table 5.2: Statistical Discrimination Test: Updated Signal
Race Gender
Earnings Evaluation Earnings Evaluation
1 Year -2.512 1.051 5.333 -2.904
2 Years -8.331 -2.029 0.229 -0.565
3 Years -3.299 0.238 1.662 0.107
4 Years -3.666 -0.093 0.542 0.255
5 Years -1.069 -1.554 0.762 0.875
6 Years -3.253 -1.215 -0.408 -0.354
7 Years -1.722 -0.770 0.902 1.305
8 Years -0.838 -0.836 0.358 -2.959
9 Years -1.703 -0.890 0.632 0.308
10 Years -1.536 -1.201 -0.653 -0.001
Note
The numbers reported in this table represent z-scores from a test of the null
hypothesis that λ does not differ by group.
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Results indicate that the information disparity across races persists in wages through
at least the first four years of employment with the state, despite there being no evidence
of it in performance evaluations.16 This conclusion is consistent with the hypothesis that
“learning” takes place as the employer observes workers through annual performance eval-
uations. Contrary to the results for whites and blacks, there exists no consistent pattern
of statistical discrimination for men and women. The first year of employment reveals a
statistically significant difference in signal quality, but not thereafter.
Table 5.3 reveals that even when a worker’s performance evaluation is excluded from
the wage and performance evaluation equations, thereby removing the vehicle through which
learning takes place, the patterns persist. There is a statistically significant difference in
signal quality across race at the beginning of the period for the first several years, but this
disparity is not present in the end-of-period measure. With regard to gender, more periods
reflect a difference in signal quality in earnings, though the results are somewhat scattered,
and no significant differences exist in performance evaluations.
As suggested, an employer who has the opportunity to observe and formally evaluate
a worker will presumably use this information about an individual’s performance on the
job when making future promotion, wage, etc. decisions. Thus, to measure performance
evaluations and wages in reduced form, and without controls for previous outcomes (namely
current salary grade, and in later periods, current or lagged salary, promotion history, tenure
with the state, and lagged performance evaluations), will result in biased estimated coeffi-
cients due to omitted variable bias. As such, in order to accurately test for the existence of
statistical discrimination, the five equations must be estimated jointly to allow the endoge-
nous variables to enter as explanatory variables that may be correlated with the error terms
(and to model that error correlation).
16It has been noted that the statistically significantly different λ2’s in early years may be due to sample
size. Specifically, 23,123 workers are observed in the first employment year, but this number decreases to
702 by year ten, where as few as 213 observations are used in the equations for blacks in year 10. However, if
the results are due entirely to large sample sizes at early points of tenure, one would expect similar patterns
across equations and demographic groups. Alternatively, the result may be driven by selection given that
modeling of the tenure (stay/leave) decision is not incorporated.
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Table 5.3: Statistical Discrimination Test: Basic Signal
Race Gender
Earnings Evaluation Earnings Evaluation
1 Year -2.512 0.997 5.333 -0.176
2 Years -2.204 -2.278 1.482 -0.447
3 Years -2.312 -2.295 3.026 0.420
4 Years -2.140 -1.100 2.020 0.995
5 Years -1.712 -0.822 1.721 1.009
6 Years -1.838 -1.632 1.285 1.970
7 Years -2.061 -1.673 0.752 0.813
8 Years -2.540 -1.581 0.554 -0.284
9 Years -3.482 -0.137 0.634 -1.051
10 Years -2.544 -0.825 -0.701 -0.251
Note
The numbers reported in this table represent z-scores from a test of the null
hypothesis that λ does not differ by group.
5.2 Results of Five-Equation Model with Controls for Unobserved
Heterogeneity
As described above, the full empirical model estimates five equations: salary grade, earnings,
performance evaluation, the probability of being promoted, and the decision to stay with
the state or leave. While no general rule exists for determining the exact number of points
of support for each type of heterogeneity, the final specification is chosen based on the value
of the likelihood function and the significance of the heterogeneity coefficients. The final
specification contains both permanent and time-varying unobserved individual heterogeneity
involving a permanent factor with two points of support and a time-varying factor with two
points of support. Results controlling for heterogeneity are reported in Appendix Table F.1-
F.2. Additionally, results from estimation of the five equations separately (i.e. not correlated
by permanent or time-varying unobserved individual heterogeneity) are similarly found in
Appendix Table F.3-F.4.
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5.3 Analysis of Estimates
Of primary interest in this study is the influence performance evaluations and promotions
have on racial and gender wage differentials. After controlling for both of these variables, the
“effect” of being black and/or female effectively disappears.17 A higher current salary grade,
more favorable performance evaluations, and having been promoted last period are positively
correlated with earnings. Last period’s salary is the strongest determinant of current salary.
If an employer statistically discriminates against blacks or women, one would expect
that observing the worker over time would allow for learning and the reduction or elimination
of ability misperceptions the employer has about these workers. That is, it would seem that
as tenure increases, being black or female should influence wages to a lesser degree. In the
earnings equations, these predictions hold in the form of small, insignificant coefficients on
interactions of tenure with race and gender. The coefficients that capture the effect of tenure
for blacks and women are not significantly different from zero, suggesting that as a worker’s
tenure with the state increases, being black or female has no effect on earnings.
A more comprehensive approach to testing for the presence of statistical discrimination
involves interacting a worker’s signal at hire with his race and gender and seeing how this
changes over time. If statistical discrimination exists, the signal will become less influential
in the determination of wages as the marginalized worker’s tenure with the state increases.
Specifically, in addition to race and gender, one signal employers have at the time of hire is
information about a worker’s education. While important before observing the worker, this
information should be less valuable in an employer’s future decisions regarding such outcomes
as earnings and salary grade. Thus, the preferred model is estimated with the addition of
four-way interactions between race, gender, education, and tenure. The full results of this
model are found in Appendix Table F.5.
The race, gender, and tenure interactions remain insignificant, as are all of the new
interactions. With regard to statistical discrimination, the coefficients on the interactions
of race and gender with education (but not tenure) in the earnings equation are negative.
17Specifically, the total effect of being black and/or female (taking into account the linear dummy variables
as well as their interactions with tenure, performance evaluation, etc) on ln(annual earnings) ranges from
-0.00428 for white women to -0.00114 for black women, which translates to a difference of $35 to $133,
compared to the average salary of white men.
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This provides some evidence that, at the time of hire, when tenure is zero, the signal sent
by blacks and women negatively affects earnings, if at all (recall that the coefficient is not
significantly different from zero). Then, as tenure increases, the effect of education shrinks,
as one would expect if the employer is observing and learning about the worker firsthand.
Therefore, though all of the coefficient are insignificant, if anything is to be taken from the
signs and magnitudes of the interaction coefficients, it is that the results are consistent with
the existence of statistical discrimination against blacks and women at the time of hire.
Because of the insignificance of all of these variables in determining wages, and because a
study of wage differentials does not call for their inclusion, the preferred model does not
include these variables, and the remaining analysis will be on the more simple specification
found in Table F.1.
Because salaries are driven by, and highly correlated with, salary grade, and because
being assigned to a higher salary grade is positively and significantly associated with higher
earnings, the determinants of salary grade are important in understanding variables that
indirectly affect earnings. Furthermore, perhaps learning that takes place on the part of
the state manifests itself through other mechanisms such as salary grade determination,
performance evaluations, and promotions.
Controlling for performance evaluation and promotion and jointly estimating to model
possible correlation with unobservables, this model predicts that being black or being female
has very little effect on the salary grade to which one is assigned. Specifically, all else equal,
black men experience a salary grade 0.01 levels lower than white men, on average, white
women enjoy a grade increase of 0.07, and black women are assigned a salary grade 0.05
lower than white men. Furthermore, the coefficients on tenure and black/female interactions
are all insignificant, which suggests that as a worker’s tenure with the state increases, and
as the state continues to evaluate their performance, being black or being female has no
affect on salary grade. None of the interactions involving past performance evaluations and
female/black interactions is significant, so no meaningful comparison can be made between
the importance of more current or more dated performance evaluations in the determination
of salary grade.
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All period t − 1 endogenous variables are significant in the salary grade equation.
Specifically, a better lagged salary grade, higher lagged earnings, better lagged performance,
and having been promoted last period all positively influence current salary grade. Workers
with more education also work at a higher salary grade, and workers in all occupational
categories other than officials and administrators work at a lower salary grade.
The next chronological outcome in the model that may yield information about sta-
tistical discrimination and the welfare of blacks is performance evaluation. The comparison
group in estimation is a performance rating of “outstanding.” Consistent with the uncon-
ditional means presented in Appendix Table C.2, white women are more likely than white
men to be evaluated favorably, all else constant. More educated workers are less likely to
earn less than an outstanding rating, as are workers who received favorable evaluations in
the last period, suggesting, perhaps, that it takes time to learn about a job and perform well
at it. Finally, for a given salary grade, workers who enjoy relatively higher annual earnings
are less likely to receive poor evaluations.
The results of many previous empirical studies of promotion are mirrored in this anal-
ysis. Older workers and those with more tenure are less likely to experience a promotion.
This supports the notion that workers are most likely to experience internal mobility early in
their careers. Individuals earning higher salaries and those operating at a higher salary grade
are more likely to be promoted (perhaps reflecting better quality work compared to equally
qualified workers), even after controlling for selection into those higher positions. Those
workers promoted last period who experienced a relatively large increase in salary grades
are less likely to be promoted in the current period. This variable, as well as interactions
including it, will be discussed in more detail. Finally, workers who begin their employment
spell with the state at a higher starting salary grade are less likely to be promoted. This is
likely due to the fact that there is potentially less room for upward mobility when starting
out higher in the hierarchy.
Finally, a worker’s decision to continue working for the state or leave is estimated.
This decision is important for a number of reasons, including the fact that if the state
does statistically discriminate, part of the “group” information used to compensate where
individual signal gaps exist may be the probability that the worker will leave. Results indicate
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that women and blacks are more likely than white men to discontinue their employment with
the state, as are more highly educated workers and those who start out at a higher salary
grade, likely due to outside employment opportunities. Employees who enjoy more favorable
outcomes for the other endogenous variables, i.e. higher salary grade, higher earnings, better
performance evaluation, and a promotion in the current period, are less likely to terminate
their employment with the state. Those with more tenure are also less likely to leave, which
may be due, in part, to the opportunity to earn a longevity pay after ten years of state
service.
Olson and Becker (1983) recognize that even if women are promoted with the same
probability as men, discrimination might occur in the gains from promotion. Specifically, if
men experience a larger change in position, conditional on being promoted, and especially
if wages are correlated with job level, it is possible that discrimination occurs through that
avenue. One feature of the data used in this study is the individual’s salary grade, which
represents job level within the state hierarchy. Therefore, to consider the possibility that
women or blacks are discriminated against in the form of smaller gains to promotion, included
in all five equations is a variable that measures the change in salary grade, given a promotion,
as well as the change in salary grade interacted with race and gender dummy variables.
The grade change variable, not interacted with race or gender, is significant in three of
the five equations (positive in salary grade and negative in earnings and promotions), and
salary grade change, interacted with female, is significant in only the salary grade equation.
Therefore, with the exception of the one interaction, there does not seem to be evidence
suggesting that discrimination manifests itself in smaller gains to promotion for women and
blacks. Olson and Becker were not able to measure job level, but did not find that women
were paid less when promoted, which is analogous to and consistent with this result.
In summary, then, the model reinforces many findings in the earnings and promotion
literatures. More educated workers fare better than those with less human capital. Older,
more experienced workers are less likely to be promoted, as are those who start at a higher
position within the salary grade range. Blacks and women are more likely to terminate
their employment with their employer. Specific to this study, workers who receive favorable
evaluations are more likely to enjoy higher earnings in future periods.
47
However, one result generated by this model, which is seldom reported in the wage
differential literature, is that blacks and women are not more likely to be assigned to a lower
salary grade, and after controlling for performance evaluation and promotions, black men
and women are not predicted to earn less than white men. The coefficients on black and
female in both the earnings and salary grade equation are most frequently not significantly
different from zero, and in some cases even positive. This result is important in that it
confirms the need to accurately control for the occurrence of promotions (which is usually
done using a worker’s self-reported change in tasks or an unusually large wage increase) and
performance on the job18.
To evaluate the impact on wage differentials of including a measure of promotion and
performance on the job, models have been run in the absence of these variables and will
be compared to models incorporating these measures one at a time. Table 5.4 contains
predicted wage differentials as each measure is considered in turn. Specifically, Model 1
is a model with controls for permanent and time-varying heterogeneity, where the decision
to stay, earnings, and salary grade are endogenized, but both promotion and performance
evaluation are excluded. Model 2 introduces performance evaluations but excludes promo-
tions, and Model 3 does the reverse. Finally, Model 4, the preferred model, controls for
unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneously estimates the decision to stay, earnings, salary
grade, performance evaluations, and promotions.
Consistent with the results in Table F.1, and compared to those in the wage differential
literature,19 controlling for heterogeneity, performance evaluations, and promotions reduces
the wage differential by between four and eight percentage points. As coefficients from the
preferred five equation model suggest, simply being black or being female has little to no
impact on wage determination. Thus, despite the fact that blacks and women still earn less
18While it is the case that discrimination may occur via performance evaluations, it is not possible to
test that hypothesis without race and gender information about the worker’s supervisor. Blau and DeVaro
(2006) are able to test for this and do not find evidence of discrimination in performance ratings.
19Long (1976), finds a black-white ratio of 0.76 and a female-male ratio of 0.74, the former being consistent
with these results. Smith (1993) finds a range of 0.68 to 0.86 for the black-white male wage ratio. Other
studies report negative coefficients on black and/or female dummy variables. Oettinger (1996) estimates a
black dummy variable coefficient ranging between -0.08 and -0.01. Neal and Johnson (1996) study race and
gender differentials and find a coefficient of -0.24 to 0.07 for men and -0.19 to 0.04 for women.
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Table 5.4: Wage Ratios with Various Controls
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Neither No Promotion No Evaluation Both
Black/White 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.79
Female/Male 0.79 0.80 0.87 0.87
Black/White Males 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.75
Black/White Females 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.84
White Female/Male 0.79 0.79 0.86 0.86
Black Female/Male 0.91 0.95 1.04 0.97
than white men, the difference is substantially reduced by controlling for variables that seem
theoretically relevant.
The above exercise demonstrates the importance of controlling for (an employer’s per-
ception of) productivity and the occurrence of promotions when drawing conclusions about
the existence or magnitude of discrimination. While discrimination appears to be less preva-
lent after measuring these endogenous variables, that a wage differential exists yet today
calls for an exploration into what might motivate the convergence of earnings. Therefore,
section 5.4 evaluates the fit of the entire model, after which simulations are run to determine
conditions under which blacks and/or women would enjoy outcomes more similar to those
of white men.
5.4 Fit of the Model
Goodness of fit tests are performed on the model to evaluate how well the model’s predictions
match the observed data. To evaluate the fit, the coefficient estimates and observed values of
explanatory variables for the entire sample of 23,231 workers are used to calculate predicted
probabilities of the outcomes by allowing random draws to determine the simulated outcome.
Uniform random errors are used to assign outcomes from dichotomous and polychotomous
alternatives. A normal random error (i.e. N ∼ (0, 1)) that is scaled by the estimated
49
standard deviation is added to a continuous prediction to obtain simulated continuous values.
This procedure is done with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity, and the
results are presented in columns two and four of Table 5.5 (no updating). Alternatively, the
initial (t = 1) values of explanatory variables are used for all individuals in the sample, but
simulated outcomes are used in calculation of subsequent outcomes. That is, the endogenous
explanatory variables are updated to reflect simulated previous period outcomes. These
averages are listed in columns three and five (updating).
Table 5.5: Goodness of Fit Tests: Model vs. Observed Outcomes
Outcome (N) Full Sample Models Without Heterogeneity Models with Heterogeneity
(Observed) No Updating Updating No Updating Updating
Earnings 28,673 28,610 28,439 28,835 29,195
Salary Grade 63.07 63.07 63.02 63.09 63.06
Promotion Probability 8.93 9.14 7.58 9.03 8.14
Performance Evaluation 3.21 3.20 3.18 3.20 3.18
1-2 0.58 0.61 0.76 0.60 0.73
3 13.20 13.37 14.40 13.62 14.58
4 51.18 50.98 50.51 50.81 50.36
5 35.04 35.05 34.33 34.97 34.32
Leave Probability 14.67 14.47 14.54 16.05 16.24
Spell Length 3.68 3.35 6.30 3.25 6.40
1 Year 25.43 19.00 19.02 20.26 20.26
2 Years 17.48 27.27 10.69 29.08 10.16
3 Years 13.93 17.53 6.41 16.26 5.72
4 Years 10.41 12.17 4.89 11.58 4.24
5 Years 9.42 7.85 3.62 7.46 3.07
6 Years 6.61 5.63 2.47 5.63 1.99
7 Years 5.45 3.49 1.91 3.30 1.44
8 Years 4.82 2.56 1.95 2.41 1.23
9 Years 3.41 2.02 1.64 1.94 1.11
10 Years 3.04 2.48 47.40 2.08 50.78
Clearly, with and without heterogeneity, and with and without updating, the model
predicts the observed outcomes quite well. When the observed data are used (i.e. no updat-
ing), the probability of being promoted is over-predicted, and when the predicted outcomes
are used to update the explanatory variables in subsequent periods, the promotion prob-
ability is under-predicted, regardless of whether or not heterogeneity is included. Worth
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noting here is the apparent under-prediction of spell lengths in the case of updating. The
predicted mean of the stay/leave (0/1) variable is nearly identical to that observed in the
data. However, when spell lengths are calculated without updating, by necessity, the model
slightly under-predicts. This goodness of fit procedure without updating does not allow for
prediction outside the time frame the employee actually spends with the state. Therefore,
if an employee is observed in the data for six years, this methodology permits, at most, six
years of predicted outcomes. Spell lengths are only predicted to be the same as, or less than,
what is actually observed in the data, which will necessarily cause an under-prediction of
spell length. This is only true in the no updating case, and as shown, when workers are
permitted to work outside the time frame they are observed in the data (updating), spell
lengths are over-predicted.
Note here, also, that workers in the entire sample are observed to work as many as ten
years, but only if they begin their employment spell in 1994, the first year of observation.
Thus, the length of the employment spell for most workers is, by nature of the data, observed
and predicted to be less than ten years. In the simulations that follow, only individuals who
begin working for the state in 1994 are considered; thus employment spells are observed and
predicted to be longer, on average, as all workers have the opportunity to be employed for
as many as ten years.20
20This is also the scenario in updating for goodness of fit tests reported in Table 5.5. When workers are
permitted to work longer than observed, the upper bound is ten possible years of employment.
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makin’ space
6 Simulations
Having established that the model fits the observed data well, it can be used to predict how
certain outcomes of interest would change with the imposition of certain restrictions. For
instance, of particular importance is how blacks or women would fare in terms of earnings if
they were instead white and/or men.
To simulate the impact particular restrictions or interventions would have on the out-
comes of certain workers, and to maintain the actual correlation among independent variables
(such as education and occupation), an evaluation data set is created from the original data
set of NC state employees. In an effort to avoid simulating behavior of individuals beyond
their observed employment spell and needing to fill in the missing exogenous information for
those observed to no longer work for the state, the evaluation sample is restricted to those
at risk for employment with the state for the longest observable length of time. In other
words, only the 2,338 employees who begin their employment spell in 1994 are included in
the simulation exercises. Characteristics of these workers are displayed in Table 6.1.
To compare the observed outcomes of only workers who began their employment with
the state in 1994 with the simulated outcomes for the same sample, Table 6.2 contains
summary statistics in the absence of an intervention. The “observed” columns represent
means of the outcomes of interest in the actual data for the four race-gender demographic
groups. The “evaluation” columns reflect results from the same updating procedure described
above in Section 5.4, making use of the evaluation data set detailed in Table 6.1. The numbers
in parenthesis represent standard deviations for the mean predicted outcomes of 250 random
parameter draws.
Again, the model performs quite well even when the data are disaggregated by race and
gender. However, the earnings of women are over-predicted (particularly for white women),
performance evaluations are under-predicted for black women, and promotion probability is
Table 6.1: Characteristics of Employees in the Evaluation Data Set
All Workers White Men Black Men White Women Black Women
(n = 2,338) (n = 795) (n = 342) (n = 843) (n = 358)
Occupational Category
Officials & Admin. 1.501 2.47 0.76 1.19 0.66
Professional 30.72 39.04 22.27 31.58 17.63
Technicians 17.60 15.24 21.16 16.30 22.54
Protective Serv. 3.20 4.18 6.68 0.71 3.39
Paraprofessionals 0.78 0.76 1.23 0.46 1.13
Office & Clerical 23.41 6.94 10.32 42.68 29.89
Skilled Craft 13.34 26.95 20.63 2.42 0.47
Service & Maint. 9.46 4.42 16.94 4.67 24.28
Educational Level
< High School 4.89 4.84 8.44 1.35 9.48
High School 30.16 27.40 39.98 28.04 32.63
> High School 26.52 22.81 22.39 27.79 35.31
College 27.41 31.87 23.74 28.36 18.72
Graduate Degree 11.02 13.09 5.45 14.46 3.87
Part-Time 1.92 0.65 0.35 4.26 1.08
Age at Hire 36.58 37.02 36.74 36.65 35.25
Starting Salary Grade 61.23 63.13 57.54 62.21 58.23
Earnings 28,611 32,485 25,224 28,227 23,702
Performance Evaluation 4.20 4.22 3.90 4.35 4.10
1-2 0.75 0.50 1.96 0.51 0.82
3 14.54 12.34 26.71 10.85 17.20
4 48.63 52.05 50.27 41.97 53.60
5 36.07 35.11 21.06 46.67 28.39
Note
1) With the exception of age, salary grade, and earnings, all numbers in this table represent the
percentage of the demographic group within a particular category (occupational, performance,
evaluation, etc).
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substantially over-predicted for white women. As the following is an exercise in simulation
changes within the model, these discrepancies will be taken into account and hypothetical
outcomes will be compared against the numbers presented in this table.
Table 6.2: Updating With No Interventions
White Men Black Men White Women Black Women
Observed Evaluation Observed Evaluation Observed Evaluation Observed Evaluation
Salary Grade 65.96 64.97 60.16 59.62 62.82 63.90 58.91 59.54
(0.298) (0.374) (0.353) (0.146)
Earnings 32,797 33,132 25,423 25,421 28,313 31,366 23,553 25,737
(797.998) (927.918) (917.926) (296.483)
Ever Promoted 30.69 24.78 23.10 14.04 23.72 23.72 29.89 20.95
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
Evaluation 3.23 3.25 2.91 2.96 3.35 3.39 3.10 2.87
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.020)
1-2 0.48 0.30 1.95 1.16 0.55 0.51 0.71 10.27
3 11.81 10.80 26.68 21.98 10.62 8.80 16.94 14.89
4 52.23 52.87 50.22 56.10 42.09 41.62 53.50 52.75
5 35.49 36.03 21.15 20.76 46.75 49.07 28.85 22.10
Spell Length 5.54 6.23 4.65 5.30 4.78 5.82 5.54 5.39
(0.021) (0.025) (0.017) (0.025)
1 Year 20.13 19.62 23.98 27.49 25.74 25.03 20.11 24.86
2 Years 14.21 11.45 18.13 14.91 14.95 8.90 11.45 14.25
3 Years 9.43 4.91 14.04 6.14 9.25 6.64 10.61 5.87
4 Years 4.91 5.53 3.80 4.39 5.58 5.22 8.10 6.98
5 Years 5.03 2.89 5.85 4.68 7.35 3.56 3.91 2.51
6 Years 3.40 3.40 1.46 1.17 3.80 3.44 3.91 3.91
7 Years 3.65 2.77 4.68 1.75 4.74 2.37 3.35 3.63
8 Years 2.39 1.89 1.75 0.29 1.90 1.54 1.96 0.28
9 Years 1.26 1.26 0.88 0.58 2.25 1.66 1.40 1.12
10 Years 35.60 46.29 25.44 38.60 24.44 41.64 35.20 36.59
Seven interventions are conducted using the evaluation data set to determine which
factors most significantly influence the employment outcomes predicted by the model: treat
all workers as white; treat all workers as male; treat all workers as white males; assign
education levels according to the empirical distribution observed for white men; assign oc-
cupational categories according to the white male distribution; promote all workers in their
third employment year, and; assign starting salary grades according to the white male dis-
tribution. In all cases, the observed data str used in the first period of employment (rather
than predicting the first period outcome). Thus, all results should be interpreted as the
outcomes workers enjoy under the restriction, conditional on having been hired at the salary
and salary actually observed in the data.
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6.1 Intervention: All White Workers
One of the primary questions this research seeks to address is the impact being black has
on wage and promotion differentials after controlling for a measure of worker productivity.
Thus, the first intervention considered involves assigning race as white to all employees.
If the state of NC discriminates against its black workforce, removing that factor should
substantially improve the outcomes of workers who are black. Therefore, to examine that
possibility, race is set to white for the first period stay/leave equation. In subsequent periods,
the same assignment is made, and all interactions involving race are also set to zero. No
changes should be observed for white men and white women, so only results for black men
and women are presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Simulated Outcomes for All White Workers
All Blacks Black Men Black Women
Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention
Salary Grade 59.58 59.81 59.62 59.80 59.54 59.82
Earnings 25,584 25,994 25,421 26,159 25,737 25,803
Ever Promoted 17.57 18.57 14.04 18.42 20.95 18.72
Performance Evaluation 2.91 3.14 2.96 3.09 2.87 3.20
1-2 5.86 0.49 1.16 0.39 10.27 0.62
3 18.32 15.51 21.98 16.43 14.89 14.45
4 54.37 53.41 56.10 56.69 52.75 49.61
5 21.45 30.58 20.76 26.49 22.10 35.33
Spell Length 5.34 5.51 5.30 6.05 5.39 4.99
1 Year 26.14 24.71 27.49 21.64 24.86 27.65
2 Years 14.57 13.71 14.91 11.40 14.25 15.92
3 Years 6.00 6.29 6.14 6.14 5.87 6.42
4 Years 5.71 6.29 4.39 5.26 6.98 7.26
5 Years 3.57 3.14 4.68 4.39 2.51 1.96
6 Years 2.57 2.86 1.17 1.46 3.91 4.19
7 Years 2.71 2.14 1.75 1.75 3.63 2.51
8 Years 0.29 0.43 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.56
9 Years 0.86 1.00 0.58 0.88 1.12 1.12
10 Years 37.57 39.43 38.60 46.78 36.59 32.40
The most noticeable differences in actual and simulated outcomes occur in promotion
rates, performance evaluations, and spell lengths. First of all, black men are substantially
more likely to be promoted when their race is changed to white. For black women, the reverse
is true. It is worth noting that black men are unconditionally least likely to be promoted,
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which leaves room for improvement in this outcome when their characteristics are altered.
Similarly, black women are only slightly less likely to be unconditionally promoted than
white men and more likely, by over four percentage points, than white women. Therefore, it
is not surprising that they are are less likely to enjoy a promotion during their employment
spell with the state when simulated to be white.
Both black men and black women enjoy an increase in overall performance evaluations
when all workers are assigned a race of white. As evaluations are also tied to better salary
grades and earnings in the next period, this intervention reveals a slight increase in both
outcomes for both groups.
Finally, as proposed previously, if employers draw conclusions about a new hire based
on what has been observed about that worker’s group in the past, it would seem that a firm’s
expectation about a new worker’s commitment to remain on the job would be of particular
interest. In other words, how long the state has observed other blacks or women to remain in
their current position ought to influence the hiring, wage, etc. decisions the state makes. In
the absence of an intervention, black men have the shortest average spell length, and black
women stay for a period of time between that of white men and black men. When all workers
are assumed to be white, the biggest change occurs for black men. They are predicted to
continue working for the state nearly one full year longer. This type of change would reflect
favorably on an employer’s prediction of whether or not black men are committed to their
job.
6.2 Intervention: All Male Workers
The next simulation, like the first, involves changing the demographic characteristics of half
of the sample. Much of the promotion literature focuses on the gender differential, where
women are often times found to be either less likely to be promoted or to enjoy smaller wage
gains when a promotion occurs. In the case of this intervention, all workers are simulated as
men to explore how the labor market outcomes of women would change. The female dummy
variable, and all interactions including it, are set to zero. The workers whose simulated
outcomes should change, then, are women. Summary statistics for the predicted outcomes
of interest are displayed in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4: Simulated Outcomes for All Male Workers
All Women White Women Black Women
Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention
Salary Grade 62.67 63.08 63.90 64.19 59.54 59.66
Earnings 29,779 30,286 31,366 31,869 25,737 25,407
Ever Promoted 22.90 23.15 23.72 25.50 20.95 17.60
Performance Evaluation 3.24 3.27 3.39 3.34 2.87 3.05
1-2 3.26 0.56 0.51 0.43 10.27 0.98
3 10.52 12.08 8.80 9.71 14.89 19.40
4 44.76 47.47 41.62 45.53 52.75 53.44
5 41.47 39.89 49.07 44.34 22.10 26.18
Spell Length 5.69 5.92 5.82 6.37 5.39 4.87
1 Year 24.98 23.40 25.03 20.88 24.86 29.33
2 Years 10.49 10.91 8.90 8.78 14.25 15.92
3 Years 6.41 5.91 6.64 5.34 5.87 7.26
4 Years 5.75 5.16 5.22 4.74 6.98 6.15
5 Years 3.25 3.25 3.56 3.56 2.51 2.51
6 Years 3.58 2.83 3.44 2.61 3.91 3.35
7 Years 2.75 2.33 2.37 2.37 3.63 2.23
8 Years 1.17 1.17 1.54 1.42 0.28 0.56
9 Years 1.50 0.92 1.66 1.07 1.12 0.56
10 Years 40.13 44.13 41.64 49.23 36.59 32.12
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As with the race intervention, assigning all workers to be male most significantly in-
fluences promotion probabilities, performance evaluations, and the length of employment
spells. Black women are predicted to be less likely to be promoted during the tenure with
the state, though white women enjoy a greater likelihood of promotion. The reverse is true
for performance evaluations; black women are predicted to far better, and white women
would earn slightly lower evalatuions.21 Unconditionally, white women earn the highest rat-
ings; thus, when restricted to an all-male population, it is not surprising that white women
are expected to be evaluated less favorably.
Finally, as white women in the evaluation sample have the one of the shortest average
spell lengths (second only to black men), when their stay/leave decision is predicted as if they
were men, the duration of the average spell length with the state increases by roughly half of
a year. Black women, who unconditionally spend the same amount of time as state employees
as white men, and nearly one year longer than black men, are expected to terminate their
employment sooner if they are assigned a gender of male.
6.3 Intervention: All White Male Workers
The first two interventions, restricting the entire sample to first be white, then male, reflect
the marginal differences in the outcomes of interest for black men and white women compared
to white men. However, imposing both restrictions on the evaluation sample is the only way
to determine the difference in outcomes for black women. Thus, the third intervention
involves setting both race and gender, as well as all interactions including these variables, to
zero. Results are found in Table 6.5.
The wages of black women are not predicted to change substantially when only race,
or only gender, changes. However, when black women are simulated to be white men, their
annual earnings are shown to increase by nearly $1000. All other variables remain relatively
constant (with the exception of the originally under-predicted performance evaluations),
which is likely due to the fact that some of the unconditional black female outcomes compare
21The sizeable increase in performance evaluations for black women is likely due to the substantial under-
prediction in the absence of an intervention.
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Table 6.5: Simulated Outcomes for All White Male Workers
Black Women
Baseline Intervention
Salary Grade 59.54 60.06
Earnings 25,737 26,417
Ever Promoted 20.95 22.07
Performance Evaluation 2.87 3.17
1-2 10.27 0.55
3 14.89 13.89
4 52.75 53.15
5 22.10 32.41
Spell Length 5.39 5.55
1 Year 24.86 23.74
2 Years 14.25 13.69
3 Years 5.87 5.59
4 Years 6.98 7.82
5 Years 2.51 2.51
6 Years 3.91 3.35
7 Years 3.63 2.51
8 Years 0.28 0.84
9 Years 1.12 0.56
10 Years 36.59 39.39
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to those of white men (spell length, promotion probability). promotion probability) offset
the potential improvement from being male (white).
6.4 Intervention: White Male Education
Turning from basic, unchangable demographic characteristics to variables that could poten-
tially be the focus of policy interventions, consider how blacks and women may fare differently
if they brought to the labor market the same human capital as white men. There is a great
deal of disparity between the education levels of blacks and whites in the population of NC
state employees. Specifically, 45-50% of blacks begin their employment with the state with
a high school education or less, compared to 25-30% of whites. On the other hand, nearly
40% of all white employees have a college or graduate level education, whereas only 25% of
blacks have acquired that level of education by the time they begin working for the state
(see Table C.3). Thus, one testable implication of the model is that those workers with
more education, or better pre-market skills, are more likely to enjoy favorable employment
outcomes. An intervention whereby all workers enjoy an educational distribution equal to
that of white men, is considered. Table 6.6 contains the results of this simulation.
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Table 6.6: Simulated Outcomes Under the Assumption of the White Male Educational
Distribution
Black Men White Women Black Women
Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention
Salary Grade 59.62 59.96 63.90 64.31 59.54 59.96
Earnings 25,421 25,662 31,366 31,926 25,737 26,454
Ever Promoted 14.04 14.04 23.72 24.20 20.96 20.11
Performance Evaluation 2.96 2.95 3.39 3.39 2.87 2.87
1-2 1.16 0.83 0.51 0.61 10.27 10.33
3 21.98 22.53 8.80 8.83 14.89 14.79
4 56.10 57.02 41.62 41.50 52.75 52.18
5 20.76 19.62 49.07 49.07 22.10 22.70
Spell Length 5.30 4.92 5.82 5.86 5.39 5.19
1 Year 27.49 32.16 25.03 24.91 24.86 25.98
2 Years 14.91 14.91 8.90 9.02 14.25 15.08
3 Years 6.14 6.73 6.64 6.41 5.87 6.42
4 Years 4.39 4.09 5.22 5.22 6.98 6.98
5 Years 4.68 3.51 3.56 3.80 2.51 1.68
6 Years 1.17 1.17 3.44 2.61 3.91 4.19
7 Years 1.75 1.46 2.37 2.37 3.63 3.63
8 Years 0.29 0.00 1.54 1.78 0.28 0.84
9 Years 0.58 1.17 1.66 1.42 1.12 1.68
10 Years 38.60 34.80 41.64 42.47 36.59 33.52
Across the board, there is an increase in earnings, by at most $700. Salary grades, pro-
motion rates, and performance evaluations remain almost unchanged across the demographic
groups due to the education intervention. Given that very few of the education variables are
significant in these equations, this result is not surprising. Even in the salary grade equation,
where all four education dummy variables are positive and significantly different from zero,
the largest suggests that an employee with more than a high school education should enjoy
an increase in salary grade of 0.13.
Tenure with the state is the only other outcome that changes by any noticeable amount,
and the results for blacks are consistent with the empirical result that more educated workers
are likely to attract better outside wage offers, which creates an incentive to terminate their
current employment situation.
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6.5 Intervention: White Male Occupations
Appendix Tables G.1 and G.3 contain information on promotion and salary grade differen-
tials by EEO category. Additionally, Table C.3 describes the differences in race and gender
by occupational assignment. Officials and administrators, professionals, and technicians are
observed to have salary grades as low as 50 and as high as 85-90. Individuals employed in
these occupations have much more room for upward mobility, given the high grade that may
be achieved, than those working as paraprofessionals and in service and maintenance, for
instance. This hypothesis is supported by the realized promotion probabilities in Table G.1.
Further, if blacks or women are more likely to be employed in occupational categories with
a more restrictive range of observed salary grades, promotion will be more difficult, if not
impossible. An examination of Table C.3 reveals that whites are nearly twice as likely to
be employed as professionals, and blacks are more often employed as technicians than are
white workers. Black men and women are also much more likely to be employed in service
and maintenance, an occupational category with very low promotion rates.
Therefore, to determine the impact occupational category has on the outcomes of
interest, all workers in the sample are assigned the observed occupational distribution of
white men. The results of this intervention are found in Table 6.7.
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Table 6.7: Simulated Outcomes Under the Assumption of the White Male Occupational
Distribution
Black Men White Women Black Women
Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention
Salary Grade 59.62 59.71 63.90 64.09 59.54 59.87
Earnings 25,421 25,279 31,366 31,483 25,737 25,787
Ever Promoted 14.04 14.04 23.72 21.59 20.95 20.67
Performance Evaluation 2.96 2.97 3.39 3.34 2.87 2.83
1-2 1.16 0.90 0.51 0.40 10.27 9.85
3 21.98 21.57 8.80 9.65 14.89 15.95
4 56.10 56.69 41.62 44.99 52.75 55.09
5 20.76 20.84 49.07 44.95 22.10 19.11
Spell Length 5.30 5.20 5.82 5.63 5.39 5.13
1 Year 27.49 28.95 25.03 26.57 24.86 25.42
2 Years 14.91 14.33 8.90 9.61 14.25 15.92
3 Years 6.14 7.31 6.64 6.76 5.87 6.70
4 Years 4.39 3.80 5.22 5.34 6.98 7.26
5 Years 4.68 3.80 3.56 3.68 2.51 2.23
6 Years 1.17 1.17 3.44 2.85 3.91 4.19
7 Years 1.75 1.75 2.37 2.49 3.63 3.07
8 Years 0.29 0.58 1.54 1.54 0.28 0.56
9 Years 0.58 0.29 1.66 1.42 1.12 1.96
10 Years 38.60 38.01 41.64 39.74 36.59 32.68
Despite the apparent differences in promotability across occupations, and the way in
which demographic groups sort themselves into the various occupational classifications, there
are almost no changes in the predicted outcomes when all workers are assigned occupations
according to the white male distribution. As Table F.1 reveals, the equations that contain
significant coefficients on the occupational dummy variables are salary grade, earnings, pro-
motion, and stay/leave. However, the first two equations include very small coefficients,
despite their significance. For instance, all else constant, service and maintenance employees
will be assigned a salary grade that is, at most, 0.88 levels lower than an otherwise obser-
vationally equivalent officials and administrators employee. Significant coefficients that are
larger in magnitude, but still not among the most important determinants, are found in the
promotion equation and stay/leave equations. Technicians, office and clerical, skilled craft,
and service and maintenance workers are all noticeably more likely to be promoted than an
individual employed as an administrator. Thus, an intervention that would involve training
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disadvantaged workers to be able to market their skills in white male occupations would not
seem to influence the labor market outcomes of these workers.
6.6 Intervention: Promotion in Employment Year 3
The occurrence of a promotion positively influences future salary grade, earnings, perfor-
mance evaluations, the probability of being promoted, and the probability of continuing to
work for the state. Therefore, evaluating the way outcomes are affected by a forced promo-
tion may suggest the ways promotion differentials affect other outcomes of interest. Table 6.8
describes the results of a simulation whereby all workers are promoted in their third em-
ployment year, assuming they are predicted to work at least three years. As shown, the
percentage of ever promoted workers increases dramatically. The 25-30% of workers who are
never promoted are those who leave the state during the first or second year of employment.
Promoting all workers in their third year of employment makes them unambiguously
worse off in terms of earnings, but by very small amounts. Likewise, changes in the other
outcomes of interest are small or non-existent. This may be driven by the fact that the coeffi-
cients on promotion or lagged promotion are generally small and/or insignificant. Therefore,
it seems forcing a promotion does little to influence the outcomes of any group. Perhaps this
is due to the fact that there is little variation by demographic group in the unconditional
percentage of workers ever promoted. Roughly 25-30% of all workers are promoted during
their first employment spell with the state, the most frequently promoted group being white
men, followed by black women, white women, and lastly, black men.
6.7 Intervention: White Male Starting Salary Grade
Finally, Table 6.9 contains summary statistics for a simulation that involves assigning a
worker’s initial grade according to the distribution of white male initial grades. One potential
reason blacks and women earn less than men, particularly at the onset of their employment
with the state, is because of statistical discrimination. Specifically, if the employer underesti-
mates the ability of certain workers, or anticipates that they may terminate their employment
due to a weaker attachment to the labor force, the worker may be assigned to a starting
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position which is lower than that of a white male, for instance. Observed starting salary
grades support this hypothesis. Unconditionally, white men have an average starting salary
grade of 63.13, black men start at 57.54, white women start at 62.21, and black women have
an average initial salary grade of 58.23.
In this particular simulation, the initial salary grade of white men remains unchanged.
Black men, white women, and black women, however, are assigned starting salary grades
according to the white male distribution. The results of each of the five outcomes of interest
are presented below.
Table 6.9: Simulated Outcomes Under the Assumption of the White Male Initial Salary
Grade Distribution
Black Men White Women Black Women
Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention Baseline Intervention
Salary Grade 59.62 65.71 63.90 65.82 59.54 65.24
Earnings 25,421 28,806 31,366 32,056 25,737 28,790
Ever Promoted 14.04 13.45 23.72 24.08 20.95 16.48
Performance Evaluation 2.96 3.00 3.39 3.40 2.87 2.89
1-2 1.16 0.90 0.51 0.44 10.27 9.88
3 21.98 20.62 8.80 8.65 14.89 14.32
4 56.10 56.27 41.62 41.68 52.75 53.14
5 20.76 22.22 49.07 49.23 22.10 22.65
Spell Length 5.30 5.86 5.82 5.98 5.39 5.60
1 Year 27.49 23.98 25.03 23.72 24.86 24.58
2 Years 14.91 13.16 8.90 8.54 14.25 12.57
3 Years 6.14 6.14 6.64 6.17 5.87 5.31
4 Years 4.39 3.51 5.22 5.58 6.98 6.98
5 Years 4.68 3.80 3.56 3.80 2.51 2.79
6 Years 1.17 1.17 3.44 3.20 3.91 3.63
7 Years 1.75 1.46 2.37 2.49 3.63 3.07
8 Years 0.29 0.29 1.54 1.42 0.28 0.56
9 Years 0.58 0.58 1.66 1.78 1.12 0.56
10 Years 38.60 45.91 41.64 43.30 36.59 39.94
Both average salary grade and salary increase for all three groups when the white male
initial salary grade distribution is imposed. Blacks benefit the most, enjoying as much as a
$3300 increase in salary (black men). Blacks are less likely to be promoted, given the new
distribution of initial salary grades, and white women experience only a small increase in
promotability. Consistent with the notion of statistical discrimination, if parity is achieved in
66
terms of initial placement, there is less need for “catch up” for groups that would otherwise
be evaluated based on group characteristics at the time of hire. Performance evaluations
increase by a negligible amount. Average tenure with the state increases for all three groups.
In summary, seven interventions have been considered: treat all workers as white, treat
all workers as male, treat all workers as white male, assign all workers an educational level
which is derived from the empirical distribution of white male education, assign all workers
an occupational category which is derived from the empirical distribution of white male
occupations, promote all workers in their third period of employment, and assign all workers
an initial salary grade derived from the distribution of white male starting salary grade.
When demographic characteristics are altered, the only noticeable changes in the out-
comes of interest occur in promotion probabilities, performance evaluations, and tenure with
the state. The exception to that is when both race and gender are altered such that black
women, when treated as white men, experience a $1000 increase in annual earnings. When
the educational or occupational distribution of white men is used to assign new, hypothetical
education levels and occupational categories to all state employees, few changes are observed.
The same is true when all workers are promoted in the third period of employment.
The only intervention that induces any sizeable changes in earnings is when the dis-
tribution of white male starting salary grades is used to assign initial grades to all workers,
ceteris paribus. In that case, the average wages of white women increase by nearly $700,
and the gain is as much as $3300 for black men. Likewise, there is a marked increase in
salary grades and tenure for all three groups. These facts, coupled with there being fewer
promotions when simulated to start at a higher salary grade, are consistent with the notion
that the state under-places workers at the onset of employment. In the absence of this in-
tervention, the more frequent promotions for black, in particular, seem to reflect the fact
that the state is “catching up” workers who were originally assigned too-low starting salary
grades. A more informed signal at the time initial salary grade decisions are made, should
the result be a higher initial placement, would likely benefit the employer at the same time
all workers would clearly fare much better in terms of all outcomes of interest.
The following graphs highlight the differences in the way the seven interventions affect
four of the variables of interest: salary grade, earnings, performance evaluations, and the
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probability of being promoted. The differences in predicated salary grades across demo-
graphic groups is consistent regardless of the intervention, with the exception of the last.
When all workers begin with roughly the same average salary as white men, black salary
grades are shown to grow at a slower rate than that of whites.
In terms of salary, it appears as if the smallest variation in wages is also seen in the last
intervention. By the time workers are observed to work ten years, the difference between
the highest average salary (white men) and the lowest (black men) is under $5,000, which is
less than each of the other inventions.
The most noticeable changes in performance evaluation are observed when all workers
are simulated to be white, or white and male. Specifically, in both of these interventions, the
performance evaluations of black women are predicted to exceed that of white men by the
tenth employment year, and the average evaluations among black men is almost the same as
that of white men. It is in these two interventions where performance evaluation convergence
among men is closest to being realized.
Predicted promotion rates vary only slightly depending upon the intervention. There
is not a great deal of dispersion around the mean during a worker’s tenure with the state.
Black women tend to be the only workers whose promotion probability seems to increase over
time. Not surprisingly, in the promotion intervention, whereby all workers enjoy a promotion
in period three, promotion rates are shown to decline considerably over time.
6.8 Source of Changes in Interventions: Unobserved Heterogene-
ity or Performance Evaluations?
This research improves upon past earnings studies by controlling for a worker’s ability on the
job by utilizing a uniform measure of performance evaluation. Additionally, endogeneity of
some of the explanatory variables in the earnings equation is addressed by jointly estimating
five outcomes and modeling correlation across the error terms by controlling for both time-
varying and permanent individual heterogeneity.
Simulations reveal that substantial improvements in the socioeconomic outcomes of
blacks and women are possible, particularly if they begin their tenure with the state at a
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Figure 1: Predicted Salary Grade from Interventions
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Figure 2: Predicted Earnings from Interventions
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Figure 3: Predicted Performance Evaluations from Interventions
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Figure 4: Predicted Promotion Probabilities from Interventions
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better position in the salary grade hierarchy. Because of the introduction of performance
evaluations and unobserved heterogeneity in this model, it is not obvious which is causing
these important improvements. To disentangle these simultaneous sources of change, all
interventions are run with a model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity, but
is otherwise identical to the preferred model, namely in its inclusion of the performance
evaluation measure. These results are found in Appendix Tables F.7-F.9.
These interventions without controls for heterogeneity suggest that the source of the
changes comes both performance evaluations and controls for unobserved heterogeneity.
Specifically focusing on the last intervention, starting salary grade, where most notable
changes occurred, it is clear that the inclusion of performance evaluations alone is respon-
sible for a significant portion of the total change, but certainly not all. For instance, black
men and women enjoy a roughly seven point increase in their overall salary grades, roughly
four of which come from a model not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Earnings for
the two groups increase by approximately $3000-4000, one-fourth of which comes from the
inclusion of performance evaluations. These types of patterns are generally consistent across
the interventions and demographic groups: blacks and woman have much to gain with these
interventions, even in the absence of heterogeneity controls, but the full improvements come
when the equations are jointly estimated.
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makin’ space
7 Conclusions
This study makes use of a rich data set provided by the state of North Carolina that has never
been released for external empirical research. Included in the data are two variables that
do not typically exist in standard nationally-representative economic data sets. Specifically,
the state of North Carolina defines a promotion as a change in position (personnel number)
accompanied by an increase in salary grade. Both of these measures exist in the data, which
makes identifying a promotion unambiguous and does not require reliance on an arbitrary
characterization such as a change in tasks or unusually large wage increase. Additionally, the
state of North Carolina annually evaluates the performance of all of its workers on a standard
1-5 scale. Because all employees in the data are employed by the same firm and evaluated
using the same rubric, comparison of ability on the job of different workers is permissible.
These unique features create the opportunity to perform empirical tests and develop
theoretical models that are either not possible or lack important components when esti-
mated with other data. The existence of performance evaluation allows for a simple test
of statistical discrimination. Specifically, the expected value of a worker’s performance on
the job, conditional on the receipt of an imperfect signal of ability, yields an equation that
is estimable by OLS, whereby performance evaluation is regressed on individual and group
characteristics. While an exact test of statistical discrimination cannot be performed due
to the relevant measures being imbedded in a ratio containing two parameters, the equality
of signal reliability across groups can be tested. In the first period, there does not appear
to be a difference in signal qualities between men and women, but there is between blacks
and whites. To further explore the possibility that statistical discrimination is present, this
same test is conducted for all employment years. Across race, evidence of a difference in
the reliability of signals persists throughout the first five employment years but disappears
thereafter. These results are robust to several specifications, suggesting that the existence
of statistical discrimination, imbedded in, but not defined by differences in, signal quality,
cannot necessarily be rejected.
If the state does, in fact, statistically discriminate against blacks, but later refines its
beliefs according to the rules of Bayesian updating, the employer is predicted to anticipate
greater ability, on average, the noisier is the initial signal. Therefore, as concluded in other
studies of statistical discrimination, blacks would seem to benefit by extending their employ-
ment spell with the state so as to have the opportunity to be observed for a longer period
of time. Throughout their tenure with the state, then, race should matter less in employ-
ment outcomes, and performance evaluations should be more influential in the determination
processes.
In order to test these hypotheses, a five-equation model of performance evaluation,
promotion, earnings, salary grade, and employment decisions, is estimated simultaneously,
allowing for permanent and time-varying heterogeneity. While mirroring the results of many
other wage and promotion studies, one less common finding is that the estimated coefficients
suggest that, after controlling for productivity, blacks are not expected to earn less, or
operate at a significantly lower salary grade, than whites. The coefficients on black and
female are either small and negative or not significantly different from zero. Furthermore,
in most equations, race and gender interacted with tenure is not significantly different from
zero, further supporting the notion that as the state observes a worker and evaluates his or
her performance, race by itself is not a significant determinant of the outcomes of interest.
Where the interactions are significant, they are very small in magnitude.
Interventions considered include treating all workers as white and/or male, assigning
all workers an education or occupation according to the respective white male distributions,
promoting all workers during their third employment year, and assigning all workers a start-
ing salary grade defined by the empirical distribution for white males. The intervention that
produced the most notable results, particularly in terms of earnings, is the starting salary
grade restriction. This also serves as evidence that if all workers were assigned a higher
starting salary grade, that would benefit them more than simply being treated as a white
male worker.
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Appendix A: Variable Construction
A.1 Promotion/Demotion
According to the NC OSP, a promotion (demotion) is defined as an increase (decrease) in
salary grade, accompanied by a change in the worker’s position-specific personnel number.
The “last action taken” variable also contains a code for “promotion (demotion) from.” Since
salary grade is not available for every employment-year observation, and some salary grades
are recoded as missing (detailed below), a promotion (demotion) is also said to have occurred
if “last action taken” is coded as such. In cases where it appears a promotion and demotion
occurred simultaneously (possible if “last action taken” indicates a promotion (demotion)
occurred at the same time personnel number changes and salary grade decreases (increases)),
if salary and salary grade change in the same direction, it is assumed “last action take” is
miscoded. If salary and salary grade movement conflict, those individuals are dropped from
the sample.
action taken” indicates a promotion (demotion) occurred at the same time personnel
number changes and salary grade decreases (increases). Upon inspection of “last action
taken,” salary, and grade, 20 of the 36 had incorrect “last action taken” codes (for instance,
salary and grade may both decrease, but “last action taken” indicates a promotion occurred).
The remaining 16 cases involved conflicting changes in grade and salary and are eliminated
from the sample.
A.2 Age
The data include a measure of age, as well as the individual’s birth date. A second measure
of age is calculated as the number of years between June 30 of a particular year and the
worker’s birth date. employment with the state. If reported age and calculated age differ in
any of the ten years, the calculated measure of age is used as long as the two are the same in
at least one year (in these cases, the years in which they differ typically report the worker as
being between 80 and 100 years old). If reported age and calculated age are never equal, age
is reported as missing. Similarly, if a worker’s birth date is never available, coded invalidly
(such as 236305 or 64610), or coded 10101, age is reported as missing.
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A.3 Race
The remaining 260 workers report variation in their race and are dropped from the sample.
Race is coded as “White,” “Black,” “Hispanic,” “Asian-American,” “American-Indian or
Alaskan Native,” and “other.” If no information on race is available, or if race appears
to change during the employee’s years of employment, it is coded as missing, and those
individuals are dropped from the sample. In the end, only workers who are consistently
reported as “White” or “Black” are used in the final sample.
It is worth nothing that according to the NC OSP, “The state employs only United
States citizens or aliens who can provide proof of identity and work authorization with three
working days of employment.”
A.4 Gender
A study of this nature necessitates that no worker have gender coded as missing. Therefore,
if reported gender varies during the worker’s tenure with the state, the most commonly-
occurring report of gender is used all years during which the individual is employed. If
gender is never reported, the individual is dropped from the sample.
A.5 Tenure
The data include a measure of aggregate service months each year, as well as the original
date the employee began working for the state of North Carolina. If neither is ever reported,
or if the worker’s entry date changes throughout the sample, experience is coded as missing.
Note that when hire date changes, this does not necessarily reflect that the worker left the
state and returned. Workers who left and returned most often have a constant entry date,
and most individuals with changing entry dates had only one employment spell. Experience
is also coded as missing if there exists no valid entry date and reported aggregate service
never changes during the worker’s employment. case for 57 workers.
Based on entry date, tenure is manually calculated each year. If calculated tenure
exceeds reported aggregate service, it is assumed the individual left the state and returned
at some point. Therefore, aggregate service is used as the tenure measure. If the worker’s
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hire date is unavailable and reported aggregate service changes during the sample period,
reported service is used. If aggregate service is unavailable or reported service is constant
during the sample period (always missing, zero, or some unchanging positive value), and hire
data is available and unchanging, calculated tenure is used.
Of the workers who have constant hire dates and varying reports of aggregate service,
but whose reported aggregate service exceeds calculated tenure by more than six months in
every employment year, there appears to have been a coding error. Though the reported
service values appear too large, they are used as the measure of tenure.
After coding tenure as detailed above, if an individual has zero months of tenure in
multiple years (reported aggregate service months are constant during a portion of the sample
period, though not in every period), the first nonzero observation is used to calculate tenure
for all previous periods. If calculated tenure is positive in each employment year, tenure is
recoded in this manner. However, for workers with tenure less than zero in at least one of
the previous employment years, tenure is considered missing.
For all workers whose tenure is still missing, a random draw is taken from the uniform
distribution for the first employment year and observed tenure is assigned according to this
draw within the actual observed tenure distribution. The final sample contains only workers
who have 0-12 months of reported service at the start of the first observation.
A.6 Education
Both “employee education level” and “education level required” are reported in the data and
are supposed to be equal to one another. In some cases (73 occurrences in the 967,473 total
observations), “employee education level” is missing or listed as “other” or “miscellaneous.”
When that occurs, “education level required” is used as the employee’s education level.
Categorical education levels include less than high school (workers with education reported
as “less than 9th grade” or “high school, not graduated”), high school, more than high school
but no degree (workers with education reported as “high school + 1 year,” “high school
+ 2 years,” or “high school + 3 years”), college graduate, and graduate degree (workers
with education reported as “masters,” “phd.,” “assoc. degree,” “dentist,” “attorney,” or
“physician”).
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Education is considered missing if reported as “miscell.,” “other,” or “miscellaneous,
doctors, lawyers, medical profession.” Excluding one-year spells, reported education does
not change while employed with the state for most workers. If education is missing during
any of their years with the state, it is imputed as the level reported in other years.
If education is missing during any of the years employed with the state, it is assumed
to be the previous reported level (or next, in the case of a worker whose education is not
reported in the first year he or she is employed with the state). For instance, a worker whose
education is first reported to increase from “high school” to “more than high school, no
degree” in 1997 is assumed to be a high school graduate in all years prior to 1997 and a high
school graduate with additional years of schooling in all years after and including 1997.
The remaining workers report a decrease and/or multi-level categorical increase (for
instance, directly from “high school graduate” to “graduate degree”) in their education
level during their employment with the state. Like the workers with no report of education,
education is coded as missing for these individuals. The final sample contains only individuals
whose education is not considered missing throughout the sample period and whose missing
education levels could be imputed from other years of data for that worker.
A.7 Salary/Wage
A record of salary is present for all workers for each year they worked with the state. There
exist no missing observations. However, an annual salary is indistinguishable from hourly
and monthly earnings as reported. The only way to identify how earnings are reported is
to examine the integer of earnings. If the integer of earnings (“wage”) differs from reported
earnings, it appears that the worker earns an hourly wage.
Earnings are considered hourly if salary and its integer do not differ and annual oth-
erwise. There exist 1020 observations where salary and its integer do not differ, but salary
is less than or equal to $85. In these cases, it appears as if the individual’s hourly wage is
an even dollar amount (e.g., $14.00), so earnings are coded as hourly. For one worker who
is employed in each of the ten sample years, he reportedly earns $195.00 in every period.
This individual’s record indicates that his hours per year vary from 3 months to 12 months.
As these data do not seem reliable, this salary of $195 is also coded as hourly, and thus,
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not used in estimation. The next smallest salary is $750 (followed by $855, $1000, $1350,
$1500, $2000, $2500, $3000, $3500, $3510, etc.), which seems less likely to be a (pattern of)
hourly wages, particularly if these individuals began working with the state near the end of
a sample period and earned only a partial annual salary.
annual salaries and are thus used in estimation.
A.8 Salary Grade
The North Carolina salary schedule includes grades 50-96. However, in addition to 50-96,
the data contain salary grades 0, 00, 03, 04, 07, 32, 33, 37, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, B, B1, B2,
B3, B4, C, C1, C2, C3, C4, D, D2, D3, D4, E, G, FR (flat rate), and NG (no grade, used
for trainees). In estimation, salary grade will be used a measure of ranking, and as such, FR
and NG have no meaning and will be coded as missing. According to the NC OSP, 0, 03,
04, and 07 should be considered NG, and 00 is treated as bad data on temporary workers.
32, 33, and 37 are likely teachers (in hospitals, for instance, whose salary grades were later
consolidated to FR) whose salary grades are invalid and should be considered NG. Finally,
there appears to be a hierarchical structure to grades A1 through G, though it is not clear
how they compare to grades 50-96. Therefore, all grades that do not fall within the 50-96
will be treated as missing.
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Appendix B: Sample Selection
Of the 1,081,533 employment positions offered by the state over a ten year period (1994-
2003), 114,060 were vacant positions, leaving 967,473 valid filled positions (in some cases, a
worker may hold multiple jobs in a single year). Of those, 190,784 were unique individuals.
The sample used in estimation contains 23,123 unique black or white individuals, each with
a valid set of dependent variables and with the following summary statistics. The following
sections detail the selection of the sample, as well as the racial and gender characteristics of
the employees dropped from the final sample.
B.1 One Job with the State at a Time
857 workers (6,925 observations) were dropped from the sample because they held multiple
jobs with the state in at least one of the ten sample years.
Table B.1: Description of Individuals Dropped from Estimation Sample Due to Multiple
Jobs in a Given Year
White Black
Spanish Asian American
Total
American American Indian
Male
118 49 3 0 2 172
68.60 28.49 1.74 0 1.16 100%
19.28 21.49 42.86 0 28.57 20%
Female
494 179 4 6 5 688
71.80 26.02 0.58 0.87 0.73 100%
90.72 78.51 57.14 100 71.43 80%
Total
612 228 7 6 7 860
71.16 26.51 0.81 0.70 0.81 100%
100 100 100 100 100 100%
Note
Three individuals have an equal number of each of two race reports; thus, 860
races are reported for 857 individuals.
81
B.2 Age 25 or Older at the Time of Hire
25,079 individuals were dropped because they were less than 25 when first observed. An
additional 22 were eliminated because no age was available. 30 individuals had a reported
birthday of January 1, 01, and were dropped as a result. Finally, 291 workers had changing
birthdates, which made the determination of age impossible. A total of 25,422 individuals
were dropped due to age limitations.
Table B.2: Description of Individuals Dropped from Estimation Sample Due to Age
White Black
Spanish Asian American
Other Total
American American Indian
Male
8,813 2,813 123 113 178 0 12,039
73.20 23.36 1.02 0.94 1.48 0 100%
50.62 39.24 42.71 38.70 55.11 0 47.25%
Female
8,589 4,352 165 179 145 1 13,431
63.95 32.40 1.23 1.33 1.08 0.01 100%
49.34 60.73 57.29 61.30 44.89 25 52.71%
Missing
7 2 0 0 0 3 12
58.33 16.67 0 0 0 25 100%
0.04 0.03 0 0 0 75 0.05%
Total
17,409 7,166 288 292 323 4 25,482
68.32 28.12 1.13 1.15 1.27 0.02 100%
100 100 100 100 100 100 100%
Note
53 individuals have two race reports, one worker has three race reports, and five have equal
reports of female and male; thus, 25,482 races and genders are reported for 25,422 individuals.
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B.3 Race Reported as Black or White
283 workers are excluded from the sample due to inconsistent reports of race, as well as the
small sample (5,410 total) of the workers whose race is listed as “other” (American-Indian,
Asian-American, Spanish-American, or “other”).
Table B.3: Description of Individuals Dropped from Estimation Sample Due to Race
White Black
Spanish Asian American
Other Total
American American Indian
“O
th
er
”
R
ac
e
Male
739 807 1,121 0 2,667
27.71 30.26 42.03 0 100%
48.88 41.99 56.79 0 49.30%
Female
773 1,115 853 2 2,743
28.18 40.65 31.10 0.07 100%
51.12 58.01 43.21 100 50.70%
Total
1,512 1,922 1,974 2 5,410
27.95 35.53 36.49 0.04 100%
100 100 100 100 100%
V
ar
y
in
g
R
ac
e
Male
91 46 32 23 57 0 249
36.55 18.47 12.85 9.24 22.89 0 100%
44.61 30.87 40 54.76 60.64 43.76%
Female
113 103 48 19 37 0 320
35.31 32.19 15 5.94 11.56 0 100%
55.39 69.13 60 45.24 39.36 0 56.24%
Total
204 149 80 42 94 0 569
35.85 26.19 14.06 7.38 16.52 0 100%
100 100 100 100 100 0 100%
Note
281 individuals have two reports of race, one has three reports of race, and one has four reports.
Thus, there are 569 reports of race for 283 workers.
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B.4 Inconsistent Reports of Gender
22 workers are have equal reports of being male and female. Race characteristics are reported
below. Note that when gender varied as reported, but one gender was documented more
frequently than the other, the more commonly-reported gender was used. Furthermore, in
the age exclusion section, 12 workers had no report of gender and have thus already been
excluded from the sample.
Table B.4: Composition of Individuals Dropped: Gender
N Percent
White 16 72.73%
Black 6 27.27%
B.5 Education
Workers were dropped from the sample if no report of education was available (831 indi-
viduals), education decreases during the individual’s tenure with the state (374 workers), or
if education jumps more than one level during an unreaslistic number of years, such as an
increase from less than a high school diploma to a college degree in three years (144 workers).
B.6 First Year with the State in 1994 or Later
In order to model unobserved heterogeneity, only workers who are new employees of the state
when first observed are used in estimation. A total of 83,820 individuals are dropped because
of tenure information. Of those, 192 did not have months of service or a valid entry date
from which tenure could be calculated. The remaining 83,628 are eliminated because number
of months of service was more than 12 when first observed. The demographic characteristics
of these workers follows.
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Table B.5: Description of Individuals Dropped from Estimation Sample Due to Education
White Black Total
Male
711 221 932
76.29 23.71 100%
75.72 53.90 69.09%
Female
228 189 417
54.68 45.32 100%
24.28 46.10 30.91%
Total
939 410 1,349
69.61 30.39 100%
100 100 100%
Table B.6: Description of Individuals Dropped from Estimation Sample Due to Tenure
White Black Total
Male
31,196 9,742 40,938
76.20 23.80 100%
50.38 44.48 48.84%
Female
30,724 12,158 42,882
71.65 28.35 100%
49.62 55.52 51.16%
Total
61,920 21,900 83,820
73.87 26.13 100%
100 100 100%
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B.7 Invalid Independent Variables
In addition to the demographic variables described above (age, gender, race), some individ-
uals have independent variables that are missing or otherwise coded in such a way that the
observations must be eliminated from the final sample. Specifically, 7,162 workers have one
or more earnings observation that is an hourly wage, rather than an annual salary, in their
first employment spell. 57 workers are missing information about the EEO category in which
their job is classified, and eight workers are dropped because they hold a position located
somewhere other than the state of North Carolina (Atlanta, Washington, DC, or Chicago).
Therefore, 7,227 workers are dropped from the sample due to missing or invalid independent
variables other than demographic characteristics described above.
Table B.7: Description of Individuals Dropped from Estimation Sample Due to Independent
Variables
White Black Total
Male
2,034 876 2,910
69.90 30.10 100%
44.46 33.03 40.27%
Female
2,541 1,776 4,317
58.86 41.14 100%
55.54 66.97 59.73%
Total
4,575 2,652 7,227
63.30 36.70 100%
100 100 100%
B.8 Missing Dependent Variables
Finally, 43,271 individuals were eliminated due to missing dependent variables. Among them,
3,706 are dropped due to missing salary grade, 25,263 are missing performance evaluation,
and the remaining 14,302 are missing both salary grade and performance evalauation. A
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total of 58,804 employment-year observations have invalid (outside the “unsatisfactory” to
“outstanding” range) or missing performance evaluations. Of those, 28,827 (49.02%) are
coded as “not enough time in job to evaluate.”
Table B.8: Description of Individuals Dropped from Estimation Sample Due to Missing
Dependent Variables
White Black Total
Male
14,734 6,491 21,225
69.42 30.58 100%
51.14 44.89 49.05%
Female
14,077 7,969 22,046
63.85 36.15 100%
48.86 55.11 50.95%
Total
28,811 14,460 43,271
66.58 33.42 100%
100 100 100%
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Number of Observations Mean/Percent Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Non-Time-Varying Demographic Variables
Age at EOD1 23,123 37.12 9.47 25 77
Sex (Female = 1) 23,123 0.57 0.50 0 1
Race (Black = 1) 23,123 0.31 0.46 0 1
Handicap Status (Yes = 1) at EOD 23,123 1.47 0.12 0 1
Veteran Status (Yes = 1) at EOD 23,123 11.33 0.32 0 1
Time-Varying Variables
Evaluation 85,180 4.13 0.70 1 5
Unsatisfactory (1) 0.06
Below Good (2) 0.56
Good (3) 17.35
Very Good (4) 50.85
Outstanding (5) 31.19
Education Level 85,180 3.11 1.09 1 5
Less than High School 3.45
High School 32.94
More than High School 24.41
Four Year Degree 27.54
Graduate Degree 11.66
Annual Earnings 85,180 27,881.97 10,713.21 4,492.17 111,785.30
Spell Length (in months) 85,180 34.77 26.37 0 120
Federal EEO Category 85,180
Officials and Administrators 1.10
Professionals 28.33
Technicians 17.40
Protective Service 6.73
Paraprofessionals 1.19
Office and Clerical 25.66
Skilled Craft 9.65
Service and Maintenance 9.93
Note
1) This is the worker’s age at the time of Entry on Duty.
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Table C.2: Time-Varying Descriptive Statistics by Race and Gender
Number of Observations Mean/Percent Std. Dev. Min Max
Annual Earnings
White Men 28,377 31,914.31 11,913.77 7,233.76 111,785.30
Black Men 9,382 24,270.11 8,605.11 6,396.31 78,431.18
White Women 31,157 27,759.98 10,166.65 5,634.23 96,069.32
Black Women 16,264 23,163.69 7,386.57 4,492.17 84,218.53
Evaluation
White Men 28,377 4.14 0.67 1 5
Black Men 9,382 3.82 0.69 1 5
White Women 31,157 4.29 0.68 1 5
Black Women 16,264 3.96 0.71 1 5
Ever Promoted (Yes = 1)
White Men 7,287 0.18 0.39 0 1
Black Men 2,645 0.16 0.37 0 1
White Women 8,754 0.17 0.38 0 1
Black Women 4,437 0.16 0.37 0 1
Ever Demoted (Yes = 1)
White Men 7,287 0.01 0.11 0 1
Black Men 2,645 0.02 0.13 0 1
White Women 8,754 0.02 0.13 0 1
Black Women 4,437 0.02 0.14 0 1
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Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics (Non-time Varying or at EOD) by Race and Gender
White Men Black Men White Women Black Women
(7,287) (2,645) (8,754) (4,437)
Education at EOD
Less than High School 3.291 7.11 1.45 5.05
High School 28.50 45.26 24.81 39.24
More than High School 20.74 21.21 24.34 29.10
4-year Degree 32.81 21.44 33.48 20.80
Graduate Degree 14.66 4.99 15.91 5.81
Federal EEO Category at EOD
Officials and Administrators 1.32 0.42 0.65 0.47
Professionals 32.07 16.22 31.03 15.39
Technicians 15.89 19.81 14.90 23.94
Protective Service 10.48 12.44 1.52 4.98
Paraprofessionals 0.85 0.76 0.89 0.70
Office and Clerical 10.99 10.25 43.36 36.83
Skilled Craft 21.89 13.76 1.61 0.54
Service and Maintenance 6.50 26.35 6.04 17.15
Number of Promotions
0 79.26 81.81 80.13 80.96
1 16.11 15.05 15.95 15.66
2 3.73 2.87 3.39 2.75
3 0.78 0.26 0.48 0.56
4 0.11 . 0.03 0.07
5 . . 0.01 .
Yrs Tenure at First Promotion 3.42 3.30 3.35 3.40
Grade Change|Promotion 3.24 3.31 3.04 2.87
1 13.15 11.76 10.04 7.98
2 38.86 35.47 47.14 56.83
3 14.84 18.18 12.25 9.67
4 12.72 14.97 15.14 12.86
5 7.50 6.60 4.52 3.29
6 3.75 3.03 4.66 3.79
7 2.80 3.21 2.55 1.79
8 2.75 4.10 1.83 2.39
9 1.74 1.43 0.86 0.60
10+ 1.89 1.25 1.01 0.80
Note
1) This number represents the percentage of white men with less than a high school
education, the percent with a high school diploma, etc.
90
Table C.4: Salary Grade and Occupation at the Time of Hire
White Black White Black
Men Men Women Women
Salary Grade at Hire 64.27 58.75 62.11 58.80
(6.77) (6.50) (6.25) (5.57)
Officials & Administrators
74.75 74.44 72.08 73.57
(5.92) (4.78) (7.17) (7.39)
Professionals
70.26 67.27 68.47 66.58
(5.08) (5.71) (4.91) (5.32)
Technicians
63.08 59.01 61.09 58.05
(3.95) (3.40) (4.16) (2.58)
Protective Service
62.96 61.78 61.92 61.71
(2.99) (2.55) (3.11) (2.00)
Paraprofessionals
62.39 62.25 62.64 61.80
(2.68) (3.45) (2.86) (3.05)
Office & Clerical
59.05 57.91 58.16 57.87
(3.85) (3.51) (1.94) (1.85)
Skilled Craft
60.81 57.37 58.12 55.90
(4.44) (5.00) (5.40) (5.41)
Service & Maintenance
54.43 51.69 52.67 51.29
(3.98) (2.80) (3.50) (2.61)
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Table C.5: Tenure (in Months) at the Time of Promotion
White Black White Black
Men Men Women Women
Employment Year (First Promotion)
Second 38.44 41.89 39.24 37.85
Third 25.98 22.74 26.59 25.89
Fourth 14.79 18.74 14.82 16.97
Fifth 9.73 7.16 9.35 9.52
Sixth 5.80 4.00 4.76 5.25
Seventh 2.40 3.16 2.47 1.83
Eighth 1.47 1.68 1.59 1.95
Ninth 0.67 0.63 1.06 0.24
Tenth 0.73 - 0.12 0.49
Employment Year (All Promotions)
Second 30.07 35.04 31.90 30.97
Third 23.61 21.30 24.01 23.38
Fourth 15.74 18.49 16.88 17.98
Fifth 12.14 9.51 11.24 11.59
Sixth 8.39 6.69 6.55 6.79
Seventh 4.64 5.11 4.21 4.10
Eighth 3.23 1.94 2.92 2.80
Ninth 1.09 1.76 1.96 1.30
Tenth 1.09 0.18 0.33 1.10
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Table C.6: Employment Spells in Sample
White Black White Black
Men Men Women Women
Number of Employment Spells
One 96.97 95.16 95.42 94.57
Two 2.94 4.65 4.34 5.27
Three 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.16
Four . 0.04 0.01 .
Length of First Observed Spell
One Year 22.96 28.17 26.89 24.99
Two Years 16.74 18.26 18.39 16.41
Three Years 14.11 12.93 13.88 14.33
Four Years 10.50 9.98 9.55 12.19
Five Years 9.44 9.04 9.42 9.62
Six Years 7.30 5.48 6.44 6.49
Seven Years 5.60 5.29 4.99 6.20
Eight Years 5.60 4.76 4.54 4.15
Nine Years 3.87 2.80 3.54 2.77
Ten Years 3.88 3.29 2.35 2.84
Table C.7: Entry into Employment
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Cumulative
New 2,338 2,204 2,683 2,501 2,547 2,752 2,413 2,286 1,717 1,682 23,123
Entrants 10.11% 9.53% 11.60% 10.82% 11.02% 11.90% 10.44% 9.89% 7.43% 7.27% 100%
Number of 2,338 4,011 5,896 7,322 8,650 10,053 10,908 11,562 11,985 12,455
Employees 2.74% 4.71% 6.92% 8.60% 10.15% 11.80% 12.81% 13.57% 14.07% 14.62%
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Appendix D: Data Limitations
D.1 Employment Alternatives
When a worker’s employment at the state is terminated (either voluntarily or involuntary),
neither the reason for leaving nor the new destination is clear. The data contain the date
and description of the “Last Personnel Action on Employee,” which in theory, should allow
the researcher to determine the exact reason for departure. However, if the employee notifies
the state that he is quitting in favor of alternative employment, but a subsequent personnel
action is taken during the same time period, the new destination will be replaced with the
most recent action taken. Furthermore, while there exist 157 detailed action codes, only 69
actually appear in the data.22 If an employee works for the state in one time period but not
the next, all that is clear is that his tenure was terminated.
D.2 Involuntary Termination
Related to the lack of information about the worker’s destination after leaving the state,
none of the action codes appearing in the data suggest that a worker was fired. In much the
same way a future destination may be masked by a subsequent personnel code, if an action
is taken after the worker is fired, the econometrician is unable to detect an involuntary
termination. It is not clear why such separations do not appear in the data, but there does
22The action codes which appear include: Fill by Temporary, Position Transferred To, Position Title
Change, Range Revision on Position, Remarks Only, EOD (Entry on Duty) - New Hire, Salary Adjustment,
Performance Increase, Range Revision, Reallocation - Employee, Promotion From, Demotion From, Re-
Statement, Appointment Change From, Increment Cancelation, Reassignment From, Performance Bonus,
Did Not Report, Temporary Assignment Terminated, Other Employment, Separation - Other, Legislative
Increase (Automated Update), Accelerated Pay Plan Salary Adjustment, Initial Employee Entry, Broad
Banded Area Change, Broad Banded Level Change, Grade-Band Transfer, Broad Banded Job Change,
Broad Banded Salary Adjustment, Cancel COLA and/or CGRA, Cancel Legislative Increase, Judicial Auto-
matic Salary Adjustment, Promotional Increase Granted After Effective Date, Reallocation Increase Granted
After Effective Date, Range Revision Increase Granted After Effective Date, Special Entry Rate Increase,
Geographic Differential, Geographic Differential Increase After Effective Date, Special Salary Adjustment -
Retention, Special Salary Adjustment - Equity, Accelerated Pay Plan Salary Adjustment, Salary Adjustment
- Trainee, Acting Capacity Promotion, Return From Acting Capacity, Salary Adjustment - Lead Worker,
Cancel Salary Adjustment - Lead Worker, Reallocation - Trainee, In-Range - Higher Level, In-Range - In-
creased Variety and Scope, In-Range - Equity, In-Range - Retention, In-Range Turnover, In-Range - Other
Labor Market, In-Range - Skill Based, Cancel In-Range, Demotion (Personal Conduct), Demotion (Un-
satisfactory Performance), Demotion (Grossly Ineffective Job Performance), Reallocation Down (Personal
Conduct), Reallocation Down (Unsatisfactory Job Performance), Reallocation Down (Grossly Ineffective Job
Performance), Legislative Increase - CGRA Bonus, Legislative Increase - Performance Bonus, Legislative In-
crease - Comp Bonus, as well as five additional codes without descriptions.
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not seem to be a way to identify when a worker has been fired by the state. As such, if a
promotion (demotion) is conditional on having not been fired in the previous period, there
does not exist a way to identify employees for whom the condition is not met.
D.3 Potential Hires
Like most employment data sets, only applicants to a particular position who receive and
accept a job offer from the state are included in the data. Nothing is known about the state’s
decision to hire the individuals for whom data are available relative to other applicants.
Therefore, only workers who begin their tenure with the state during the sample period will
be used in estimation and analysis. In other words, all individuals have 0-12 months of
tenure when first observed, and in the case of multiple employments spells between 1994 and
2003, only the first is used.
D.4 Outside Wages
The empirical concern with wages in this study is not unique to the NC OSP data. An
employee’s wage is not observed after he leaves the state. Therefore, it is not possible for the
econometrician to compare the monetary benefits of an outside employment option with the
employee’s current salary offered by the state. One alternative is to use the average earnings
within the state of North Carolina for the occupational category in which the employee was
last observed. This approach is used, as it seems reasonable for the individual to consider
the option of joining the private sector when making his next-period employment decision.
D.5 Supervisor Demographic Information
One explanatory variable that might prove important in many of the outcomes is informa-
tion about a particular worker’s supervisor. Specifically, if one argument supporting the
theory of statistical discrimination is that workers belonging to particular groups commu-
nicate differently than workers in the same group, it would be useful to know information
about the supervisor making performance evaluation, promotion, etc. decisions. If the ma-
jority of managerial positions are filled by white employees, black workers may have difficulty
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demonstrating their true productivity to a white supervisor. Therefore, of particular use to
this study is the supervisor’s race and gender. Codes in the data that would contain this
information are no longer maintained, so the best attempt at obtaining these demographic
characteristics would be to identify the worker with the highest salary grade in a particular
department. A series of approximately eight budget codes exist which might allow for dis-
aggregation of all positions into smaller departmental units, from which a supervisor could
be isolated.
D.6 Nature of the Data
Finally, the nature of the data may preclude generalization of the results of this study to
other industries or the private sector. All individuals in the sample are employed by the
(public sector) state of North Carolina. Furthermore, only employees of the state who are
covered by the State Personnel Act (SPA) are included in the data.23
23Those employees exempt from the SPA and who are excluded from the data fall into one of the following
four categories: Exempt from the Personnel Act (EPA) Professional, Faculty, Senior Academic Administra-
tive Officer Tier-I (SAAO Tier-I), or Senior Academic Administrative Officer Tier-II.
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Appendix E: Derivation of Conditional (on original sig-
nal and evaluation) Expectation and Variance
In the basic statistical discrimination model, ability (α) is conditioned on just the worker’s
signal (s) at the time of hire:
s = α + v
α ∼ N(m,σ2α)
v ∼ N(0, σ2v)
E(s) = E(α + v) = E(α) + E(v) = m
var(s) = var(α + v) = var(α) + var(v) + 2 cov(α, v)︸ ︷︷ ︸ = σ2α + σ2v , so that
= 0
s ∼ N(m,σ2α + σ2v)
The employer forms an expectation of a worker’s ability, given the received signal. Using the
joint density of α and s, as well as the marginal density of α, the conditional expectation
and variance is extracted.
f(α|s) = f(α, s)
f(s)
, where
f(s) =
1√
2λσs
exp
[−(s−m)2
2σ2s
]
and
f(α, s) =
1
2λσασs
√
1− λ2 exp
[− (α−m)2
σ2α
+ 2λ(α−m)(s−m)
σασs
− (s−m)2
σ2s
2(1− λ2)
]
, where
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λ = corr(α, s) =
E
[
(α−m)(s−m)
]
σασs
=
E
(
αs− αm−ms+m2
)
σασs
=
E(αs)−mE(α)−mE(s) +m2
σασs
=
E
(
α(α + v)
)
−m2
σασs
=
E
(
α2 + αv
)
−m2
σασs
=
E(α2)−m2
σασs
=
σ2α
σασs
=
σα
σs
Focusing on just the terms preceeding in exp(·) in f(s|α) and f(α), will reveal var(α|s).
1
2λσασs
√
1−λ2
1√
2λσs
=
√
2λσs
2λσασs
√
1− λ2
=
1√
2λσα
√
1− λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
statistical discrimination
Therefore, var(α|s) = σ2α(1− λ2). To solve for the conditional expectation, E(α|s), simplify
the ratio of exp(·) expressions and extract var(α|s) = σ2α(1− λ2):
exp
[− (α−m)2
σ2α
+
2λ(α−m)(s−m)
σασs
− (s−m)2
σ2s
2(1−λ2)
]
exp
[
−(s−m)2
2σ2s
]
= exp
[
−
(α−m)2
σ2α
+ 2λ(α−m)(s−m)
σασs
− (s−m)2
σ2s
2(1− λ2) +
(s−m)2
2σ2s
]
= exp
[
−
(α−m)2
σ2α
+ 2λ(α−m)(s−m)
σασs
− (s−m)2
σ2s
2(1− λ2) +
(s−m)2
2σ2s
]
= exp
[−(α−m)2σ2s + 2λσασs(α−m)(s−m)− (s−m)2σ2α
2(1− λ2)σ2ασ2s
+
(s−m)2
2σ2s
]
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= exp
[−(α−m)2σ2s + 2λσασs(α−m)(s−m)− (s−m)2σ2α
2(1− λ2)σ2ασ2s
+
(s−m)2(1− λ2)σ2α
2(1− λ2)σ2ασ2s
]
= exp
[ −1
2(1− λ2)σ2α
[
(α−m)2 − 2λσασs(α−m)(s−m)
σ2s
+
(s−m)2σ2α
σ2s
− (s−m)
2(1− λ2)σ2α
σ2s
]]
= exp
[ −1
2(1− λ2)σ2α
[
(α−m)2 − 2λ2(α−m)(s−m) + (s−m)2λ2
− (s−m)2(1− λ2)λ2
]]
= exp
[ −1
2(1− λ2)σ2α
[
(α−m)2 − 2λ2(α−m)(s−m) + (s−m)2λ4
]]
= exp
[ −1
2(1− λ2)σ2α
[
(α−m)− λ2(s−m)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ]2]
mean
Therefore, α|s ∼ N
(
m + λ2(s − m), σ2α(1 − λ2)
)
. Given the availability of performance
evaluations, the firm is able to condition its expectation about a worker’s ability on both
her signal and her performance evaluation (p), i.e. α|s, h. The same approach is used to
solve for the conditional expectation and variance of α, given s and h, this time in matrix
notation for simplicity.
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As before,
s = α+ v
α ∼ N(m,σ2α)
v ∼ N(0, σ2v)
s ∼ N(m,σ2v + σmu2)
s|α ∼ N(α, σ2v)
α|s ∼ N(m(1− λ2) + λ2s, σ2α(1− λ2)), where λ =
σ2α
σ2s
corr(s, α) =
σα
σs
(see λ from α|s)
Similarly,
p = α + κ
κ ∼ N(0, σ2κ)
p ∼ N(m,σ2κ + σ2α)
p|α ∼ N(α, σ2κ)
α|p ∼ N(m(1− θ2) + θ2p, σ2α(1− θ2)), where θ =
σ2α
σ2p
corr(p, α) =
σα
σp
(see λ from α|s)
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Finally,
corr(p, s) =
E
[
(p− E(p))(s− E(s))
]
σpσs
=
E
[
(p−m)(s−m)
]
σpσs
=
E
(
ps− pm−ms+m2
)
σpσs
=
E(ps)−mE(p)−mE(s) +m2
σpσs
=
E
[
(α + κ)(α + v)
]
−m2
σpσs
=
E(α2 + vα+ κα + κv)−m2
σpσs
=
E(α2)−m2
σpσs
=
σ2α
σpσs
Bayes’ Theorem, f(A|B) = f(A)f(B|A)
f(B)
, is applied in this situation to find the expectation and
variance of α, conditioned on both s and h. In other words,
f(α|s, p) = f(α)f(s, p|α)
f(s, p)
=
f(α, s, p)
f(s, p)
since f(s, p|α) = f(α, s, p)
f(s, p)
,
where, generally,
f(x1, x2, ...xn) =
1
(2λ)
n
2 det(Σ)
1
2
exp
[1
2
(x− x)>Σ−1(x− x)
]
, where
x =

x1
x2
...
xn

=

E(x1)
E(x2)
...
E(xn)

and Σ =

σ11 σ12 · · · σ1n
σ21 σ22 σ2n
...
. . .
...
σn1 σn2 · · · σnn

.
Define the following for f(αsh):
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A =

α
s
p
 with mean vector B =

m
m
m
 and var-cov matrix, C =

σ2α σ
2
α σ
2
α
σ2α σ
2
s σ
2
α
σ2α σ
2
α σ
2
p
.
Similarly, for f(sp):
D =
 s
p
 with mean vector E =
 m
m
 and var-cov matrix, F =
 σ2s σ2α
σ2α σ
2
p
.
Therefore,
f(αsp)
f(sp)
=
1
(2λ)
3
2 det(C)
1
2
exp
[
− 1
2
(A−B)>C−1(A−B)
]
1
(2λ)
2
2 det(F )
1
2
exp
[
− 1
2
(D − E)>F−1(D − E)
]
=
1
(2λ)
1
2
√
det(C)
det(F )
exp
{
− 1
2
[
(A−B)>C−1(A−B)− (D − E)>F−1(D − E)]}
In this setup,
√
det(C)
det(F )
is the standard deviation of α, conditional on both the worker’s signal
and performance evaluation. Specifically, the standard deviation simplifies to
√
det(C)
det(F )
=√
σ2α(σ
2
α−σ2s)(σ2α−σ2p)
σ2sσ
2
p−σ4α , so var(α|s, p) =
σ2α(σ
2
α−σ2s)(σ2α−σ2p)
σ2sσ
2
p−σ4α =
σ2ασ
2
vσ
2
κ
σ2sσ
2
p−σ4α .
Now, the var(α|s, p) can be extracted from the exp(·) term to determine E(α|s, p).
Here,
exp(·) = exp
{
−1
2
[
sσ2α(σ
2
p − σ2α)− (σ2α − σ2s)(pσ2α −mσ2α +mσ2p) + α(σ2sσ2p − σ4α)
]2
2σ2α(σ
2
α − σ2s)(σ2α − σ2p)(σ2sσ2p − σ4α)
}
Multiplying numerator and denominator by (σ2sσ
2
p − σ2α) yields
exp
{
− σ
2
sσ
2
p − σ4α
2σ2α(σ
2
α − σ2s)(σ2α − σ2p)
[
sσ2α(σ
2
p − σ2α)
(σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α)
− (σ
2
α − σ2s)(pσ2α −mσ2α +mσ2p)
(σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α)
+ α
]2}
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= exp
{
−σ
2
sσ
2
p − σ4α
2σ2ασ
2
vσ
2
κ
[
α−
(
(σ2α − σ2s)(pσ2α −mσ2α +mσ2p)
(σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α)
− sσ
2
α(σ
2
p − σ2α)
(σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α)
)]2}
= exp
−σ2sσ2p − σ4α2σ2ασ2vσ2κ
α− (pσ2ασ2v +mσ2κσ2v + sσ2ασ2κ
σ2sσ
2
p − σ4α
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
E(α|s, p)
Therefore, (α|s, p) ∼ N
(
pσ2ασ
2
v+mσ
2
κσ
2
v+sσ
2
ασ
2
κ
σ2sσ
2
p−σ4α ,
σ2ασ
2
vσ
2
κ
σ2sσ
2
p−σ4α
)
.
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Appendix F: Additional Results
Table F.1: Jointly-Estimated Equations with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Eval = 5 Excl.) Promotion Pr(Leave)
n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 72,725
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Current Endogenous Variables
Salary 0.020 * 0.026 * 0.059 * -0.033 0.727 * -0.056 *
Grade (0.0002) (0.008) (0.013) (0.045) (0.012) (0.012)
ln(Annual Earnings)
-0.396 * -1.253 * -0.709 0.264 -0.470 *
(0.092) (0.133) (0.488) (0.135) (0.093)
Performance -0.121 * -0.307 *
Evaluation (0.026) (0.017)
Current -0.056
Promotion (0.107)
Lagged t− 1 Endogenous Variables
Salary Gradet−1
0.941 *
(0.004)
Salaryt−1
0.328 * 0.764 *
(0.033) (0.002)
Evaluationt−1
0.050 * 0.004 * -2.188 * -3.844 * -4.340 *
(0.012) (0.001) (0.038) (0.060) (0.205)
Promotedt−1
0.085 * 0.031 * 0.200 * 0.333 * 0.071 2.260 *
(0.041) (0.002) (0.099) (0.163) (0.532) (0.143)
Demographic Characteristics
Female
0.071 -0.005 -0.771 * -2.068 * -0.342 -0.115 0.258 *
(0.081) (0.005) (0.235) (0.372) (1.191) (0.204) (0.082)
Black
-0.013 -0.003 -0.061 0.121 2.544 * -0.082 0.394 *
(0.111) (0.007) (0.380) (0.483) (1.234) (0.308) (0.113)
Female*Black
-0.112 0.006 -0.355 0.212 -1.738 -0.266 -0.580 *
(0.144) (0.009) (0.470) (0.626) (1.703) (0.394) (0.146)
Age
-0.005 * 0.001 * -0.0004 0.004 * -0.002 -0.016 * -0.135 *
(0.000) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009)
Age2
-0.001 * 0.130 *
(0.0003) (0.011)
High School
0.071 * -0.004 * -0.083 -0.186 * -0.304 0.118 -0.042
(0.026) (0.002) (0.072) (0.092) (0.272) (0.124) (0.064)
> High School
0.133 * -0.003 -0.094 -0.160 -0.175 0.154 0.157 *
(0.027) (0.002) (0.075) (0.098) (0.295) (0.128) (0.068)
College
0.095 * -0.004 * -0.203 * -0.240 * -0.057 -0.072 0.392 *
(0.029) (0.002) (0.078) (0.103) (0.310) (0.132) (0.070)
Graduate Degree
0.062 * -0.004 * -0.330 * -0.483 * -0.184 -0.018 0.743 *
(0.031) (0.002) (0.083) (0.119) (0.364) (0.141) (0.077)
Occupational Controls
Professionals
-0.271 * -0.018 * 0.016 -0.104 -0.230 0.195 -0.332 *
(0.043) (0.002) (0.095) (0.205) (0.700) (0.139) (0.123)
Technicians
-0.501 * -0.011 * 0.084 -0.013 -0.495 0.666 * -0.456 *
(0.047) (0.003) (0.104) (0.214) (0.729) (0.151) (0.130)
Protective -0.591 * -0.001 0.889 * 1.084 * -0.882 0.323 -0.470 *
Service (0.049) (0.003) (0.120) (0.223) (0.785) (0.170) (0.134)
Parapro- -0.122 * -0.013 * 0.236 0.381 0.0001 0.296 -0.283
fessional (0.059) (0.003) (0.141) (0.248) (0.805) (0.200) (0.162)
Office & -0.651 * 0.004 -0.175 -0.264 -0.535 1.054 * -0.566 *
Clerical (0.048) (0.003) (0.106) (0.217) (0.734) (0.155) (0.131)
Skilled Craft
-0.590 * -0.005 0.273 * 0.246 -0.286 0.428 * -0.293 *
(0.049) (0.003) (0.109) (0.219) (0.745) (0.161) (0.134)
Service & -0.876 * 0.019 * 0.059 0.217 -0.811 0.605 * -0.594 *
Maintenance (0.052) (0.003) (0.119) (0.230) (0.775) (0.178) (0.141)
Continued on the next page
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Table F.1: Results with Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Relative to 5) Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Tenure Controls
Tenure
0.049 * 0.003 0.092 0.038 0.618 -0.293 * 0.024
(0.026) (0.002) (0.067) (0.111) (0.413) (0.090) (0.042)
Tenure2
-0.057 * -0.004 * -0.065 -0.017 -0.444 -0.155 -0.071
(0.022) (0.001) (0.057) (0.097) (0.363) (0.085) (0.055)
Female*Tenure
-0.051 -0.003 0.031 0.270 -1.110 * 0.015 -0.033
(0.034) (0.002) (0.089) (0.161) (0.540) (0.099) (0.054)
Female*Tenure2
0.039 0.003 -0.021 -0.213 0.893 0.074 0.070
(0.030) (0.002) (0.077) (0.142) (0.473) (0.102) (0.070)
Black*Tenure
-0.030 -0.003 -0.236 -0.254 -0.852 0.091 -0.082
(0.048) (0.003) (0.140) (0.196) (0.543) (0.151) (0.077)
Black*Tenure2
0.018 0.003 0.160 0.159 0.719 -0.108 0.024
(0.041) (0.003) (0.120) (0.171) (0.470) (0.157) (0.101)
Female*Black* 0.003 0.003 0.231 0.013 1.189 0.080 0.099
Tenure (0.062) (0.004) (0.177) (0.262) (0.760) (0.192) (0.100)
Female*Black* 0.006 -0.003 -0.196 -0.023 -1.006 0.004 -0.097
Tenure2 (0.054) (0.003) (0.153) (0.231) (0.658) (0.200) (0.132)
Promotion Controls
Promoted Yet
-0.236 * -0.041 * -0.151 -0.024 0.435 -2.365 * 0.040
(0.037) (0.002) (0.087) (0.144) (0.518) (0.076) (0.086)
Time Since 0.111 * 0.004 * 0.012 -0.003 -0.206 -0.031
Promotion (0.011) (0.001) (0.025) (0.043) (0.166) (0.036)
Grade Change | -0.040
Promotiont−1 (0.041)
Female*Grade 4| 0.028
Promotiont−1 (0.031)
Black*Grade 4| -0.003
Promotiont−1 (0.044)
Female*Black*Grade 4| 0.026
Promotiont−1 (0.059)
Grade Change | 0.022 * -0.010 * -0.026 -0.072 -0.087 -0.726 *
Promotiont (0.010) (0.001) (0.025) (0.042) (0.159) (0.041)
Female*Grade 4| -0.036 * 0.0005 -0.010 -0.084 0.126 -0.049
Promotiont (0.010) (0.001) (0.026) (0.051) (0.157) (0.045)
Black*Grade 4| -0.008 0.00001 -0.005 -0.011 -0.134 -0.094
Promotiont (0.015) (0.001) (0.041) (0.059) (0.236) (0.072)
Female*Black*Grade 4| 0.027 -0.001 -0.022 0.028 0.106 -0.044
Promotiont (0.021) (0.001) (0.054) (0.083) (0.274) (0.099)
Evaluation Controls
Female* 0.002 0.002 * 0.148 * 0.407 * 0.725 *
Evaluationt−1 (0.012) (0.001) (0.051) (0.084) (0.274)
Black* 0.017 0.001 0.292 * 0.437 * -0.088
Evaluationt−1 (0.023) (0.001) (0.083) (0.111) (0.302)
Female*Black* 0.020 -0.002 -0.043 -0.113 -0.114
Evaluationt−1 (0.029) (0.002) (0.102) (0.143) (0.400)
Previous -0.003 0.004 * -0.827 * -1.392 * -1.346 *
Evaluations (0.012) (0.001) (0.033) (0.055) (0.201)
Female*Previous 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.012 0.443 *
Evaluations (0.013) (0.001) (0.031) (0.060) (0.215)
Black*Previous -0.012 -0.0004 0.006 -0.030 0.173
Evaluations (0.020) (0.001) (0.053) (0.076) (0.237)
Female*Black*Previous 0.010 -0.001 0.005 0.034 -0.511
Evaluations (0.025) (0.002) (0.065) (0.100) (0.311)
Job Characteristics
Period 2
-0.036 0.013 * -2.732 * -4.233 * -3.948 * -0.244 * 0.107 *
(0.034) (0.002) (0.094) (0.132) (0.395) (0.072) (0.027)
Initial Grade
0.017 * -0.008 * -0.018 * -0.030 * 0.015 -0.701 * 0.027 *
(0.003) (0.0002) (0.007) (0.011) (0.040) (0.010) (0.011)
Part-Time
-0.033 -0.136 * -0.346 * -0.887 * -0.122 -1.039 * 0.199 *
(0.037) (0.002) (0.095) (0.160) (0.476) (0.237) (0.081)
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Table F.1: Results with Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Relative to 5) Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Year 2
-0.067
(0.069)
Year 3
-0.009 -0.020 * -0.038 0.057 0.406 -0.038 -0.129 *
(0.033) (0.002) (0.081) (0.115) (0.396) (0.113) (0.066)
Year 4
0.156 * 0.011 * 0.032 0.201 0.252 -0.025 -0.190 *
(0.032) (0.002) (0.077) (0.109) (0.391) (0.105) (0.066)
Year 5
0.016 0.015 * 0.033 0.293 * 0.299 -0.091 -0.197 *
(0.031) (0.002) (0.076) (0.107) (0.386) (0.105) (0.066)
Year 6
0.033 0.005 * 0.124 -0.054 0.050 0.108 -0.154 *
(0.031) (0.002) (0.074) (0.107) (0.387) (0.102) (0.066)
Year 7
0.066 * -0.008 * 0.034 -0.069 -0.088 0.088 -0.129
(0.031) (0.002) (0.073) (0.105) (0.388) (0.101) (0.066)
Year 8
0.091 * 0.010 * -0.020 -0.050 -0.022 -0.081 -0.350 *
(0.031) (0.002) (0.073) (0.105) (0.384) (0.102) (0.069)
Year 9
-0.032 0.0002 0.043 0.088 0.114 -0.591 * -0.360 *
(0.032) (0.002) (0.073) (0.105) (0.381) (0.106) (0.073)
Year 10
-0.012 -0.024 * 0.069 0.152 0.487 -0.224
(0.032) (0.002) (0.073) (0.106) (0.376) (0.105)
Constant
0.113 1.688 * 13.831 * 25.410 * 19.299 * -6.479 * 7.215 *
(0.379) (0.024) (0.700) (1.006) (3.843) (0.987) (0.996)
Exogenous Variables
Unemployment Rate
-0.007 * -0.001 * -0.041 *
(0.003) (0.0002) (0.009)
Vacancies
0.042 * 0.003 * -0.007 0.034 * 0.110 * 0.113 * 0.002
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.037) (0.011) (0.010)
ln(Private Wages)
-0.030 -0.003 * 0.204 *
(0.028) (0.002) (0.071)
Heterogeneity Coefficients
ρ
10.000 0.540 * 0.234 1.199 -124.204 -1.653 6.538 *
(10.000) (0.031) (1.208) (1.471) (772.610) (1.460) (0.509)
ω
10.000 0.098 * 0.177 0.467 * -23.769 0.233 0.038
(10.000) (0.003) (0.118) (0.183) (10111.460) (0.145) (0.217)
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Table F.2: Initial Conditions with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Eval = 5 Excl.)
n = 23,123 n = 23,123 n = 23,123
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Female
-2.497 * -0.127 * -0.383 * -0.573 * -0.877 *
(0.080) (0.004) (0.040) (0.047) (0.223)
Black
-3.490 * -0.155 * 0.510 * 1.104 * 1.345 *
(0.117) (0.006) (0.078) (0.080) (0.242))
Female*Black
2.169 * 0.098 * -0.005 -0.021 0.204
(0.148) (0.008) (0.094) (0.098) (0.331)
Age
0.022 * 0.003 * -0.002 -0.009 * 0.007
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
< 9th Grade
-6.658 * -0.241 * -0.060 0.046 0.793
(0.636) (0.035) (0.399) (0.411) (0.983)
< High School
-4.220 * -0.144 * 0.313 * 0.153 -0.083
(0.198) (0.011) (0.135) (0.141) (0.538)
High School 1.611 * 0.086 * -0.171 * -0.366 * 0.283
+ 1 Year (0.142) (0.008) (0.080) (0.086) (0.307)
High School 2.386 * 0.115 * -0.289 * -0.508 * -0.439
+ 2 Years (0.156) (0.008) (0.085) (0.093) (0.414)
High School 3.088 * 0.151 * -0.469 * -0.927 * -0.986
+ 3 Years (0.197) (0.011) (0.101) (0.116) (0.603)
Associate’s 4.196 * 0.205 * -0.174 * -0.426 * 0.330
Degree (0.129) (0.007) (0.071) (0.078) (0.279)
College
6.418 * 0.293 * -0.545 * -1.018 * -0.374
(0.088) (0.005) (0.048) (0.053) (0.218)
Master’s 9.610 * 0.448 * -0.695 * -1.459 * -0.471
Degree (0.121) (0.007) (0.059) (0.074) (0.300)
> Master’s 14.403 * 0.670 * -0.769 * -1.705 * -0.965
Degree (0.259) (0.014) (0.116) (0.165) (0.724)
Constant
59.142 * 9.893 * 1.400 * 1.248 * -3.498 *
(0.162) (0.009) (0.087) (0.097) (0.401)
ρ
8.878 * 0.478 * 0.288 0.453 * 1.877 *
(0.295) (0.015) (0.160) (0.181) (0.388)
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Table F.3: Independent Equations with No Unobserved Heterogeneity
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Eval = 5 Excl.) Promotion Pr(Leave)
n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 72,725
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Current Endogenous Variables
Salary 0.022 * 0.030 * 0.072 * -0.045 0.732 * -0.058 *
Grade (0.0002) (0.008) (0.013) (0.041) (0.012) (0.012)
ln(Annual Earnings)
-0.402 * -1.261 * -0.713 0.252 -0.260 *
(0.098) (0.141) (0.503) (0.138) (0.094)
Performance -0.121 * -0.319 *
Evaluation (0.029) (0.017)
Current -0.086
Promotion (0.093)
Lagged t− 1 Endogenous Variables
Salary Gradet−1
0.885 *
(0.004)
Salaryt−1
0.560 * 0.753 *
(0.048) (0.002)
Evaluationt−1
0.098 * 0.004 * -2.188 * -3.842 * -4.341 *
(0.017) (0.001) (0.040) (0.063) (0.201)
Promotedt−1
0.232 * 0.038 * 0.214 * 0.374 * 0.032 2.283 *
(0.047) (0.002) (0.100) (0.165) (0.634) (0.146)
Demographic Characteristics
Female
0.019 -0.005 -0.774 * -2.066 * -0.351 -0.118 0.292 *
(0.092) (0.008) (0.249) (0.395) (0.932) (0.235) (0.082)
Black
-0.128 -0.003 -0.063 0.121 2.543 * -0.083 0.351 *
(0.128) (0.009) (0.393) (0.491) (0.959) (0.384) (0.113)
Female*Black
-0.076 0.005 -0.355 0.206 -1.739 -0.270 -0.579 *
(0.168) (0.011) (0.487) (0.640) (1.137) (0.503) (0.147)
Age
-0.008 * 0.001 * -0.0004 0.004 * -0.002 -0.016 * -0.130 *
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010)
Age2
-0.001 * 0.124 *
(0.0003) (0.011)
High School
0.175 * -0.004 * -0.083 -0.186 * -0.306 0.117 -0.063
(0.032) (0.002) (0.074) (0.095) (0.317) (0.125) (0.067)
> High School
0.289 * -0.003 -0.094 -0.160 -0.176 0.153 0.123
(0.033) (0.002) (0.077) (0.101) (0.348) (0.130) (0.070)
College
0.328 * -0.004 * -0.202 * -0.237 * -0.062 -0.072 0.311 *
(0.035) (0.002) (0.079) (0.106) (0.371) (0.133) (0.072)
Graduate Degree
0.259 * -0.004 -0.329 * -0.478 * -0.190 -0.019 0.577 *
(0.039) (0.002) (0.085) (0.123) (0.428) (0.142) (0.078)
Occupational Controls
Professionals
-0.589 * -0.019 * 0.015 -0.104 -0.224 0.193 -0.281 *
(0.046) (0.004) (0.108) (0.298) (0.533) (0.142) (0.120)
Technicians
-1.233 * -0.013 * 0.082 -0.016 -0.487 0.661 * -0.420 *
(0.050) (0.004) (0.119) (0.311) (0.555) (0.155) (0.129)
Protective -1.294 * -0.002 0.888 * 1.084 * -0.876 0.322 -0.460 *
Service (0.055) (0.004) (0.137) (0.321) (0.641) (0.171) (0.133)
Parapro- -0.717 * -0.016 * 0.231 0.368 0.018 0.288 -0.245
fessional (0.070) (0.005) (0.157) (0.346) (0.658) (0.207) (0.162)
Office & -1.585 * 0.002 -0.176 -0.266 -0.528 1.051 * -0.523 *
Clerical (0.050) (0.004) (0.122) (0.316) (0.555) (0.159) (0.130)
Skilled Craft
-1.309 * -0.006 0.272 * 0.245 -0.278 0.425 * -0.253
(0.051) (0.004) (0.126) (0.319) (0.570) (0.164) (0.134)
Service & -2.031 * 0.018 * 0.058 0.214 -0.803 0.601 * -0.509 *
Maintenance (0.055) (0.004) (0.136) (0.334) (0.591) (0.179) (0.141)
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Table F.3: Results with No Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Tenure Controls
Tenure
0.014 0.002 0.091 0.036 0.614 -0.294 * -0.052
(0.034) (0.002) (0.069) (0.117) (0.383) (0.096) (0.045)
Tenure2
-0.033 -0.004 * -0.065 -0.018 -0.439 -0.156 -0.008
(0.030) (0.002) (0.059) (0.102) (0.340) (0.091) (0.058)
Female*Tenure
-0.042 -0.003 0.031 0.269 -1.106 * 0.016 -0.035
(0.041) (0.003) (0.094) (0.170) (0.399) (0.112) (0.056)
Female*Tenure2
0.036 0.003 -0.021 -0.211 0.889 * 0.075 0.076
(0.036) (0.003) (0.082) (0.150) (0.367) (0.115) (0.073)
Black*Tenure
-0.002 -0.003 -0.236 -0.255 -0.851 * 0.091 -0.042
(0.056) (0.004) (0.144) (0.203) (0.430) (0.184) (0.078)
Black*Tenure2
-0.003 0.003 0.160 0.160 0.717 -0.107 -0.013
(0.049) (0.003) (0.124) (0.178) (0.386) (0.185) (0.103)
Female*Black* -0.006 0.003 0.231 0.016 1.184 * 0.084 0.089
Tenure (0.072) (0.005) (0.187) (0.277) (0.570) (0.243) (0.101)
Female*Black* 0.005 -0.003 -0.197 -0.028 -1.001 0.001 -0.088
Tenure2 (0.063) (0.004) (0.162) (0.243) (0.537) (0.247) (0.133)
Promotion Controls
Promoted Yet
-0.345 * -0.049 * -0.168 -0.068 0.479 -2.389 * 0.038
(0.043) (0.002) (0.088) (0.146) (0.657) (0.080) (0.090)
Time Since 0.156 * 0.004 * 0.013 -0.002 -0.207 -0.028
Promotion (0.012) (0.001) (0.026) (0.044) (0.206) (0.038)
Grade Change | -0.031
Promotiont−1 (0.034)
Female*Grade 4| 0.029
Promotiont−1 (0.033)
Black*Grade 4| -0.003
Promotiont−1 (0.048)
Female*Black*Grade 4| 0.031
Promotiont−1 (0.062)
Grade Change | -0.003 -0.012 * -0.030 -0.085 -0.075 -0.732 *
Promotiont (0.014) (0.001) (0.025) (0.043) (0.157) (0.042)
Female*Grade 4| -0.031 * 0.001 -0.009 -0.084 0.128 -0.049
Promotiont (0.015) (0.001) (0.026) (0.050) (0.155) (0.042)
Black*Grade 4| 0.016 0.0002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.134 -0.093
Promotiont (0.023) (0.001) (0.043) (0.060) (0.221) (0.069)
Female*Black*Grade 4| 0.004 -0.001 -0.022 0.027 0.107 -0.046
Promotiont (0.034) (0.001) (0.055) (0.084) (0.256) (0.101)
Evaluation Controls
Female* -0.017 0.002 0.149 * 0.406 * 0.727 *
Evaluationt−1 (0.023) (0.001) (0.053) (0.087) (0.272)
Black* 0.012 0.001 0.293 * 0.436 * -0.088
Evaluationt−1 (0.029) (0.002) (0.088) (0.118) (0.304)
Female*Black* 0.017 -0.001 -0.043 -0.113 -0.111
Evaluationt−1 (0.035) (0.002) (0.107) (0.148) (0.396)
Previous 0.012 0.004 * -0.827 * -1.393 * -1.343 *
Evaluations (0.018) (0.001) (0.033) (0.057) (0.191)
Female*Previous -0.0001 0.0005 -0.002 0.013 0.441 *
Evaluations (0.016) (0.001) (0.032) (0.063) (0.194)
Black*Previous -0.025 -0.0004 0.006 -0.030 0.172
Evaluations (0.027) (0.001) (0.054) (0.080) (0.205)
Female*Black*Previous 0.032 -0.001 0.005 0.034 -0.509 *
Evaluations (0.035) (0.002) (0.068) (0.104) (0.253)
Job Characteristics
Period 2
0.012 0.013 * -2.733 * -4.236 * 0.028 -0.245 * 0.060 *
(0.050) (0.002) (0.097) (0.134) (0.034) (0.074) (0.030)
Initial Grade
0.013 * -0.011 * -0.023 * -0.043 * -0.123 -0.706 * 0.034 *
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.461) (0.010) (0.011)
Part-Time
-0.059 -0.142 * -0.349 * -0.892 * -3.945 * -1.045 * 0.299 *
(0.056) (0.002) (0.099) (0.166) (0.397) (0.174) (0.083)
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Table F.3: Results with No Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Year 2
-0.101
(0.068)
Year 3
-0.025 -0.020 * -0.038 0.056 0.409 -0.039 -0.167 *
(0.041) (0.002) (0.083) (0.118) (0.396) (0.111) (0.065)
Year 4
0.192 * 0.011 * 0.032 0.199 0.255 -0.026 -0.219 *
(0.038) (0.002) (0.077) (0.110) (0.391) (0.108) (0.065)
Year 5
0.055 0.015 * 0.034 0.293 * 0.301 -0.093 -0.237 *
(0.036) (0.002) (0.076) (0.108) (0.386) (0.107) (0.066)
Year 6
0.108 * 0.005 * 0.125 -0.052 0.049 0.108 -0.189 *
(0.037) (0.002) (0.074) (0.107) (0.387) (0.105) (0.066)
Year 7
0.116 * -0.008 * 0.035 -0.069 -0.084 0.087 -0.163 *
(0.035) (0.002) (0.073) (0.106) (0.390) (0.105) (0.067)
Year 8
0.150 * 0.010 * -0.020 -0.050 -0.019 -0.080 -0.385 *
(0.033) (0.002) (0.073) (0.106) (0.384) (0.105) (0.070)
Year 9
-0.011 0.0002 0.044 0.088 0.118 -0.590 * -0.393 *
(0.035) (0.002) (0.073) (0.105) (0.382) (0.107) (0.074)
Year 10
0.007 -0.024 * 0.070 0.153 0.489 -0.224 *
(0.037) (0.002) (0.073) (0.107) (0.377) (0.107)
Constant
1.837 * 1.774 * 13.882 * 25.497 * 19.306 * -6.373 * 5.239 *
(0.446) (0.024) (0.773) (0.974) (4.145) (0.994) (0.996)
Exogenous Variables
Unemployment Rate
-0.008 -0.001 * -0.040 *
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.009)
Vacancies
0.053 * 0.003 * -0.007 0.033 * 0.110 * 0.112 * 0.003
(0.005) (0.0002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.036) (0.014) (0.009)
ln(Private Wages)
-0.008 -0.003 0.167 *
(0.037) (0.002) (0.072)
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Table F.4: Initial Conditions with No Unobserved Heterogeneity
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Eval = 5 Excl.)
n = 23,123 n = 23,123 n = 23,123
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Female
-2.466 * -0.125 * -0.381 * -0.571 * -0.856 *
(0.084) (0.005) (0.041) (0.049) (0.195)
Black
-3.506 * -0.156 * 0.509 * 1.102 * 1.331 *
(0.121) (0.007) (0.080) (0.083) (0.241)
Female*Black
2.128 * 0.096 * -0.006 -0.022 0.186
(0.154) (0.010) (0.096) (0.100) (0.313)
Age
0.027 * 0.004 * -0.002 -0.008 * 0.008
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
< 9th Grade
-6.776 * -0.247 * -0.063 0.040 0.743
(0.652) (0.036) (0.533) (0.552) (0.994)
< High School
-4.247 * -0.146 * 0.312 * 0.152 -0.097
(0.213) (0.011) (0.140) (0.145) (0.558)
High School 1.584 * 0.084 * -0.171 * -0.367 * 0.272
+ 1 Year (0.155) (0.010) (0.082) (0.089) (0.307)
High School 2.489 * 0.121 * -0.286 * -0.503 * -0.394
+ 2 Years (0.170) (0.011) (0.088) (0.096) (0.388)
High School 3.281 * 0.161 * -0.462 * -0.917 * -0.918
+ 3 Years (0.218) (0.012) (0.106) (0.122) (0.599)
Associate’s 4.366 * 0.214 * -0.168 * -0.417 * 0.387
Degree (0.139) (0.008) (0.074) (0.082) (0.285)
College
6.583 * 0.302 * -0.539 * -1.010 * -0.304
(0.097) (0.006) (0.050) (0.055) (0.226)
Master’s 9.666 * 0.451 * -0.692 * -1.456 * -0.446
Degree (0.129) (0.008) (0.062) (0.077) (0.302)
> Master’s 14.518 * 0.677 * -0.765 * -1.698 * -0.909
Degree (0.336) (0.013) (0.121) (0.174) (0.693)
Constant
59.052 * 9.888 * 1.395 * 1.242 * -3.524 *
(0.179) (0.010) (0.090) (0.101) (0.396)
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Table F.5: Jointly-Estimated Equations with Unobserved Heterogeneity
(Testing for Statistical Discrimination)
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Eval = 5 Excl.) Promotion Pr(Leave)
n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 72,725
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Current Endogenous Variables
Salary 0.006 * 0.022 * 0.077 * -0.007 0.190 * -0.118 *
Grade (0.0002) (0.010) (0.015) (0.051) (0.019) (0.013)
ln(Annual Earnings)
-0.419 * -1.272 * -0.658 -1.317 * -0.151
(0.092) (0.135) (0.515) (0.231) (0.095)
Performance -0.236 * -0.335 *
Evaluation (0.034) (0.017)
Current -0.018
Promotion (0.096)
Lagged t− 1 Endogenous Variables
Salary Gradet−1
0.845 *
(0.003)
Salaryt−1
0.706 * 0.823 *
(0.024) (0.002)
Evaluationt−1
0.015 0.002 * -2.188 * -3.842 * -4.338 *
(0.008) (0.001) (0.039) (0.061) (0.200)
Promotedt−1
0.297 * 0.006 * 0.151 0.365 * 0.152 0.983 *
(0.026) (0.002) (0.100) (0.166) (0.548) (0.193)
Demographic Characteristics
Female
-0.130 0.089 0.113 -2.708 * -3.198 0.880 -1.620
(0.885) (0.071) (0.754) (1.059) (5.725) (1.436) (0.817)
Black
-1.226 0.054 3.303 * 3.301 * 2.041 -0.539 -2.232 *
(1.075) (0.092) (1.114) (1.262) (5.597) (1.090) (0.994)
Female*Black
1.715 -0.035 -4.118 * -3.132 * 6.003 -1.019 1.505
(1.697) (0.149) (1.330) (1.580) (8.096) (1.655) (1.150)
Age
-0.002 * 0.001 * -0.0003 0.004 * -0.003 -0.009 * -0.133 *
(0.000) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010)
Age2
-0.001 * 0.129 *
(0.0002) (0.011)
High School
0.029 -0.004 -0.016 -0.149 -0.220 0.053 -0.252 *
(0.024) (0.002) (0.082) (0.111) (0.375) (0.187) (0.075)
> High School
0.022 -0.004 -0.013 -0.076 -0.034 0.045 -0.182 *
(0.032) (0.003) (0.094) (0.129) (0.461) (0.210) (0.088)
College
0.012 -0.004 -0.109 -0.147 0.091 -0.155 -0.078
(0.036) (0.003) (0.100) (0.139) (0.505) (0.221) (0.095)
Graduate Degree
-0.063 -0.006 * -0.270 * -0.366 * 0.027 -0.226 0.167
(0.036) (0.003) (0.101) (0.147) (0.505) (0.230) (0.097)
Female*Education 0.020 -0.012 -0.127 0.091 0.405 -0.168 0.244 *
(in years)) (0.121) (0.010) (0.098) (0.143) (0.755) (0.190) (0.109)
Female*Education2
-0.005 0.004 0.044 -0.031 -0.140 0.066 -0.072
(0.040) (0.003) (0.032) (0.048) (0.252) (0.063) (0.036)
Black*Education
0.183 -0.009 -0.484 * -0.431 * 0.112 -0.032 0.399 *
(0.154) (0.013) (0.156) (0.176) (0.762) (0.151) (0.141)
Black*Education2
-0.065 0.003 0.168 * 0.141 * -0.054 0.036 -0.145 *
(0.054) (0.005) (0.054) (0.061) (0.263) (0.055) (0.050)
Female*Black -0.275 0.011 0.556 * 0.499 * -1.098 0.062 -0.322
*Education (0.239) (0.021) (0.187) (0.227) (1.099) (0.240) (0.162)
Female*Black 0.097 -0.006 -0.198 * -0.180 * 0.380 -0.019 0.120 *
*Education2 (0.083) (0.007) (0.065) (0.080) (0.378) (0.085) (0.057)
Occupational Controls
Professionals
-0.211 * -0.017 * 0.009 -0.119 -0.189 0.118 -0.265 *
(0.028) (0.002) (0.096) (0.205) (0.667) (0.207) (0.116)
Technicians
-0.501 * -0.016 * 0.068 -0.035 -0.449 -0.115 -0.422 *
(0.031) (0.003) (0.104) (0.214) (0.698) (0.225) (0.124)
Protective -0.447 * -0.003 0.879 * 1.076 * -0.840 0.152 -0.483 *
Service (0.032) (0.003) (0.122) (0.224) (0.751) (0.248) (0.128)
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Table F.5: Results with Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Relative to 5) Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Parapro- 0.055 * -0.003 0.230 0.351 0.024 0.884 * -0.177
fessional (0.039) (0.003) (0.142) (0.249) (0.776) (0.289) (0.158)
Office & -0.634 * -0.006 * -0.190 -0.273 -0.457 0.220 -0.545 *
Clerical (0.032) (0.003) (0.107) (0.217) (0.700) (0.232) (0.126)
Skilled Craft
-0.483 * -0.009 * 0.269 * 0.246 -0.215 0.104 -0.302 *
(0.032) (0.003) (0.110) (0.219) (0.710) (0.240) (0.128)
Service & -0.759 * 0.006 * 0.037 0.193 -0.777 -0.054 -0.569 *
Maintenance (0.035) (0.003) (0.120) (0.230) (0.740) (0.261) (0.136)
Tenure Controls
Tenure
0.073 -0.003 0.091 0.039 0.614 -0.178 0.050
(0.127) (0.011) (0.068) (0.113) (0.400) (0.117) (0.044)
Tenure2
-0.165 0.001 -0.063 -0.022 -0.448 0.097 -0.089
(0.169) (0.015) (0.058) (0.099) (0.352) (0.107) (0.056)
Female*Tenure
0.151 -0.023 0.032 0.271 -1.101 * -0.048 -0.060
(0.419) (0.034) (0.090) (0.160) (0.520) (0.128) (0.055)
Female*Tenure2
-0.056 0.012 -0.022 -0.212 0.888 0.079 0.098
(0.436) (0.036) (0.078) (0.141) (0.458) (0.128) (0.071)
Black*Tenure
0.610 -0.016 -0.234 -0.256 -0.847 0.221 -0.076
(0.514) (0.044) (0.142) (0.198) (0.529) (0.202) (0.078)
Black*Tenure2
-0.741 0.027 0.159 0.162 0.718 -0.245 0.017
(0.555) (0.047) (0.122) (0.173) (0.457) (0.203) (0.103)
Female*Black -0.857 0.002 0.224 0.005 1.162 0.141 0.100
*Tenure (0.797) (0.070) (0.179) (0.262) (0.718) (0.256) (0.101)
Female*Black 0.923 -0.006 -0.192 -0.019 -0.988 -0.027 -0.096
*Tenure2 (0.820) (0.071) (0.155) (0.231) (0.626) (0.259) (0.134)
Tenure*Education Controls
Education* -0.008 0.001
Tenure (0.017) (0.002)
Education* 0.023 -0.0004
Tenure2 (0.023) (0.002)
Education2* 0.003 -0.0003
Tenure (0.003) (0.001)
Education2* -0.008 0.0002
Tenure2 (0.008) (0.001)
Female*Educ* -0.024 0.002
Tenure (0.006) (0.057)
Female*Educ* 0.010 -0.0004
Tenure2 (0.060) (0.005)
Female*Educ2* 0.007 -0.001
Tenure (0.019) (0.002)
Female*Educ2* -0.002 -0.0001
Tenure2 (0.020) (0.002)
Black*Educ* -0.087 0.003
Tenure (0.073) (0.006)
Black*Educ* 0.102 -0.004
Tenure2 (0.079) (0.007)
Black*Educ2* 0.030 -0.001
Tenure (0.026) (0.002)
Black*Educ2* -0.034 0.002
Tenure2 (0.028) (0.002)
Female*Black* 0.123 -0.002
Educ*Tenure (0.112) (0.010)
Female*Black* -0.127 0.002
Educ*Tenure2 (0.116) (0.010)
Female*Black* -0.041 0.001
Educ2*Tenure (0.039) (0.003)
Female*Black* 0.041 -0.001
Educ2*Tenure2 (0.040) (0.004)
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Table F.5: Results with Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Relative to 5) Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Promotion Controls
Promoted Yet
0.157 * -0.001 -0.121 -0.075 0.347 0.003 0.159
(0.023) (0.002) (0.089) (0.148) (0.531) (0.093) (0.089)
Time Since -0.012 -0.001 0.008 -0.002 -0.203 -0.030
Promotion (0.007) (0.001) (0.026) (0.044) (0.164) (0.037)
Grade Change | -0.112 *
Promotiont−1 (0.031)
Female*Grade 4| 0.033
Promotiont−1 (0.032)
Black*Grade 4| 0.006
Promotiont−1 (0.045)
Female*Black*Grade 4| 0.017
Promotiont−1 (0.060)
Grade Change | -0.097 * -0.002 * -0.009 -0.080 -0.107 -0.271 *
Promotiont (0.006) (0.001) (0.025) (0.043) (0.158) (0.060)
Female*Grade 4| 0.005 0.001 -0.011 -0.089 0.113 0.002
Promotiont (0.007) (0.001) (0.027) (0.054) (0.151) (0.062)
Black*Grade 4| 0.012 -0.00001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.129 -0.351 *
Promotiont (0.010) (0.001) (0.042) (0.061) (0.224) (0.097)
Female*Black*Grade 4| -0.001 -0.001 -0.022 0.028 0.118 0.206
Promotiont (0.014) (0.001) (0.056) (0.088) (0.266) (0.134)
Evaluation Controls
Female* -0.003 0.001 0.146 * 0.404 * 0.722 *
Evaluationt−1 (0.011) (0.001) (0.051) (0.085) (0.270)
Black* -0.003 0.0002 0.294 * 0.441 * -0.072
Evaluationt−1 (0.015) (0.001) (0.085) (0.114) (0.308)
Female*Black* 0.023 -0.0002 -0.042 -0.113 -0.113
Evaluationt−1 (0.020) (0.002) (0.104) (0.145) (0.411)
Previous -0.015 0.003 * -0.826 * -1.395 * -1.348 *
Evaluations (0.008) (0.001) (0.034) (0.056) (0.193)
Female*Previous 0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.012 0.437 *
Evaluations (0.008) (0.001) (0.032) (0.060) (0.210)
Black*Previous 0.004 0.0001 0.005 -0.032 0.165
Evaluations (0.012) (0.001) (0.054) (0.078) (0.232)
Female*Black*Previous -0.0003 -0.002 0.007 0.038 -0.499
Evaluations (0.016) (0.001) (0.066) (0.100) (0.304)
Job Characteristics
Period 2
-0.025 0.014 * -2.728 * -4.238 * -3.960 * -0.035 0.118 *
(0.021) (0.002) (0.096) (0.136) (0.393) (0.101) (0.029)
Initial Grade
0.104 * 0.002 * -0.015 -0.048 * -0.012 -0.120 * 0.097 *
(0.003) (0.0002) (0.009) (0.014) (0.047) (0.016) (0.012)
Part-Time
0.275 * -0.105 * -0.352 * -0.897 * -0.091 -1.987 * 0.152
(0.025) (0.002) (0.097) (0.163) (0.487) (0.280) (0.083)
Year 2
-0.099
(0.068)
Year 3
-0.036 * -0.020 * -0.038 0.057 0.421 -0.189 -0.166 *
(0.019) (0.002) (0.082) (0.116) (0.394) (0.179) (0.065)
Year 4
0.050 0.010 * 0.030 0.201 * 0.282 -0.411 * -0.225 *
(0.020) (0.002) (0.078) (0.110) (0.387) (0.171) (0.064)
Year 5
-0.002 0.016 * 0.036 0.295 0.318 -0.049 -0.244 *
(0.018) (0.002) (0.076) (0.107) (0.383) (0.167) (0.064)
Year 6
-0.013 0.003 * 0.125 -0.050 0.073 -0.011 -0.201 *
(0.018) (0.002) (0.075) (0.107) (0.384) (0.163) (0.065)
Year 7
0.020 -0.008 * 0.037 -0.068 -0.064 0.168 -0.171 *
(0.018) (0.002) (0.074) (0.106) (0.383) (0.163) (0.065)
Year 8
0.021 0.009 * -0.018 -0.048 -0.002 -0.282 -0.397 *
(0.019) (0.002) (0.073) (0.106) (0.380) (0.164) (0.068)
Year 9
-0.031 0.001 0.050 0.091 0.132 -0.587 * -0.402 *
(0.019) (0.002) (0.073) (0.105) (0.381) (0.167) (0.071)
Year 10
-0.045 * -0.025 * 0.074 0.157 0.509 -0.315
(0.019) (0.002) (0.074) (0.106) (0.378) (0.166)
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Table F.5: Results with Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Relative to 5) Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Constant
-11.094 * 0.979 * 13.674 * 25.504 * 19.551 * -7.745 * 3.184 *
(0.264) (0.024) (0.711) (1.026) (4.186) (1.749) (1.017)
Exogenous Variables
Unemployment -0.002 -0.001 * -0.042 *
Rate (0.002) (0.0002) (0.010)
Vacancies
0.001 0.002 * -0.008 0.031 * 0.107 * 0.123 * 0.001
(0.003) (0.0002) (0.007) (0.011) (0.037) (0.015) (0.010)
ln(Private) 0.045 * -0.001 0.187 *
Wages (0.019) (0.002) (0.071)
Heterogeneity Coefficients
ρ
10.000 0.279 * -0.168 -0.280 -0.783 6.080 * 2.656 *
(10.00) (0.005) (0.201) (0.320) (1.250) (0.477) (0.139)
ω
10.000 0.398 * 0.440 * 0.005 -1.135 18.381 * 1.006 *
(10.00) (0.004) (0.134) (0.225) (0.817) (0.255) (0.215)
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Table F.6: Independent Equations with No Unobserved Heterogeneity
(Testing for Statistical Discrimination)
Grade Earnings Evaluation (Eval = 5 Excl.) Promotion Pr(Leave)
n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 62,057 n = 72,725
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Current Endogenous Variables
Salary 0.022 * 0.030 * 0.073 * -0.046 0.733 * -0.057 *
Grade (0.0002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.037) (0.011) (0.011)
ln(Annual Earnings)
-0.406 * -1.272 * -0.700 0.253 -0.274 *
(0.102) (0.134) (0.508) (0.139) (0.093)
Performance -0.122 * -0.321 *
Evaluation (0.027) (0.016)
Current -0.084
Promotion (0.092)
Lagged t− 1 Endogenous Variables
Salary Gradet−1
0.885 *
(0.004)
Salaryt−1
0.561 * 0.753 *
(0.042) (0.002)
Evaluationt−1
0.099 * 0.004 * -2.187 * -3.844 * -4.343
(0.014) (0.001) (0.038) (0.058) (0.200)
Promotedt−1
0.232 * 0.039 * 0.214 * 0.374 * 0.026 * 2.284 *
(0.048) (0.002) (0.100) (0.164) (0.547) (0.141)
Demographic Characteristics
Female
-0.247 0.051 0.130 -2.719 * -3.206 1.560 -1.735 *
(1.373) (0.081) (0.766) (1.051) (5.839) (0.987) (0.832)
Black
1.622 0.194 3.281 * 3.255 * 1.974 0.886 -2.168 *
(1.945) (0.104) (1.135) (1.301) (5.920) (0.972) (0.912)
Female*Black
-0.798 -0.166 -4.105 * -3.069 6.123 -4.970 * 1.458
(2.916) (0.167) (1.407) (1.716) (8.277) (0.990) (0.928)
Age
-0.008 * 0.001 * -0.0003 0.004 * -0.003 -0.016 * -0.128 *
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009)
Age2
-0.001 * 0.123 *
(0.0003) (0.011)
High School
0.181 * -0.002 -0.015 -0.150 -0.221 0.082 -0.194 *
(0.040) (0.002) (0.083) (0.112) (0.354) (0.138) (0.075)
> High School
0.242 * -0.001 -0.014 -0.078 -0.033 0.068 -0.090
(0.054) (0.003) (0.095) (0.130) (0.437) (0.155) (0.087)
College
0.282 * -0.002 -0.113 -0.152 0.088 -0.156 0.071
(0.060) (0.004) (0.101) (0.141) (0.474) (0.163) (0.093)
Graduate Degree
0.146 * -0.003 -0.275 * -0.374 * 0.019 -0.135 0.345 *
(0.059) (0.003) (0.103) (0.150) (0.487) (0.167) (0.095)
Female*Education 0.026 -0.008 -0.130 0.091 0.404 -0.219 0.239 *
(in years)) (0.187) (0.011) (0.100) (0.143) (0.771) (0.132) (0.111)
Female*Education2
-0.005 0.003 0.045 -0.031 -0.140 0.070 -0.069
(0.062) (0.004) (0.033) (0.048) (0.258) (0.044) (0.037)
Black*Education
-0.204 -0.027 -0.482 * -0.426 * 0.120 -0.239 0.370 *
(0.277) (0.015) (0.160) (0.182) (0.812) (0.131) (0.129)
Black*Education2
0.053 0.009 0.168 * 0.139 * -0.057 0.116 * -0.133 *
(0.097) (0.005) (0.055) (0.063) (0.282) (0.046) (0.045)
Female*Black* 0.083 0.029 0.555 * 0.492 * -1.110 0.688 * -0.300 *
Education (0.411) (0.023) (0.197) (0.245) (1.125) (0.150) (0.132)
Female*Black* -0.020 -0.012 -0.198 * -0.177 * 0.384 -0.245 * 0.110 *
Education2 (0.142) (0.008) (0.068) (0.085) (0.386) (0.054) (0.046)
Occupational Controls
Professionals
-0.581 * -0.019 * 0.010 -0.122 -0.208 0.188 -0.282 *
(0.044) (0.002) (0.099) (0.212) (0.517) (0.143) (0.119)
Technicians
-1.224 * -0.013 * 0.074 -0.039 -0.480 0.664 * -0.411 *
(0.047) (0.003) (0.108) (0.221) (0.542) (0.155) (0.126)
Protective -1.286 * -0.002 0.883 * 1.074 * -0.861 0.321 -0.479 *
Service (0.050) (0.003) (0.124) (0.229) (0.594) (0.168) (0.131)
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Table F.6: Results with No Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Parapro- -0.708 * -0.017 * 0.229 0.356 0.043 0.273 -0.248
fessional (0.063) (0.003) (0.144) (0.255) (0.642) (0.203) (0.159)
Office & -1.578 * 0.002 -0.181 -0.277 -0.491 1.025 * -0.517 *
Clerical (0.048) (0.003) (0.112) (0.225) (0.536) (0.159) (0.128)
Skilled Craft
-1.300 * -0.006 * 0.272 * 0.242 -0.239 0.409 * -0.299 *
(0.049) (0.003) (0.114) (0.226) (0.554) (0.165) (0.131)
Service & -2.027 * 0.018 * 0.043 0.190 -0.801 0.628 * -0.502 *
Maintenance (0.053) (0.003) (0.124) (0.237) (0.578) (0.182) (0.138)
Tenure Controls
Tenure 0.001 -0.012 0.091 0.039 0.619 -0.296 * -0.053
(in months) (0.217) (0.011) (0.068) (0.112) (0.396) (0.093) (0.042)
Tenure2
-0.032 0.022 -0.065 -0.021 -0.444 -0.155 -0.007
(0.289) (0.014) (0.056) (0.097) (0.352) (0.088) (0.055)
Female*Tenure
0.147 -0.016 0.032 0.272 -1.101 * 0.011 -0.033
(0.643) (0.038) (0.090) (0.160) (0.525) (0.102) (0.054)
Female*Tenure2
0.064 0.010 -0.021 -0.213 0.886 0.080 0.074
(0.677) (0.039) (0.079) (0.142) (0.461) (0.105) (0.071)
Black*Tenure
-0.436 -0.080 -0.234 -0.256 -0.845 0.103 -0.043
(0.929) (0.050) (0.147) (0.203) (0.514) (0.155) (0.077)
Black*Tenure2
0.261 0.097 0.159 0.162 0.714 -0.119 -0.012
(0.995) (0.052) (0.127) (0.177) (0.447) (0.159) (0.102)
Female*Black -0.048 0.067 0.225 0.005 1.155 0.083 0.092
*Tenure (1.350) (0.078) (0.185) (0.272) (0.676) (0.196) (0.099)
Female*Black* -0.010 -0.091 -0.193 -0.019 -0.981 0.001 -0.091
Tenure2 (1.384) (0.078) (0.160) (0.239) (0.586) (0.203) (0.131)
Tenure*Education Controls
Education* -0.008 0.002
Tenure (0.029) (0.002)
Education* 0.008 -0.004
Tenure2 (0.039) (0.002)
Education2* 0.005 -0.001
Tenure (0.009) (0.001)
Education2* -0.005 0.001
Tenure2 (0.013) (0.001)
Female*Educ* -0.019 0.002
Tenure (0.088) (0.005)
Female*Educ* -0.013 -0.0002
Tenure2 (0.093) (0.005)
Female*Educ2* 0.004 -0.0004
Tenure (0.029) (0.002)
Female*Educ2* 0.008 -0.0002
Tenure2 (0.031) (0.002)
Black*Educ* 0.043 0.010
Tenure (0.132) (0.007)
Black*Educ* -0.024 -0.013
Tenure2 (0.142) (0.008)
Black*Educ2* -0.007 -0.003
Tenure (0.046) (0.003)
Black*Educ2* 0.003 0.004
Tenure2 (0.050) (0.003)
Female*Black* 0.007 -0.010
Educ*Tenure (0.190) (0.011)
Female*Black* 0.008 0.013
Educ*Tenure2 (0.196) (0.011)
Female*Black* -0.003 0.004
Educ2*Tenure (0.066) (0.004)
Female*Black* -0.005 -0.005
Educ2*Tenure2 (0.068) (0.004)
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Table F.6: Results with No Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Promotion Controls
Promoted Yet
-0.348 * -0.049 * -0.167 -0.066 0.489 -2.396 * 0.039
(0.043) (0.002) (0.087) (0.146) (0.532) (0.075) (0.086)
Time Since 0.156 * 0.004 * 0.013 -0.002 -0.211 -0.028
Promotion (0.012) (0.001) (0.026) (0.044) (0.165) (0.037)
Grade Change | -0.003 -0.012 * -0.031 -0.086 * -0.075 -0.732 *
Promotiont−1 (0.012) (0.001) (0.026) (0.042) (0.147) (0.039)
Female*Grade 4| -0.030 * 0.001 -0.009 -0.086 0.124 -0.047
Promotiont−1 (0.013) (0.001) (0.027) (0.049) (0.149) (0.044)
Black*Grade 4| 0.015 0.0002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.128 -0.106
Promotiont−1 (0.019) (0.001) (0.042) (0.061) (0.214) (0.069)
Female*Black*Grade 4| 0.003 -0.001 -0.024 0.028 0.115 -0.045
Promotiont−1 (0.026) (0.001) (0.055) (0.084) (0.254) (0.095)
Grade Change | -0.029
Promotiont (0.033)
Female*Grade 4| 0.025
Promotiont (0.032)
Black*Grade 4| -0.001
Promotiont (0.045)
Female*Black*Grade 4| 0.026
Promotiont (0.059)
Evaluation Controls
Female* -0.016 0.002 * 0.148 * 0.407 * 0.727 *
Evaluationt−1 (0.020) (0.001) (0.051) (0.080) (0.260)
Black* 0.013 0.001 0.297 * 0.442 * -0.069
Evaluationt−1 (0.028) (0.001) (0.083) (0.111) (0.275)
Female*Black* 0.013 -0.001 -0.045 -0.115 -0.124
Evaluationt−1 (0.036) (0.002) (0.102) (0.141) (0.346)
Previous 0.011 0.004 * -0.826 * -1.394 * -1.344 *
Evaluations (0.015) (0.001) (0.033) (0.054) (0.199)
Female*Previous -0.0002 0.0005 -0.002 0.013 0.440 *
Evaluations (0.015) (0.001) (0.032) (0.059) (0.218)
Black*Previous -0.025 -0.0003 0.004 -0.031 0.166
Evaluations (0.023) (0.001) (0.055) (0.078) (0.232)
Female*Black*Previous 0.030 -0.001 0.008 0.037 -0.500
Evaluations (0.030) (0.002) (0.068) (0.103) (0.299)
Job Characteristics
Period 2
0.009 0.013 * -2.732 * -4.238 * -3.944 * -0.248 * 0.060 *
(0.040) (0.002) (0.095) (0.133) (0.383) (0.073) (0.028)
Initial Grade
0.013 * -0.011 * -0.023 * -0.043 * 0.029 -0.708 * 0.034 *
(0.004) (0.0001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.029) (0.008) (0.011)
Part-Time
-0.061 -0.142 * -0.354 * -0.899 * -0.099 -1.037 * 0.289 *
(0.045) (0.002) (0.098) (0.162) (0.462) (0.234) (0.081)
Year 2
-0.101
(0.068)
Year 3
-0.024 -0.020 * -0.038 0.055 0.414 -0.034 -0.169 *
(0.033) (0.002) (0.082) (0.118) (0.409) (0.113) (0.063)
Year 4
0.192 * 0.011 * 0.031 0.198 0.264 -0.024 -0.218 *
(0.031) (0.002) (0.078) (0.112) (0.386) (0.107) (0.063)
Year 5
0.055 0.015 * 0.034 0.293 * 0.310 -0.089 -0.238 *
(0.030) (0.002) (0.077) (0.111) (0.387) (0.106) (0.063)
Year 6
0.108 * 0.005 * 0.125 -0.052 0.059 0.111 -0.190 *
(0.030) (0.002) (0.075) (0.109) (0.372) (0.104) (0.063)
Year 7
0.116 * -0.008 * 0.035 -0.070 -0.075 0.088 -0.165 *
(0.030) (0.002) (0.075) (0.108) (0.382) (0.102) (0.064)
Year 8
0.149 * 0.010 * -0.019 -0.050 -0.010 -0.078 -0.388 *
(0.030) (0.002) (0.075) (0.109) (0.376) (0.103) (0.067)
Year 9
-0.011 0.0002 0.044 0.087 0.126 -0.588 * -0.397 *
(0.031) (0.002) (0.074) (0.108) (0.361) (0.107) (0.071)
Year 10
0.007 -0.024 * 0.069 0.152 0.499 -0.224 *
(0.032) (0.002) (0.075) (0.109) (0.365) (0.105)
Continued on the next page
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Table F.6: Results with No Unobserved Heterogeneity, cont.
Grade Earnings Evaluation Promoted Pr(Leave)
Eval = 4 Eval = 3 Eval = 1-2
Constant
1.908 * 1.771 * 13.869 * 25.490 * 19.036 * -6.217 * 5.450 *
(0.437) (0.021) (0.787) (1.005) (4.185) (1.012) (0.993)
Exogenous Variables
Unemployment -0.008 * -0.001 * -0.040 *
Rate (0.004) (0.0002) (0.009)
Vacancies
0.054 * 0.003 * -0.007 0.032 * 0.107 * 0.114 * 0.003
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.007) (0.011) (0.032) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(Private) -0.009 -0.003 * 0.174 *
Wages (0.033) (0.002) (0.071)
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Appendix G: Additional Data Tables
Table G.1: Promotion Rates within EEO Category
No Change Promoted
Officials and Administrators 86.51% 13.49%
Professionals 89.52% 10.48%
Technicians 90.07% 9.93%
Protective Service 95.89% 4.11%
Paraprofessionals 90.05% 9.95%
Office and Clerical 90.51% 9.49%
Skilled Craft 92.00% 8.00%
Service and Maintenance 95.32% 4.68%
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Table G.2: 2003 Salary Grade Schedule
Grade Min Max Grade Min Max Grade Min Max
50 20,112 23,461 66 28,888 43,460 82 56,499 90,211
51 20,112 24,314 67 30,045 45,462 83 59,188 94,612
52 20,112 25,213 68 31,204 47,586 84 61,967 99,182
53 20,112 26,112 69 32,432 49,755 85 64,866 103,952
54 20,112 27,081 70 33,790 52,065 86 67,885 108,986
55 20,112 28,039 71 35,134 54,430 87 71,084 114,278
56 20,268 29,128 72 36,521 56,911 88 74,507 119,787
57 20,955 30,276 73 37,994 59,557 89 77,990 125,571
58 21,656 31,453 74 39,623 62,372 90 81,664 131,697
59 22,426 32,689 75 41,366 65,282 91 85,536 138,161
60 23,227 34,030 76 43,157 68,344 92 89,720 144,917
61 24,101 35,412 77 45,185 71,545 93 94,066 152,041
62 24,958 36,812 78 47,232 74,945 94 98,580 159,488
63 25,886 38,297 79 49,428 78,499 95 103,347 167,352
64 26,830 39,902 80 51,686 82,179 96 108,355 175,600
65 27,818 41,639 81 54,076 86,055
Table G.3: Salary grades within EEO category
Year
Officials and Profes-
Technicians
Protective Paraprofes- Office and Skilled Service
Admin. sionals Service sionals Clerical Craft Maintenance
1994 53-90 50-90 53-82 50-76 56-65 50-77 50-77 50-74
1995 57-90 54-88 54-82 50-76 56-69 50-77 50-77 50-73
1996 57-90 50-88 54-82 50-77 54-69 50-80 50-77 50-73
1997 54-90 51-88 52-82 50-77 56-69 50-80 50-75 50-73
1998 57-90 50-88 50-82 50-77 56-69 50-80 50-77 50-70
1999 50-90 53-88 50-85 50-77 56-70 50-82 50-77 50-73
2000 65-91 50-88 52-85 50-77 56-70 50-82 50-77 50-73
2001 65-90 50-88 51-85 50-77 56-69 50-82 50-77 50-73
2002 58-90 50-92 52-85 50-77 55-69 50-80 50-77 50-73
2003 64-90 53-92 50-85 50-78 56-69 50-80 50-77 50-73
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